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Abstract 
Most linguists acknowledge, explicitly or impli- 
citly, the relevance of epistemological questions in 
linguistics but relatively few have given more than a 
cursory, ad hoc or incomplete consideration to them. 
The work of one of those few, Jan Mulder, forms the 
starting point for much of the present discussion. 
Epistemological considerations arise in many contexts 
in linguistics and in many guises. It is an episte- 
mological matter whenever we test the adequacy of a 
description or the acceptability of a theory. Episte- 
mological considerations are latent whenever we dis- 
cuss the form or the content of linguistic theories 
and descriptions or their interrelations. The com- 
parison of different approaches to linguistics inevi- 
tably raises epistemological questions concerning our 
approach to linguistics or our presuppositions aboutit. 
These questions are of a general nature and transcend 
questions about particular linguistic theories and 
des- 
criptions. These epistemological questions force us 
to 
consider what we take linguistics to be. In considering 
questions of the type mentioned we are forced, for 
example, to analyse what we mean by a "linguistic 
theory", a "linguistic description" and what pheno- 
mena we are aiming to understand. We are, further- 
more, forced to analyse the constraints whicý.. a sci- 
entific attitude places upon linguistic theorising 
and description-building. It is these questions con- 
cerning the acceptability of linguistic theories and 
descriptions which we call linguistic meta-theory. 
This thesis falls into five main parts. Firstly, 
in Chapter One, we consider the nature and scope of 
linguistic meta-theory. Secondly, in Chapter Two, we 
look at a number of previous approaches to the subject. 
Other important contributions are discussed as they 
arise in the text. Thirdly, in Chapters Three and 
Four, we consider in detail the major meta-theoretical 
distinctions in linguistics and their consequences. 
In particular, we distinguish linguistic theories 
from linguistic descriptions and discuss the nature of 
linguistic phenomena. The view is put forward that 
linguistics is a scientific sub-,, ect. The meaning of 
this assertion is analysed and the interrelations of 
linguistic theories, descriptions and phenomena are 
considered in the light of this analysis. The main 
epistemological requirement that is put forward and 
defended is that of the empiricism of linguistics. 
Certain changes in our view of the philosophy of sci- 
ence and in our view of the form of linguistic theo- 
ries and descriptions follow from the conjunction of 
these major meta-theoretical positions. 
Fourthly, we consider the main meta-theoretical 
considerations concerning theories (Chapter Five) and 
reject a widespread view of linguistic theory as a 
non-empirical study (Chapter Six) and we consider the 
main meta-theoretical conditions relating to linguistic 
descriptions and some practical examples of description 
-building consonant with the general positions adopted 
in Chapter Seven. In Chapter Eight, we look at a con- 
crete example of theory-building in the light of the 
meta-theoretical conditions of acceptability previously 
set up. We are especially concerned to show how a 
theory can meet the condition of being "applicable" or 
"indirectly scientific" through the establishment of 
acceptable empirical descriptions consonant with the 
meta-theoretical conditions on descriptions considered 
earlier. 
The view that linguistics is a science implies 
that we must be concerned with the empirical testing of 
descriptions and, so, the fifth part of the wcrk is 
devoted to methodology. In Chapter Nine, we defend 
the role and necessity of methodology in linguistics. 
and set up the logical framework of relations between 
the methodology and theory descriptions and phenomena. 
In Chapter Ten, we examine two of the known types of 
empirical testing and their shortcomings. Finally, in 
Chapter Eleven, we give an example of the successful 
and correct application of a methodology in order to 
bring out the nature of empirical testing and to demon- 
strate its feasibility within a scientific linguistics 
of the sort we imagine. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PRELIMINARIES TO LINGUISTIC META-THEORY 
-1- 
a. The function of linguistic theories and descriptions 
In any subject or thesis there will probably be 
found one or more "fundamental questions" which it is 
the aim of the study to investigate. The value of any 
study will be largely determined, therefore, by the 
exactness and usefulness of the formulation of these 
questions. In linguistics the fundamental questions 
have often been formulated as "what is language 9.11, 
"what is communication ? 11 or some such. These questions 
will lead nowhere, if "language" or "communication" are 
considered as given objects of investigation or if 
they remain no more than intuitive concepts to be 
rendered comprehensible by "explicating" them. Rather, 
one should be concerned to develop a conception of, say, 
language as a consequence of a self-contained theory. 
One can then test the applicability of the theory and 
of the theory of language contained therein. We expli- 
citly assert that language is a conceptual model which 
we build ; it is neither an intuitive concept to "expli- 
catell nor a pre-existant thi - to 
investigate. 
Chomsky,.. by contrast, has maintained that, in 
setting up a grammar of English, "we assume intuitive 
knowledge of the grammatical senteces of English" 
1* 
and that "we thus face a familiar task of explication 
*The footnotes are placed at the end of each chapter. 
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of some intuitive concept - in this case the concept 
"grammatical in English" and, more generally, the con- 
1 
cept "grammatical"" . It would seem, on this showing, 
that linguistics, as Chomsky sees it, is concerned 
with the "explication" of certain familiar and intui- 
tive concepts. However, it is simply a non-sequitur 
to suggest that the assumption of an intuitive know- 
ledge of the set of grammatical sentences of a language 
(if, indeed, this can be assumed) implies that one is 
aiming to explicate an intuitive concept. Of course, 
one might wish to attempt tome explanation of the lin- 
guistic intuitions which speakers seem to possess, but 
it does not follow from the fact that one uses certain 
data drawn from intuition that one is necessarily con- 
cerned with the intuitions involved, rather than, say, 
the development of a grammatical model of the sentences 
about which intuitions are held. There is no reason to 
a33ume that the development Of 3Uch a model would be 
identical with the development of the explication of 
speakers' intuitions. In fact, the unlikelihood of 
this identity places the burden of proof onto those 
who claim that a linguistic model is both a linguistic 
and a psychological model. Nor is there any reason to 
assume that the existence of grammatical intuitions 
implies the existence of some concept of "the gramma- 
tical" other than that which is created by the linguist 
to explain not intuitions about sentences but the sen- 
tences themselves. That is, there is no necessary 
-3- 
correlation between a grammatical model and linguistic 
intuitions. 
From my point of view the explication of "familiar 
concep s it is of no interest to any scientific sutject, i. e., 
in general , one concerned with the acquisition. of k, '-,, iow- 
ledgeabout the world that may be shared with others and 
which is empirically testable in confrontation with 
intersubjectively agreed phenomena. Although it may 
have a place in conceptual analysis, the approach 
apparently advocated by ChOM3ky has no place in the 
epistemology of the sciences (including linguistics), 
2 
as I see it . 
Generally speaking, we may assert that science 
recognises an explanandum only when there is general 
consent about the existence and certain properties of 
(some set of) observables. One can only observe that 
"intuitive concepts" scarcely constitute observables 
and that, although intuitive reports about sentences 
may serve as data for something, there is no reason to 
think that they serve as data about familiar concepts 
of the grammatical. In fact, there is nothing to sug- 
gest that the explication of such a concept would 
be 
of value to linguistics. l(by'contrast witt tne expli- 
ý; ation of a theory of grammar, i. e. 
týie establishment 
of a concept of grammar, which would be of value). 
The exploration of familiar concepts is then no part of 
linguistics as I conceive it, although it may have a 
place in certain branches of psychology or philosophy. 
The situation is even more confused when we approach 
the "familiar concept" of language. The existence of 
familiar concepts of language or "the grammaticaý171 is 
as irrelevant and as harmful to linguistics as the 
existence of certain familiar prejudices about langLugge 
and grammar. (I. n fact, it is sometimes difficult, 
to say the least, to tell the familiar concepts from 
the familiar prejudices - e. g. in the contention that 
each "sentence" must be analysed in terms of a "subject" 
and a "predicate". ) Unless one considers it to be the 
task of linguistics to explore "familiar concepts", 
there is no reason to think that some familiar concept 
of, say, language has anything to do with linguistics at 
all. One may as well maintain that the familiar concept 
of Heat must be treated as one of the explananda of 
physics. The mere existence of familiar concepts does 
not imply either their validity or their usefulness. 
The explication of familiar concepts is often nothing 
more than the gross hypostatization of the intuitive, 
for nothing is easier than the establishment of one's 
intuitions as reflections of reality. 
Slightly different is the contention of Shaumjan that, 
"Although the definitions of concepts are in them- 
-5- 
selves arbitrary, we can regard any definition of a 
concept as a statement which possesses an explanatory 
function. In this case, the the definition of the 
concept answers the 
? it x....... since the 
based on the formul 
require on the part 
into some sphere of 
question, "what is the nature of 
definitions of concepts which are 
a, "what is the nature of x ? ", 
of the scholar a deep penetration 
reality and are at the same time 
formulated not in the form of single, isolated state- 
ments but in the form of an entire system of state- 
ments, such definitions can be called "theories" 
as well .,, 
3 
Shaumjan goes on to take as an example the defi- 
nition of the phoneme. In the case of the phoneme, the 
theoretician is required, according to Shaumjan, to 
find "which definition of the phoneme based on the 
formula, "what is the nature of x ? ", i. e. which pho- 
neme theory, reflects most closely the linguistic re- 
ality. " 
4 
It is clear that this position is somewhat 
confused. One would agree that, if the definitions 
of concepts within a theory are abitrary, then the 
stated definitions constitute explanations of the mea- 
ning or use of the terms ("concepts") in question. In 
this sense only can one speak meaningfully in the sci- 
ences, of "explicating a concept", i. e. by defining it 
(and by deriving the consequences of defining it in the 
way chosen). However, it is not at all clear that 
such definitions do answer the question, "what is the 
-6-- 
nature of x ? ". Alternatively, if the definitions of 
concepts do answer questions of this form, it is not 
at all clear why one should call the definitions 
"arbitrary", since in such a case one would be defi- 
ning objects and not concepts. 
Still more controversial is the claim that the 
theoretician must find that definition of a concept 
which most closely resembles "linguistic reality". 
In the first place, one should point out that, if 
the definition of a concept, e. g. the definition of 
the concept "phoneme", does give an arbitrary answer 
to the question, "what is the nature of x ? ", then 
the definition in question supplies us with an explana- 
tion of the nature of the concept (as it is used in 
the theory) ; it cannot be said to constitute a defi- 
nition of some external reality, an object, unless, 
of course, it is maintained that the concept in question, 
e. g. "phoneme", corresponds to, or is the concept of, 
some external reality. If this last condition were 
met, one could indeed require the linguist to find the 
"best definition" by means of some "deep penetration" 
into "linguistic reality". The trouble is, however, that 
there is no reason to think that this "linguistic re- 
ality" exists outside the linguist's own skull ; that 
is, 
the phoneme and other theoretical objects of linguistics 
belong to our conceptual world. 
-7- 
One should be careful to note that our argument 
does not imply that no linguistic reality exists. 
Our argument implies that, if the linguist wishes to 
"penetrate" lingui3tic reality, he MU3t fir3t 3how 
us what this reality is. This a linguist cannot do 
by retreating into artificial systems of definitions. 
The difficulty with Shaumjan's position is that 
much more evident when we remember that it is precisely 
with theoretical terms that he is concerned. Whilst 
the ontological status of particular phonemes might 
be a matter of dispute, it would seem beyond serious 
question that the intension of the class of phonemes 
("the phoneme concept") is a theoretical abstractioný 
That is to say that the search for the nature of some 
external reality by means of the definition of a 
theoretical concept is an inherently pointless exercise, 
unless one has reason to believe in the existence of 
the "reality" in question as an entity outside one's 
theoretical conception. The reason why such a course 
would be pointless is that, unless the above condition 
is met, one is not defining a reality at all and, hence, 
one is not supplying a definition of the nature of x, 
because there is no x, the nature of which can be defined. 
The step of giving reasons for a belief in the existence 
of "the phoneme" outside the theory is precisely what 
is 
missing from Shaumjan's account. The confusion 
is 
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particularly clear in Shaumjan's. case because he ex- 
plicitly asserts that the definitions of theoretical 
concepts are arbitrary. Since a theoretical concept 
(i. e. presumably a name of a concept for Shaumjan) 
stands in a relation of equivalence to its definition 
(a definition of x must state the necessary and suffi- 
cient conditions of x), it follows that the theoretical 
concept is arbitrary also. If this is so, then 'I -, 
it is self-contradictory to maintain that the concept 
in question is the concept of a linguistic reality, 
since this would imply that the concept in question 
was both arbitrarily selected as a theoretical function 
appropriate for a certain descriptive task and that it 
was not arbitrary, since the concept reflects lingui- 
stic reality. 
If the above condition were met and a. given theore- 
tical concept were to correspond to a given linguistic 
reality, it would be entirely clear that the definition 
of the concept could be achieved through a study of 
a given set of phenomena ; it would be difficult to see 
under such circumstances how the definition could be 
arbitrary. In any case, it is dubious whether such a 
case could occur, without gross hypostatization, when 
we take into consideration the nature of theoretical 
concepts as inherently abstract entities (intensions of 
classes, types of relations, etc. ). The main point is 
that the explanation of a theoretical concept is not the 
-9- 
same thing as the explanation of a-reality, except 
insofar as a concept can itself be considered as a 
reality worthy of scientific investigation. Rather, 
the theoretical concept may be applied in the explana- 
tion of some sphere of observable reality. That is 
to say that a scientific linguistics should distinguish 
between its conceptual apparatus, in terms of which 
one attempts to comprehend phenomena, and the pheno- 
mena theM3elve3. 
It would be a mistake to think that the conceptual 
apparatus embodied in a theory gave us an account of 
the nature of empirical objects, such as the "phoneme" 
or the "sign" or of empirical relations, e. g. "is in 
construction with", etc., existing independently of 
the theory. The phenomena of speech may be modelled 
in terms of such objects and relations. Claims about the, 
e. g. psychological, existence of particular objects 
or relations in particular languages (e. g. /b/, the 
sign "weather", the constructional relation "prenomi- 
nal - noun" in "hatstand", all in English) require 
additional, independent and different (i. e. psycholo- 
gical) support. However, even if such support were 
forthcoming, it would not allow us to say that theoreti- 
cal objects and relations correspond tc empirical re- 
alities, although one could say that such theoretical 
objects and relations were the intensions of (sets of) 
-10- 
real objects and relations. As we shall see later, it 
is important to maintain a distinction between theories 
and the applications or instantiations of theories in 
the description of particular sets of phenomena. 
Related to this distinction is another concerning 
the phenomena. The phenomena with which the linguistic 
sciences are principally concerned, i. e. the phenomena 
6 
of speech communication, must be capable of being con- 
sidered both as entities existing in space and time 
independently of any theoretical apparatus and as 
independently existing entities capable of satisfying 
the arbitrary functions of some theory and in their 
capacity of satisfying those functions. That is, we 
distinguish phenomena per se from phenomena as modelled. 
in other words, we distinguish simple, relatively 
unclassified observables (e. g. the sum total of all 
phonetically recordable speech events in English) from 
observables classified with respect to a given theore- 
tical function (e. g. the sets of phonetic events which 
are classified as exponents of phonemes, distinctive 
features, phonotagms, etc. ). Subclasses of observables, 
when classified, constitute the empirical interpreta- 
tions of descriptive objects, such as the phoneme /b/ 
or the distinctive feature /labial/ in English, pro- 
vided that the observables in question meet the conditions 
of the theoretical functions ("is a phoneme", "is a 
distinctive feature", etc. ) concerned. The fact is that 
descriptive-objects such as /b/ and /labial/ in English 
have large doses of arbitrary theory in them and the 
fact that descriptive objects, such as /b/ and /labial/, 
may be assigned an empirical interpretation or may 
correspond to sets of phenomena as modelled does not 
imply the existence of any real object outside the 
classification. This is why independent evidence would 
be required to demonstrate the existence of the 
psychological reality of phonemes (or other objects). 
One would need to demonstrate the existence of psycho- 
logical correlates for linguistic descriptive objects. 
Linguistic evidence alone is not sufficient to demon- 
strate the psychological reality of linguistic objects. 
It should now be clear that the prod,. iction of such 
evidence would not affect the status of theoretical 
objects such as the "phoneme", which remain arbitrarily 
selected theoretical functions with descriptive (classi- 
ficatory) application. 
The distinction between phenomena per se and pheno- 
mena as modelled (see below for further discussion) is 
introduced in order that, in the first place, linguistics 
be not vacuous, i. e. it must deal with existing inter- 
subjectively agreed phenomena and, in the second place, 
in order that the subclass of phenomena relevant to 
linguistics may be distinguished from the class of all 
phenomena. In the third place, clearly, empirical models 
must be empirically interpretable. It is important that 
linguistic theories be applicable in the description of 
-12- 
phenomena which are linguistically describable. That 
is, the set of phenomena per se relevant to linguistics 
should be independently chosen and should not be confused 
with that set of phenomena which happens to satisfy or 
be modelled by some particular theory. This is a question 
of determining the scope of relevance of theories of 
linguistic communication 
7 
on the one hand and of deter- 
mining what sort of facts any linguistic theory might be 
expected to account for on the other hand. Each theory 
determines its own scope of relevance. In "functional- 
ist" approaches to linguistics, for instance, the 
criteria of relevance are the "functional principle 118 
and the "double articulation" doctrine. However, one 
should not be misled into thinking that a theory can 
afford to ignore phenomena which fall outside its 
determined scope. Functionalist theories have been 
extended to cope with communicational phenomena falling 
outside the double articulation and the functional 
principle. Notably, it has been necessary to provide 
components of functionalist theory concerned with pro- 
sodic phenomena, facts of variance and semantic phenomena. 
This would be a case where agreement over sets of phenomena 
per se has led to extensions and revisions of an existing 
theory - that is, changes in the scope of the 
theory. 
Modern functionalist theories are now capable of coping 
with, at least, phenomena of variance and prosody, 
i. e. 
-13- 
the set of phenomena capable of being modelled has 
increased. In fact, changes in the theory were necessary 
in order to deal with, for example, variance. As is 
fairly well known, it is not possible to regard the 
second articulation as operating directly on the 
signifiants of signs, if the signifiant is itself a 
class of allomorphs. This leads to a more radical 
distinction between the first and second articulations. 
The point of this discussion is, then, that there 
may be a conflict between the scope of relevance which 
a theory determines for itself and the set of phenomena 
which the theory might be expected to account for. In 
any such conflict the theory-determined scope of rele- 
vance must always be the loser, if there is sufficient 
evidence that (a) the theory should be capable of des- 
cribing the phenomena in question and (b) that the 
theory currently cannot describe those phenomena. One 
such area confronting many varieties of functionalist 
linguistics is the question of the factors involved in 
relating observed sentences in texts to the grammatical 
analogues of sentences set up in the grammar. 
in English such as, for example, 
(1) They never leave, do they ? 
You are, aren't you ? 
You want to marry my daughter, do you ? 
John won't, won't he ? 
Sentences 
are all well attested and are incapable of being related 
-14- 
to many known grammatical models in any obvious way. 
The factors determining the form and usage of such 
sentences are as yet unexplained in many functionalist 
accounts (and other treatments) because there is no 
theoretically justified way of. accommodating the ob- 
served features of these sentences while relating them 
to grammatical models. The outstanding features are 
the following. Firstly, the sentences fall into two 
categories of question from the point of view of usage : 
those where the speaker seeks to confirm or to gain 
acceptance of his own supposition (1 and 2) and those 
where the speaker (rhetorically) seeks confirmation 
of new information from a third party or his interlocu- 
tor (3 and 4). In the first case (1 and 2) the occur- 
rence of a negative "tag" clause depends on the occur- 
rence of a P03itive main claU3e and, conver3ely, the 
occurrence of a positive "tag" clause depends on the 
occurrence of a negative main clause. In the second 
case (3 and 4) both the main clause and the tag are 
positive or both are negative. The second outstanding 
feature is that in both of the categories considered 
the auxili-ary verb of the tag (whether a "do" pro-verb, 
part of an aspectual verb or a modal) must be identical 
with the first verb (main or auxiliary) of the main 
clause. There must also be identity of subject between 
the two clauses (the tag clause subject being normally 
-15- 
a pronoun). These remarks hold true both when the 
main clause is non-elliptical (1 and 3) and when it 
is elliptical (2 and 4). 
It is dubious whether many approaches can handle 
these facts. The question of the usage of this type 
of sentence is not a purely grammatical matter. Nor 
it is it a purely semantic matter. Buhler would have 
said the difference in usage depended upon the 
communicative role of the speaker. Sentences 1 and 2 
would be used by the speaker when his role was pre- 
dominantly one of appeal to the speaker (,, Appellfunk- 
tion") and 3 and 4 would be used when the expressive 
function was dominant (,, Ausdrucksfunktion"). However 
that may be, most approaches have no theoretically 
justified means of explaining the usage of these sen- 
tences. 
The question of the form of the tag clause is, 
however, a purely grammatical matter. Since most 
approaches do not have a theoretically justified mechan- 
ism for determining the first verb in a construction, 
it is dubious whether the above grammatical observations 
can be handled either. One must remember also that 
there is usually no theoretically justified way of 
handling grammatical relations between such construction- 
ally distant objects as subordinate auxillaries and 
auxillaries or pro-verbs in different clauses or the 
-16- 
subjects of different clauses. Obviously, any rigidly 
or uniquely immediate-constituent approach could not 
handle these data but it is also probable that most 
dependency approaches would have difficulty as well. 
Even in a dependency approach there would be serious 
difficulties involved in setting up 'ependency relations 
(presumably occurrence dependency relations) between 
objects that are often very loosely grammatically re- 
lated as when a modal or aspectual verb in a tag clause 
is occurrence dependent on a subordinate modal or aspectual 
verb in a main clause. Even worse would be the case 
where the occurrence of a negative "not" is occurrence 
dependent on the non-occurrence of a subordinate nega- 
tive in the main clause. Incidentally, the negation 
may not even come in the nucleus of the main clause, 
as in, for example, 
They will give you no credit at that bank, will 
they ? 
Here the occurrence of "no", which is a subordinate 
element of the direct object (itself subordinate to the 
verbal nucleus), excludes the possibility of a negative 
tag. 
Here is not the place to go into all the details 
of this problem or to offer a solution in the case 
of a particular linguistic theory. Suffice it to say 
that even a number of depena-ency approaches would need 
modification in order to handle the sort of phenomena 
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we have been. discussing. Any such modification, 
probably involving the notion of dependency and the 
scope of dependency relations, would arise as a result 
of an effort to enrich a theory which was previously 
too poor to accommodate the relevant facts. The main 
point here is that in such a case as this the scope 
of the theory must be enlarged because of a pressing 
need to accommodate bona fide observations about speech 
phenomena. The established scope of the theory cannot 
lead us to ignore or exclude speech phenomena. 
However this atay be, no theory can be said to 
have any scope at all, unless there exist explicit 
means of modelling phenomena using the functions of 
the theory. That is, we can never arrive at pheno- 
mena as modelled , unless the functions of the theory 
are explicit and capable of being satisfied by the 
phenomena under consideration. One way of achieving 
this is to stipulate that all linguistic descriptions 
constructed using a certain theory be set up in such 
a way that all statements within them be related 
directly or ultimately to classes of "protocol state- 
mentsf? 
9. Such "protocol statements" simply record the 
occurrence of particular events from a particular point 
of view. For instance, the occurrence of a speech 
event may be recorded and given an initial phonetic 
classification, e. g. "Epl' occurred in speech phenomena 
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at time T in place P". Protocol statements connect 
a description to observed events and provide a way of 
giving a description an empirical interpretation. 
Such a protocol of a speech phenomenon is the record 
of an independently existing event in its capacity of 
satisfying some arbitrarily selected function of the 
theory so long as the theory in question contains the 
notion "phonetic form" as a means of classifying speech 
events by means of phonetic description 
10 (this is 
the force of the square brackets). Protocol statements 
are, of course, a highly idealised way of establishing 
intersubjective agreement about phenomena, although 
a transcript of a field recording is in fact just such 
a (set of) protocol statements. 
It is highly important to note the "theory-laden" 
nature of the apparently simple notion of phenomena ; 
without the connection with some appropriate theoretical 
notion in a protocol (or otherwise implicit), it wobld 
be impossible to show that the recorded event was in 
any way relevant to any linguistic description or theory. 
The notion of phenomena as modelled is clearly heavily 
theory-laden. But it is also true that what we recog- 
nise as independently existing phenomena per se 
is not 
established without theoretical considerations. 
Firstly, 
phenomena per se must be relevant to the investigation 
at hand (ultimately to some theory) and, secondly, 
they must be recordable or quantifiable (in a way which 
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allows them to be connected to theoretical considerations. 
(Often, incidentally, there is great difficulty in 
finding genuinely independent phenomena in support 
of a linguistic argument constructed with reference 
to da ta .)11 
From the present point of view one can think of 
the function of a linguistic theory as being to enable 
the linguist to establish conceptual mo., 'els which will 
account for independent, empirical phenomena. That is, 
one may view linguistic theory as a self-contained 
analytical basis which, in Hjelmslevian terms, "a pour 
but dle"laborer un procede' au moyen duquel on puisse 
12 de'crire .... des objets donne*s dlune nature supposeell. 
Such an analytical basis will necessarily adopt a parti- 
cular point of view 
13 
with regard to the description of 
phenomena through its "rigid selection of functions 
1114 as necessary and sufficient for unambiguous description , 
as Uldall puts it. Self-evidently, a homogeneous theory 
of the sort described will be developed in response to 
some "fundamental question". In order to avoid the 
difficulties outlined above, in linguistics/semiotics 
this question may be formulated as follows. "What are 
the both sufficient and necessary conditions for com- 
municational systems ?I, 11015 Dhe should note that, if this 
formulation is accepted, then linguistics would fall 
within the wider study of semiotics, as was foreseen by 
Saussure, when he says, 'Ila ta*che du linguiste est 
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de d4finir ce qui fait de la langue un systeme special 
I 
16 dans l1ensemble des faits semiologiques". Axiomatic 
Functionalism and Glossematics offer solutions to this 
problem. On the Hjelmslevian view, which we shall adopt here, 
Shaumjan (above), in attempting to set up an arbitrary 
but appropriate linguistic theory with an "existence 
postulate", is merely trying to have his theoretical 
cake and eat it, i. e. have a "glossematic" view of 
linguistic theory and yet maintain the position, impossible 
under the glossematic approach, that linguistic theory 
and the functions which it contains correspond to some 
supposed linguistic reality. 
The question which we have suggested as the starting 
point for the development of a linguistic theory is 
prior to the question, "how is communication achieved in 
language, L ? ". If L is a communication system, then it 
must satisfy the conditions proposed in answer to the 
above ("fundamental") question. The development of a 
general theory of communication systems is, therefore, 
logically prior to linguistic description, i. e. the 
description of a set of conventions as necessary for 
communication in some particular L (a description of 
how communication is achieved in L). On the other hand, 
any proposed theoretical construction will be adequate, only 
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if the proposed theory allows us to answer the question, 
"how is communication achieved in L 6,: ý any other com- 
munication system ? ". That is to say that the theory 
will not be accepted unless applicable in linguistic 
description, i. e. the adequate description of particular 
semiotic systems as a necessary condition of the 
acceptability of a theory containing proposed conditions 
as necessary and sufficient for communication. The 
possibility of the adequate description of any parti- 
cular semiotic system is, however, a both sufficient 
and necessary condition of the applicabi-I'Vity of such a 
17 theory. We consider the conditions under which a 
description will be considered adequate below). It 
follows that the acceptability of a linguistic-theory 
implies the applicability of that theory in the construc- 
tion of linguistic descriptions. I. e. if the accep- 
tability of a theory, T, implies that the adequate 
In4 
descriptions, D ....... yD , may be constructed _n 
accordance with that theory and the adequacy of D .., D 
is equivalent to the applicability of T (the adequacy 
of D1...... Dn is equivalent to showing that T is suited 
to its purpose), then the acceptability of T implies 
the applicability of T (applicability is a necessary 
condition of the acceptability of a theory. ) As we 
shall see the acceptability of a theory involves many 
other factors as well. In this sense linguistic theory 
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entails the potential for adequate linguistic descrip- 
tion ; the development of a linguistic theory as an 
analytical basis implies the possibility of the adequate 
description of particular communicational phenomena by 
making use of that theory (whereas the existence of 
a linguistic description implies the existence of some 
theory of linguistic structure). 
It is in this way that the theoretical and empirical 
interests of linguistics are, in the first place, bound 
together, viz. through the notions of acceptability 
and applicability. Linguistic meta-theory, as it is 
understood here, is mainly concerned with the investi- 
gation of what it is for linguistic theories and des- 
criptions to be acceptable and for linguistic theories 
to be applicable. The importance of linguistic meta- 
theory is then that it raises such questions as the 
nature and structure of linguistic theories and des- 
criptions, their mutual relations, the nature of 
"adequacy" and empiricism in linguistics, the relations 
of theories and descriptions to phenomena, their place in 
the conceptual world and the relation of linguistics to 
the philosophy of science. 
One should note that we speak here of "accepta- 
bility" and not of "validity" in the context of an 
arbitrary theory which is introduced in order to allow 
the adequate and appropriate description of phenomena. 
We could never speak of the "truth" or "validity" 
(other 
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than in a purely formal sense) of such a system, because 
it is arbitrarily introduced. We can find only necessary 
conditions for the acceptability of a theory as a 
useful tool in description and, hence, as a theory 
of language ; we could never find a sufficient condition 
of the validity of the theory. From this point of view 
there is a serious lacuna in Hjelmslev's exposition of 
of the epistemological foundations of linguistics. He 
.f writes, "il semble legitime en tous cas de poser a priori 
11hypothese qula tout processus repond un systeme qui 
permette de l'analyser et de le decrire au moyen dlun 
nombre restreint de premisses". Additionally, he writes, 
'Ile but de la theorie du langage est de verifier la 
these de llexistence dlun systýme sous-jaýent au 
processus, et celle dlune constance qui sous-tende 
les fluctuations et dlappliquer ce systeme a un objet 
18 
qui semble tout particulierement sly preter". 
There is some confusion here over whether Hjelmslev 
is speaking of a theory to be applied in analysis or of 
a particular application of a theory in describing some 
set of speech phenomena or both. However, the main 
point is that Hjelmslev seems to be making it a premise 
(a priori) of linguistic theory that some systematic 
constancy underlies the process of speech. Of course, 
any approach to linguistics presupposes that linguistic 
phenomena may be accounted for by means of rational 
models (regularities or constancies). However, Hjelmslev 
is suggesting also that this premise ("hypothesis") 
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is subject to empirical test, i. e. that, for at least 
one premise of linguistic theory, there is a test of 
empirical validity. This is directly in opposition 
to the view we are adopting here. 
The fact that no sane man would doubt that speech 
is organised in some way does not imply that the premise 
of a linguistic constancy can be empirically tested or 
that it can be anything more than an assumption under- 
lying our attempts to give a rational account of speech 
communication. Similarly, the premise that "the shortest 
distance between two points is a straight line" remains 
an assumption. It could not be proved without circu- 
larity, because it is a definition. So also, in the 
case of Hjelmslev's hypothesis, one could not prove 
the existence of a system underlying the process of 
speech from the fact that it is possible to establish 
such a system, since the establishment of the system 
already presupposes the premise that for each process 
there is an underlying system. Furthermore, Hjelmslev's 
view leads to paradoxes. Firstly, Hjelmslev maintains 
1119 that linguistic theory contains no "existence postulate . 
If this view is correct, then Hjelmslev cannot maintain 
that it is possible to I've'rifier l1existence d1un syst*e*me 
sous-jaýent au processus", since no objective existence 
is claimed for the said system. Alternatively, if one 
can always set up a priori the hypothesis that such a 
system exists, then it is false to say that the theory 
contains no existence postulate. However, i f Hjelmslev's 
I- --A----ý4, rN v, i I-% Vq i i- I- nn :- -ir i ri Pn r- P 
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of any sort could ever, even in principle, be capable 
of refuting it. On the other hand, to suggest that 
one can test for the existence of some postulated system 
implies that the hypothesis might be false. This is 
paradoxical - we must have either an irrefutable hypo- 
thesis or a refutable a priori. It seems clear that 
the assumption of a system underlying the process of 
speech is intended to be accepted as true by definittion 
and not by empirical test. The difficulty stems directly 
from the mistake of viewing a premise of the theory as 
some sort of empirical hypothesis. The moment we drop 
the idea that theoretical statements are or can be 
hypotheses, the paradoxes disappear. However, then 
we could say only that a linguistic theory might be 
applicable and acceptable and not that it might be 
verified and empirically valid - and that is the position 
which we adopt here. One mil-lht add that Hjelmslev's m) 
difficulties are only a special case of the general 
confusion in the hypothetico-d-eductive approaches to 
linguistics over what is accepted a priori and what 
is subject to empirical test, i. e. the problem of dis- 
tinguishing the "hypothetical" from the "deductive" 
elements of those approaches (see below for more 
extensive treatment of this question). 
Our present formulation is designed to imply a 
minimum commitment to any particular view of language 
or any particular theory of language. Insofar as there 
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is a commitment here, it is to what is perhaps inap- 
propriately called a "fictionalist" position. The 
fictionalist position in linguistics, it seems to me, 
is capable of being held by supporters of any lingui- 
stic theory. It is the minimal theoretical position 
in linguistics in that it involves no commitment to 
any extra-linguistic (psychological or sociological 
or philosophical or other) position, while leaving 
open the possibility that collateral information may 
lead to an interdisciplinary approach. The fictionalist 
approach is preferable also in that it will save us 
from the hypostatization of such entities as Language, 
etc., since each such entity will be a purely theoretical 
construct and subject to the restriction that linguistic 
20 
theory contains no existence postulate (see below). 
In this approach descriptive constructs are not assigned 
any ontological status other than that of scientific 
construct until such time as collateral non-linguistic 
evidence is available. The approach certainly does not 
involve any less commitment to empiricism. "Communi- 
cation" may be left as an indefinable. We shall treat it 
extensionally as the class of communication events, the 
class of actual or potential signals capable of being 
transmitted by means of a fixed physical medium by a 
source to at least one receiver, where a signal is a 
physical indication of something other than itself. 
-27- 
This explanation is offered largely for the sake of 
completeness. It is not intended to restrict the 
study of communication to any particular type of 
signal or to any particular type of property of 
signals. We merely wish to point out some common area 
of phenomena with which semiotic/linguistic theories 
can be expected to be concerned. One should note t. hat 
"communication" is not defined or explained f-:;. s a conrýeýpf.. 
Each theory might be expected to provide an account 
of some set of properties of the phenomena we are 
calling "communication events". A theory might, for 
instancep provide the intensiot of the class of 
communications' systems, a typology thereof and a 
a typology of communicational objects. This is what 
21 
we find in Axiomatic Functionalism. In such an approach 
the theory aims to provide the intension of the class 
22 
of communication events. Linguistic theory will be 
concerned with the subset of communications' systems 
which involve vocal communicational phenomena. A 
linguistic description, then, provides an account of 
specified properties of communication events by reference 
to an applicable and appropriate theory by modelling 
those events and their properties. 
b. The function of linguistic meta-theory 
In the previous section we attempted to describe 
linguistic theories and linguistic descriptions by 
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considering what such theories and descriptions do 
(or, perhaps, what we consider they ought to do). 
We also looked at various ways of considering the 
ontological nature of linguistic theories and descrip- 
tions. Discussions of this sort are not uncommon in 
linguistics. These two questions are both I'meta- 
theoretical" in being "about linguistics" rather than 
being particular proposals within linguistics .A new 
theory within linguistics might be a new theory of 
distinctive features or of morphological structure. 
A description within linguistics might be, for example, 
a phonology of Russian. However, whenever a theory or 
description is proposed within linguistics, precisely 
"meta-theoretical" questions arise about that theory 
or description, i. e. we must ask whether the new theory 
meets the kind of conditions which we would demand 
any theory or description. The conditions which any 
linguistic theory or description might be required 
of 
to 
meet are clearly I'meta- theoretical" and are themselfres 
subject to meta-theoretical debate. Clearly, our viiews 
about the conditions to be met by any tý-eory or des- 
cription can only be kept apart from the questions of 
the function and nature of linguistic theories and 
descriptions with considerable artificiality. These 
three questions are inevitably interconnected. To 
maintain that a linguistic theory is a logical system 
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(e. g. a deductive system) implies that linguistic theories 
meet the conditions of logical systems. To establish the 
condition that linguistic descriptions be psychologically 
realistic implies the view that a theory of language is 
properly an investigation of a psychological nature. 
All such questions we might assign to what we could 
call "the philosophy" of the subject. In this thesis 
we shall concentrate on the particular problem of 
judging the acceptability of linguistic theories and 
descriptions. As will already have been seen, this 
problem leads to the three aforementioned questions 
concerning the function, nat-. -ýre and requirements of 
linguistic theories and descriptions. It is this re- 
stricted area which we will provisionally call I'lingui- 
stic meta-theory". 
The philosophy one adopts notoriously affects 
one's view of linguistic theory. We have already come 
to some decisions regarding the nature and function 
of linguistic theories and descriptions in the previous 
section . It is inevitable 
that one takes up some 
position in these matters and, of course, any position 
will be unacceptable to somebody. I think it would 
be 
naive to suppose that one's opinions of 
linguistic 
theory did not affect one'S meta-theoretical pronounce- 
ments also. The generality introduced 
by the term 
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"meta-11 is to some extent illusory. The force of this 
pessimistic caveat can, I think, be minimised if our 
version of linguistic meta-theory can be justified 
on generally acceptable grounds. Otherwise, our lin- 
guistic meta-theory will be of relevance to only a 
restricted number of approaches to linguistics (although 
this in itself would be a worthwhile exercise). We 
do not say that the meta-theory selects a particular 
sort of linguistic theory or description. Since the 
adoption of a particular position in linguistics or 
one's general philosophical position both affect one's 
view of linguistic meta-theory, one would run the danger 
of circularity or vacuity in setting up linguistic 
meta-theory as an "evaluation procedure". The danger, 
exemplified by the case of Chomsky (below) is that one 
may select those criteria which are favorable to one's 
own version of linguistics. 
Wittgenstein has rightly pointed out that, in 
attempting to answer the question, "what is the meaning 
of a word ? ", one should first enquire what would 
constitute a satisfactory answer to the question, i. e. 
what would a satisfactory explanation of the meaning 
of a word look like ? 
23 Wittgenstein's point is of 
general application. It would be absurd to attempt 
an answer to any question without knowing what 
kind 
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of answer is required. One should not, then, attempt 
to set up a linguistic theory in response to, e. g. our 
"fundamental question" or any other such starting point, 
without having some idea of the requirements that such 
a theory should meet. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, 
for descriptions of semiotic systems. Obviously, not 
every answer or theory or description is an acceptable 
answer, theory or description. We have already seen some 
of the restrictions that must be placed on linguistic 
theories and descriptions. The theory must, for instance, 
avoid hypostatization. Also, it must lead to adequate 
descriptions of phenomena in order to be considered 
"applicable". An inapplicable theory will be considered 
vacuous. The phenomena with which linguistics is con- 
cerned are, on the other hand, required to be inter- 
subjectively a-greed and capable of being recorded in 
such a way that they are describable in linguistic/ 
semiotic terms. It is the aim of this discussion to 
determine the conditions under which linguistic 
theories and descriptions will be considered "acceptable" ; 
in other words, rather than being concerned with the 
construction of a linguistic theory answering our 
initial question, I shall be dealing with what the 
nature and structure of such a theory and 
the descrip- 
tions which can be constructed using that theory would 
look like. Much of the discussion will centre around 
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the problem of knowing when a theory is "applicable" 
and when a description is"empirically adequatell . 
We show afterwards how given theories and descriptions 
might meet the proposed conditions. 
It is important to point out that we are not 
concerned to establish the content of a particular 
theory (other than for illustrative purposes). It 
is also important to realise that, although it should 
be possible to agree on the kind of phenomena with 
which linguistics can be expected to cope, it is not 
possible to determine the content of a linguistic 
theory or description directly from a consideration 
of the phenomena. We have already said that it is 
the function of linguistic theories to permit the con- 
struction of conceptual models and the function of 
linguistic descriptions to be conceptual models 
accounting for observable phenomena. The content of 
linguistic theories and descriptions clearly belongs to 
the conceptual world and is determined in a very large 
measure by the way we choose to approach linguistic 
problems. It could not, without circularityq be claimed 
that our choice of an analytical basis was determined by 
the phenomena themselves, since such an attitude would 
presuppose an analysis of the properties of the phenomena 
under consideration ; it is, however, the function of 
linguistic theories and descriptions to present precisely 
such an analysis. 
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The problem of what may be considered an 
acceptable linguistic theory or description has been 
relatively little discussed and, often, its treatment 
has been of either an ad hoc or cursory nature. The 
present investigation considers the conditions under 
which an answer to the theoretical problem (the con- 
struction of a linguistic theory) and to the associated 
descriptive problem (viz. "what constitutes an accep- 
table account of how communication is achieved in L 9.11y 
"what is an acceptable linguistic description of L ? 11) 
will be considered acceptable. This may be called the 
"meta-theoretical problem". Accordingly, we will 
place the study of these conditions within linguistic 
meta. -theory. 
Clearly, the considerations involved transcend 
particular questions of linguistic theory or linguistic 
description (henceq "meta, "). Questions of linguistic 
meta-theory will extend, as we have suggested, not merely 
to linguistic theories but to linguistic descriptions 
also. One might be inclined to call those considerations 
of acceptability which are appropriate to linguistic 
description "linguistic meta-description" , or some such. 
We have seen already, however, that linguistic 
theories and 
descriptions are inextricably linked through the notions 
of applicability and "modelling in accordance with". 
If 
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we take it to be the first principle of linguistic 
meta-theory that no theory shall be considered accep- 
table, unless it permits the construction of adequate 
linguistic descriptions, then it is clear that the 
acceptability of a linguistic theory depends in part 
on the acceptability of the linguistic descriptions 
which, can be made in applying that theory to the speech 
phenomena. If, in addition, linguistic meta-theory 
tells us that the acceptability of a linguistic des- 
cription depends in part on the acceptability of the 
general linguistic theory upon which it relies, then 
we can say that the conditions of acceptability attaching 
to linguistic descriptions have a bearing on those 
pertaining to linguistic theories and vice versa. 
The meta-theoretical conditions of acceptability 
applying to theories and descriptions can only 
arbitrarily and unnaturally be sundered, i. e. what 
we are saying is, in effect, "no description without 
good theory and no theory without good description". 
We will take it as a principle that linguistic 
meta-theory involves both the conditions for good 
theories and for good descriptions and that good 
theory and good description are inextricably linked. 
Clearly, no acceptable linguistic description can be 
made on the basis of an unacceptable linguistic 
theory. 
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An inconsistent theory inevitably leads to confusion 
in description. Martinet's double articulation theory, 
to take a solid example, contains the view that the 
elements of the second articulation are determined by 
means of analysis of the signifiants of signs. Thus, 
if we compare the signifiant of "cat" with that of 
"pat", we find that the signifiants are differentiated 
by two units, which both recur elsewhere, (in "pin't 
and "kill") and which are not items of the first 
articulation - they are not signs. However, a moment's 
reflection will convince us that the signifiant of a 
sign is a set of elements in free or complementary 
distribution, as is the case with the sign "bell in 
English, where we have the variants "am" , "are" , Ifisil I 
etc. . If we accept t-his, then it is impossible to main- 
tain that the second articulation is a product of the 
analysis of signifiants. The signifiant is a set. 
It is not the set which is analysed but the members of 
the set by comparison with the members of other sets. 
But this outlet is simply not catered for in the theory. 
Strictly speaking, the inconsistency involved makes a 
description of the second articulation of a language 
impossibleg since the theory leaves nothing which can be 
compared in the desired fashion. 
The reverse problem arises when insuperable diffi- 
culties in description lead Lýs to reject a theory. A 
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case in point is the immediate constituent analysis of 
the 1940's and 50's. In I. C. A. two meta-theoretical 
criteria were proposed. These were that the analysis should 
be exhaustive and that the analysis should lead to 
determinate results. Clearly, any theory which, when 
applied in the analysis of speech phenomena, could 
not achieve these goals, would be rejected. Now, 
the theory provided various criteria for 'cutting' 
strings. One of these criteria was the principle of 
binary cuts, which asserted that, for any grammatical 
n-tuple, X, where n >1, X is a pair, <A, B>, of 
grammatical objects. That is, every string is cut in 
two parts. So, in English, the string, 
John died. 
is analysed 
John / died 
and the string 
The cat went home. 
is analysed 
The cat / went home 
The methodology for the analysis was a criterion of 
substitutability in a fixed context. John died is 
clearly a pair (in syntax). The item, the cat, is 
substitutable for John (but not the or cat singly) 
in the context, '_ died' ; and went home_(but not 
home) is substitutable for died. That is, all substi- 
tutions leave us with wellformed grammatical strings. 
Thus we have, 
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(8) The cat died. 
and 
(9) John went home. 
but not 
(10) *the died. 
(11) *cat died. 
or 
(12) *John home. 
Of course we have, 
(13) John went. 
But in that case we are left with a pair again. 
Now, the criterion Of substitutability or "like- 
patterning" works quite well in a number of cases. 
However, it proved impossible, in a number of cases, 
to arrive at a binary cut. In those cases there 
was a principle of multiple cuts. The French, 
bleu-blanc-rouge, was one example. Another was 
multiple apposition, as in 
(14) John / the man from London / the man who read the 
paper // went home. 
This was, of course, the poverty of the method. There 
was a principle of binary cuts except only when binary 
cuts were impossible. 
Quite apart from these examples, in a range of 
cases, only arbitrary decision could determine the 
order of cuts. For example, in 
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by comparison with John / died or 
John runs / fast 
by comparison with 
swim / fast. 
In the case of 
The King of England's hat 
we might have the King- of England I sl hat by comparison 
with a/ hat or the / King of England's hat by comparison 
with the / man. A lot of rather doubtful solutions 
were proposed to deal with these examples. All this 
is very well known. The point I wish to make is that 
I. C. A. was a. theory which was rejected principally 
because it was incapable of leading to acceptable 
linguistic descriptions. It failed the meta-theoretical 
requirements which specified that a theory should allow 
the determinate and abaustive analysis of speech pheno- 
mena. That is, we have a case where a theory is rejected 
on the grounds that it fails to give good descriptions. 
(It was also unacceptable on other grounds, no doubt). 
The example of Martinet's double articulation 
theory shows there is no good description without good 
theory and the I. C*A. example shows there is no good 
theory without good description. The implication for 
linguistic meta-theory is that there can be no arbitrary 
division between the conditions of acceptability for 
theories and those for descriptions. 
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From a different point of view, as we shall sep, 
any linguistic description implies the existence of 
some linguistic theory in terms of which the linguistic 
description was formulated : we want to avoid the 
terminologically confusing conclusion that linguistic 
theory is also "linguistic meta-description" (albeit 
in a different way). To the extent to which a linguis- 
tic description implies some theory, any linguistic 
description will be dependent on the acceptability of 
the theory applied in constructing that description 
(the consistency, etc.,, of that theory). Hence, we 
may say that the conditions of acceptability of lin- 
guistic theories are relevant to the acceptability of 
linguistic descriptions and vice versa. That is, 
since the acceptability of descriptions is a necessary 
condition of the acceptability of linguistic theories, 
the conditions of acceptability of descriptions are 
relevant to the acceptability of theories. The I. C. A. 
example and the Martinet example illustrate these 
last points. 
This is not all, however. Certain meta-theore- 
tical conditions, most notably - consistency, can be 
interpreted as concerning also the relation between 
a linguistic theory and a linguistic description. 
We 
require, for example, that a linguistic 
description be 
consistent with some linguistic 
theory. If a theory 
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specifies that all communicational entities are 
'functional' (in the functionalist sense) , then no 
communicational entity can be postulated in a descrip- 
tion using that theory which can be shown to be not 
functional. A case in point might be whether or not 
than is a sign in English in such expressions as, 
He is bigger than John. 
My car is newer than John's. 
The functional principle requires that at each point 
in the chain the speaker is considered to make a choice. 
This implies that than must be chosen from a set con- 
taining at least one other item (possibly 0). Consequent- 
ly, to set up a sign than would make the description 
inconsistent with the theory, becaU3e than is not 
replaceable by any other item - it is obligatory in 
the comparative construction (it is not even replaceable 
by 0). Than can be treated as a discontinuous part of 
the comparative. The fact that conditions of acceptability 
may apply, as in this case, to the relation between 
theory and description affords us another reason for 
subsuming the conditions of acceptability applying 
to 
theories and those applying to descriptions under one 
rubric - linguistic meta-theory. 
One objection which could appropriately 
be raised at 
this point in connection with 
the study of linguistic 
meta-theory is that the present 
formulation leaves us 
-41- 
open to a potentially infinite and pointless regression. 
That is to say, one could not only study the meta-theore- 
tical conditions of acceptability of linguistic theories 
and descriptions, but one could go on to ask, "under 
what conditions are the proposed meta-theoretical 
conditions themselves acceptable and under what conditions 
are these meta-meta-theoretical conditions acceptable 
(and so on ad infinitum) 
To avoid this infinite regression and the potential 
horrors of linguistic meta n_ meta n1-.... meta 
1- theory, 
I introduce in this context a priori Hjelmslev's 
25 
notion of the arbitrary and the appropriate. In the 
context of linguistic theory, this notion is explained 
as stating that linguj; stic theory is, 
llun systeme deductif pur, en ce sens que clest 
la theorie a elle seule qui, a partir des premisses 
quýelle enonce, permet le calcul des possibilites qui 
25 
en resultent" 
The theory, according to this view, does not imoly 
the prior knowledge of existing phenomena or of the 
nature of those phenomena (thus avoiding a potential 
circularity) and is, thus, "arbitrary" 
in that the 
calculus of theoretical possibilities 
depends on the 
selection of the initial set of premises - each of which 
42- 
is arbitrarily selected (i. e. might have been different). 
On the other hand, 
"Le theoricien sait par experience que certaines 
premisses enoncees dans la theorie remplissent les 
conditions necessaires pour que celle-ci soit applicable 
% 
1125 a certaines donnees de l1expe'rience . 
That is to say that a linguistic theory must, as we 
have pointed. out. avoid vacuity by being applicable 
in the description of speech phenomena. In order to 
achieve this, it must be capable of enumerating all 
necessary possibilitýes for the consistent and adequate 
description of fields of phenomena. A theory which 
is capable of achieving this will be "appropriate". 
In the context of linguistic meta-theory, we will 
say that the conditions to be fulfilled by a linguistic 
theory and those to be satisfied by linguistic descrip- 
tions are required to be (demonstrably) appropriate 
conditions of the acceptability of linguistic theories 
and descriptions. A meta-theoretical condition will 
be "arbitrary" in that it is introduced, as a condition, 
without implying prior knowledge either of linguistic 
theories or of linguistic descriptions (i. e. the condi- 
tions might have been different). A condition will be 
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"appropriate", if it is such that its non-observance 
in a linguistic theory or description would lead to 
self-contradiction, absurdity, inadequacy or circularity 
of argument. Stated positively, we will say that 
certain requirements are necessary for the acceptability 
of any theory or description. Meta-theoretical conditions 
of acceptability will be appropriate (useful) insofar as 
their observance is necessary for meeting these conditions. 
We will, say, arbitrarily, that the demonstration of 
the appropriateness of any given condition of acceptability 
belongs to linguistic meta-theory. The demonstration 
in question will constitute the justification for the 
acceptance or rejection of any meta-theoretical condition 
proposed. It is also part of the justification for the 
acceptance of any meta-theoretical condition of accepta- 
bility that the condition meet certain general, episte- 
mological conditions of, for instance, consistency 
(i. e. with other meta-theoretical conditions). One 
cannot, for instance, require both that a linguistic 
theory abstain from containing an existence postulate 
and that it be empirically valid also (as does Shaumjan, 
above). Similarly, one cannot set up a "general linguistic 
theory" without an existence postulate and then require that 
empirical linguistic descriptions be "deducible" from 
that theory (as does Uldall, see below). 
It might be argued that conditions on conditions 
(sL eory . 
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However, it is more appropriate, in view of the 
very general nature of these epistemological con- 
siderations, to treat them as part of the justi- 
fication of a given condition of acceptability and 
hence as part of linguistic meta-theory. The reason 
for this is that considerations of consistency, etc., 
in a set of meta-theoretical conditions may be 
regarded as merely the application of general prin- 
ciples of epistemology rather than specifically 
linguistic meta-meta-theory. One does not have to 
reinvent epistemology in order to discuss the accepta- 
bility of linguistic theories and descriptions (although 
we may have to remind ouselves of it). 
It should be clear from the foregoing that I 
shall not be principally concerned with the construc- 
tion of actual linguistic theories and descriptions 
but I shall deal with the conditions which particular 
theories and descriptions or descriptive methods will 
ideally 26 be required to meet and, to a lesser extent, 
with illustrative examples and the success or failure 
of existing theories and descriptions in matching up 
to these conditions. 
The conditions involved in the acceptability of 
theories and descriptions may be usefully, if somewhat 
"1 
) 
crudely2 divided into the following categories. 
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(a) The 'general' and the 'specific' depending upon 
whether the condition in question is of a general, 
epistemological nature and applicable to any scientific 
discipline or a condition peculiar to linguistics. 
Consistency is a general condition but the condition 
that all features in communicational or linguistic 
systems possess physical realisations, i. e. there 
is no feature that is not physically transmitted, is 
clearly a condition peculiar to linguistics/semiotics. 
(b) The Iformalland the 'empirical'. A 'formal' 
condition tests the theory or description with respect 
to its logical structure. An 'empirical' condition 
is a test of the theory or description which involves 
the confrontation of the theory or description with 
some set of phenomena. If we want to know whether 
the conclusions of a theory or the implications of 
a description are valid, as deductions from the theory 
or description, we are concerned with 'formal' conditions. 
We might wish to check, for instance, whether there 
is a minimum entity in phonotactics or a maximum 
entity in phonematics in Axiomatic Functionalist theory. 
This would be a purely formal matter involving the 
lefinitions and permissible inferences postulates, . 
of that theory. The question of the recognition of 
a morphology/syntax distinction revolves around the 




in a given approach, bank-clerk and men in English 
are morphological or syntactic complexes, we have to 
do with an empirical matter concerning the structure of 
English which cannot be resolved within the confines 
of any theory or description but which can be resolved 
only through a consideration of the relevant data 
(and the construction of appropriate models and tests). 
(c) Thelinternall and the lexternalf, An 'internal' 
condition tests a linguistic theory or description 
by means of some criterion lying within linguistics. 
An 'external' condition is a criterion which tests 
a linguistic theory oe description by some standard 
not intrinsically concerned with linguistics. It is 
an 'internal' (but not 'specific') condition that all 
linguistic theories be applicable to all fields of 
speech phenomena. (The same condition applies 
mutatis mutandis to phonetic theories. ) An 'external' 
condition might be that any linguistic theory provide 
a psychologically realistic account of language acqui- 
sition and that each description be usable as a model 
for language learning. 
To take other examples ; it would be a general 
condition of scientific systems that they be 'exhaustive' 
in their treatment of the data under consideration but 
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it would be a requirement peculiar to linguistics to 
require that certain of the categories of linguistic 
theory be translatable into phonetic terms or that 
linguistic descriptive constructs be interpretable as 
observable as phonetic forms. The requirement of con- 
sistency would be regarded as a formal condition of 
acceptability, whereas the requirement that a lin- 
guistic description enumerate all and only the finite 
strings of a lan-:,, uage is a clearly empirical condition. 
Whether a linguistic theory should account for "para- 
phrase relations" or whether a linguistic description 
can adequately describe the affricates in Russian are 
matters internal to linguistics. However, the condi- 
tion that a linguistic theory provide an account of 
language acquisition or be interpretable as a behavioural 
account of language use can only be regarded as external 
27 
criteria of acceptability. (Note that we do not comment 
at this point on the merits of these particular condi- 
tions - they are examples only. ) These six categories 
are not intended to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive. 
Consistency is a general, formal and external condition, 
for example. The advantage of the classification 
is that it helps us to know what kind of condition we 
are dealing with in any given case. We can also see, 
incidentally, the wide range of types of condition 
that are involved in the acceptability of linguistic 
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theories and descriptions. 
As we have said, we will be concerned not only with 
the types of meta-theoretical condition but the- 
justification of their selection and formulation 
also. This justification is a matter of demonstrating 
the consistency and appropriateness of the conditions 
proposed. In order to be able to apply the conditions 
of acceptability, it will be necessary for us to 
consider the areas of linguistic theories and descrip- 
tions to which any given meta-theoretical condition 
will, or will not, be applicable. 
As I take it, any scientific discipline is 
ultimately concerned with this kind of meta-theoretical 
consideration. The point where linguistics, or any 
other science, becomes self-consciously aware of the 
conditions to be satisfied by its own theories and 
descriptions is more or less the overlap between that 
science and the philosophy of science. 
The need for an awaremess of the epistemological 
constraints on linguistic, -, theories and descriptions. 
has been noted by only a small number of writers on 
linguistics. The most notable (and outspoken) of these 
was probably Hjelmslev, who writes, "aucune theorie 
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scientifique ne peut etre construlte sans une col- 
28 laboration active avec llepistemologiell, Whilst 
this particular statement may be considered something 
of an overstatement if taken too literally, one would 
certainly be inclined to agree that any approach in 
science requires an implicit or explicit foundation 
in some philosophical attitude towards science in 
general. This is especially so when we consider a 
scientific theory in terms of its logical structure. 
A concern with the philosophy of science seems to be 
particularly important in linguistics which deals with 
an area of reality which is the traditional concern 
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of the Humanities. One should be careful to note, 
however, that the fact that some theory or description 
is in accord with some conception of the philosophy 
of science cannot serve as a justification of that 
theory or description (although the converse might 
hold, i. e. a successful scientific theory might lend 
support to a philosophical conception of science). As 
Shaumjan has pointed out, 
"The question of the adequacy of some or other 
scientific andq in particular, linguistic theory must 
be decided using the resources of that science wi in 
the framework of which a given theory is proposed. 
Philosophy cannot serve as a weapon for the justifi- 
cation of a scientific theory. The justification of 
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a scientific theory is to be sought in those facts 
which are explained or predicted by that theory. 40/31 
Shaumjan's view clearly implies the position (which 
we will adopt) that external conditions of acceptabi- 
lity of the sort we have mentioned must be regarded 
as taking second place to the other types of condition 
(i. e. the epistemological and, especially, the empirical). 
Nevertheless, as Lyons 
32 has pointed out, it is part 
of the "material adequacy" of a linguistic theory 
("saving the appearances") that the theory in question 
(or description in question) should not conflict with 
relevant information from other disciplines or other 
areas of linguistic study. 
It is clearly the case that "an active collabo- 
ration with epistemology" is intended by Hjelmslev 
to be a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
the acceptability of linguistic theories. This being so, 
the satisfaction of that condition cannot serve as 
any form of justification for the theory. Furthermore, 
any given attitude towards the philosophy of science 
may itself be in error, contain contradictions or may 
prove inappropriate to linguistic theory on rigorous 
application orý indeed, it may lead to self-contradiction 
33 
within the linguistic theory in question. For these 
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reasons it is necessary to speak of the meta-theoretical 
conditions or constraints onor to be met by, 
linguistic theories or descriptions. The satisfaction 
of these conditions does not constitute the justifi- 
cation of any theory or description to which the con- 
ditions may be applied but it does show that the theory 
or description is not to be rejected on epistemological 
grounds ; more positively, conditions of acceptability 
show us how we might go about rejecting a linguistic 
theory or description in a principled way. 
There is a sense, as we have seen, in which we 
must avoid the dangers of an excessive commitment to 
any particular attitude in the philosophy of science 
prevailing or otherwise in setting up the meta-theore- 
tical conditions to be satisfied by linguistic theories 
and descriptions. The difficulty in this respect is 
exactly the same as that encountered in psychological 
approaches to linguistics (as opposed to psycholinguis- 
tics), which notoriously run the risk of becoming 
quickly outmoded or of relying on notions which are 
either too naively reproduced or which are already 
discarded or o, tsolescent 
ý4 A certain independence is 
advisable, then, but it would be churlish not to 
recognise that the philosophy of science necessarily 
plays a considerable role in setting up meta-theore- 
tical conditions on the acceptability of theories and 
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descriptions in linguistics. 
One should emphasiseagain that no approach to 
the philosophy of science is to be accepted uncritically 
in linguistic meta-theory. On the other hand, we 
must be wazýy of the dangers of an eclectic approach 
to the philosophy of science. The position adopted 
here is that linguistic meta-theory looks both towards 
the philosophy of science and towards linguistics. 
There is no doubt that no view of the philosophy of 
science has been constructed with linguistics in mind ; 
equally, there are reasons to think that no view of 
the philosophy of science adequately represents the 
nature of linguistics. Also, there are questions in 
linguistic meta-theory, as we have seen, which have 
relevance only to linguistics. For these reasons we 
set up linguistic meta-theory as a separate field 
of research different from the philosophy of science. 
-53- 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 
1. N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, p. 13. 
2. Intuitions about unacceptable, "asterisked") forms 
serving as the basis for (sometimes) highly theore- 
tical treatments illustrate the difficulty of 
the approach. Often the reason for the asterisk 
is quite opaque and one suspects that the theoreti- 
cian's intuitions are all too convenient for his 
theoretical purpose or that the theoretician is 
not presenting independent phenomena but pheno- 
mena that have heen extensively modelled already 
(see below). Examples of forms asterisked for 
opaque reasons are not difficult to find. Con- 
sider, for instance, the expressions asterisked 
by Chomsky in his "Remarks on Nominalisation" 
which serve as the basis of discussion ; 
*John's easiness to please (p. 18) 
*His criticism Of the book before he read it (p. 27) 
"TDon't be tall (p. 27) 
And compare such counter-examples as, 
John's easiness to please is well known. 
I didn't like his criticism of the book before he 
read it. 
Don't be tall when you grow up -I don't like tall 
people . 
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The point is that it would be absurd for each 
lirguist to give a different account of "the gram- 
matical" because his intuitions about what is 
and what is not acceptable in English lead him 
to accept or reject different sets of data from 
the next linguist. The obvious possibility of 
bickering over data drawn from intuitions is 
very clear in this case. 
S. K. Shaumjan, Problems of Theoretical Phonology, 
PP. Pp. 15 -ý-., 16. 
S. K. Shaumjan, ibid., p. 16. 
The view that the theory provides the intension 
of the class of descriptions is due to J. Mulder, 
"The Strategy of Linguisticsýl. 
See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory, Linguistic 
Descriptions and the Speech Phenomena". 
This problem has been highli., -----hted by R. Harris, 
Synonymj and Linguistic Analysisq pp. 158 - 
As expressed, for instance, in the dictum of A. V. 
Martinet that, "function is the criterion of 
linguistic reality"; A Functional View of Language-, 
p. 5. 
According to I. M. Bochenski, "protocol statements" 
are Aussagen, welche 
das Vorkommen von Phanomenen 
feststellen" (Die Zeitgenossischen Denkmethoden, p. 






das Phanomen P auf der Stelle Z beobachtet" 
(_Europaische Philosophie der Gegenwart, P. 71). 
In linguistics the first writer to have regarded 
recorded phenomena as "protocols" seems to have 
been K. Buhler. He writes, an konkreten Sprech- 
it. ), 
ereignissen macht der Sprachforscher seine 
spezifischen Beobachtungen und fixiert ihr 
11 
Ergebnis in Protokollsatzen" (Die Axiomatik der 
Sprachwissenschaften", p. 19). See also J. Mulder, 
"Linguistic Theory .... all, p. 92. 
This programme is carried out in the "Postulats de 
la Linguistique Fonctionnelle Axiomatiquell by 
J. Mulder and in the "Postulats de la Semantique 
Axiomatiquell by S. Hervey, where the notion, 
phonetic forrr4 is integrated into the theory via 
the notion, phonological form. In Axiomatic Func- 
tionalism a phonological form is defined as a 
"particular maximum class of one or more phonetic 
forms, f, each member, f, in its capacity of 
standing in a relation with a particular distinctive 
function, d" (df. 23) and a phonetic form is a 
"generalised model for a class of impressionisti- 
cally similar phenomena that may correspond to 
one or more figurae in a natural language" (dfs. 
22 and 22a). 
Chomsky's argument in favour of transformational 
grammars over "taxonomic grammars" is a case in 
point. It is discussed in the following chapter. 
L. Hjelmslev, Pro14gomenes 
'a Une Theorie du Langage, 
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13 This is clearly related to the dictum of Saussure 
that, "bien loin que 11objet pre"cede le point de 
vue, on dirait que clest le point de vue qui cree 
llobjet", Cours, p. 23 ; for a discussion of this 
idea, see J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory, it, 
14 H. Uldall, Outline of Glossematics, p. 11. 
15 The present position implies that a semiotic theory 
provide a typology of semiotic systems of which 
language is but one possibility. This is, in fact, 
the position in Axiomatic Functionalism (see J. 
Mulder and S. Hervey, Theory of the Linguistic Sign) 
and in, Glossematics (see L. Hjelmslev, Resume 
of a Theory of Language). 
16 F. de Saussure, Cours, p. 33. 
17 See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,... ", p. 96, where 
he writes, "the purpose of a linguistic theory is 
to render an unlimited number of good ... linguistic 
descriptions possible and this gives us the criterion 
for judging the adequacy of linguistic theories". 
I prefer to reserve the terrp "adequacy", for another 
purpose but the same condition is retained. 
18 L. Hjelmslev, Prole'gom*enes, pp. 16 - 17. 
19 L. Hjelmslev, ibid., p. 24. 
20 See note 14 above. 
21 See J. Mulder, "Les Postulats .... especially 
the 
Introductiong pp. 19 - 21. 
22 See note 5 above. 
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and Brown Bo-oks, p. 1, where he says, 
"What is the meaning of a word ? "..... Let us attack 
this question by askirgfirst, what is an explanation of 
the meaning of a word : what does the explanation of 
the meaning of a word look like ..... to understand 
the meaning of "meaning" you ought to understand the 
meaning oflbxplanation of meaning.,... 
See below, ch. 3. 
L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomenes, pp. 24 - 
When Popper says, "I suggest that it is the task 
of the logic of scientific discovery -... . ý4 
(1 to give a logical analysis of this procedure 
that is, to analyse the method of the empirical 
sciences" (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 27), 
it is clear that he has in mind the ideal method 
of the the empirical sciences. A similar position 
is adopted here with respect to linguistic theories 
and descriptions. 
It might be argued that no "ideal meta-theory" 
could be set up for linguistic theories and des- 
criptions on the grounds that each theory (a) imposes 
its own point of view and (b) thereby, in a sense, 
creates its own set of phenomena (i. e. those which 
satisfy the conditions for analysis by that theory 
as opposed to any other theory). Thus, it might 
be held, no set of meta-theoretical conditions 
could be of relevance to all linguistic theories 
and descriptions (each theory would have its own 
meta-theory). Such a point of view fails to distinguish 
between the agreed range of the theory (the set of 
Ole, 
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phenomena existing independently and agreed upon 
ase3(plicanda (phenomena per se)) and the scope 
of a description (the set of phenomena which 
actually satisfy and are considered in their 
capacity of satisfying the functions of the theory 
or description (phenomena as modelled). It is 
agreement on the range of phenomena that is required 
that is, we require an agreement on an independent 
selection of phenomena. Furthermore, to create 
different meta-theories for each approach to 
linguistics would destroy the initial motivation 
for setting up meta-theoretical conditions, viz. 
the need to establish an independent set of criteria 
of acceptability. 
27 Of course, there is a certain amount of overlap 
between these categories, which are intended as no 
more than broadly illustrative. 
28 L. Hjelmslev, Prole'*gomenes, p. 25. 
29 See in this connection, H. Uldall, Outline, ch. 
30 S. K. Shaumjan, Fil03Of3kije Problemy Teoretiýe3koj 
Lingvistiki (Philosophical Problems of Theoretical 
Linguistics), trans. P. R. R., p. 
31 The requirement that a theory be tested for empirical 
adequacy in leading to the understanding of given 
phenomena is itself a meta-theoretical condition. 
32 See J. Lyons, Structural Semantics, p. 
33 Examples of these hazards are illustrated below. 
34 One will recall in this context the obsolete and 




A SURVEY OF SOME PREVIOUS APPROACHES 
-6o- 
In general, we can say that only very few linguis- 
tic theoreticians have turned their attention to the 
problem which is considered here. The treatment of 
the conditijns of acceptability of linguistic theories 
and descriptions has been cursory or has been simply 
Cý 
iLi-nored as a matter of self-evidence or epistemology 
transcending linguistics proper. While it is not the 
present task to enumerate the valid forms of argument 
which are presupposed in all rational discussion and 
while epistemology must lurk somewhere in the near 
background, so that one may say that there is some 
degree of self-evidence and epistemology in linguistic 
meta-theory, it is not true to say that all the problems 
of the acceptability of linguistic theories and des- 
criptions ca-, -i be solved by an easy reference to 
well known principles of argument or universally ac- 
cepted views on the epistemology or philosophy of science. 
In the first place, it is necessary to have firm prin- 
ciples in judging the acceptability of linguistic 
theories and descriptions and, in the second, it is 
far from obvious that there is any prevailing view 
of the philosophy of science to which one can make 
unambiguous and universally acceptable appeal. It 
would seem to be the case, furthermore, that linguistics, 
as a discipline, contains a structure of components 
that may be unique to it. The relations between the 
various components of linguistics, as we shall see, 
'Aid 
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determine, in a large measure, not only the kind of 
conditions to be met by linguistic theories and 
descriptions but also their precise formulation and 
the-way in which they are to be satisfied. Moreover, 
less specific conditions of acceptability deriving 
from the general notion of a science and the need for 
a "calculus" aspect of, say, linguistic description 
must be formulated specifically with respect to 
linguistics in such a way that the "empirical" and 
"formal" aspects of sciences are recognisably re- 
tained. Through a consideration of the problems associ- 
ated with these questions we are led to an investigation 
of various notions of acceptability of linguistic theories 
and descriptions, the precise formulation of conditions 
of acceptability and a consideration of the points 
at which such conditions are pertinent and how given 
linguistic theories and descriptions may satisfy the 
conditions in question. 
One area of linguistic meta-theory which has 
received considerable attention of late is the question 
of "explanation" in linguistics. As should be obvious 
from the present remarks, the "explanatory" aspect 
of linguistics is, from my point of view, only one 
of the areas to be considered by linguistic meta-theory. 
In particular, insofar as any explanation may be said 
to rely on a principled and epistemologically sound 
description of phenomena, in linguistics necessarily 
involving an epistemologically sound theory, one can 






be "explanatory" already presupposes the satisfaction 
of a whole set of other logically prior conditions 
of acceptability on the part of linguistic theories 
and descriptions. It is for this reason that we are 
not greatly concerned in this thesis with the notion 
"explanation". 
In the main, we can say that there have been 
five major contributors to linguistic meta-theory. 
I ', 234 They are Hjelmslev, Chomsky, Lyons, ShaumJan and 
5 Mulder. Contributions of a more cursory nature 
have come from many sources. The most noteworthy 
of these is undoubtedly Bloomfield according to whom, 
"the only useful generalisations about language are 
116 inductive generalisations . The principle that lin- 
guistics should be characterised by its inductive 
approach may be said to recur in virtually all British 
and American works on linguistics between 1930 and 
1960. European linguistics since Saussure (and 
probably influenced by neo-grammarian tradition) has 
been either implicitly or explicitly characterised by 
its deductive or hypothetico-deductive approach. The 
adoption of an inductive approach to linguistics as 
a necessary condition of its scientific nature was, 
no doubt, influenced by the logical positivism of the 
Vienna Circle 7 of logicians for most of whom science 
was to be characterised by its inductive nature. It 
may fairly be said that, since the early sixties, most 
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philosophers of science and most linguists have cdnpidered 
that science and linguistic science in particular are 
to be conceived of a3 "deductive" or 11hypothetico-deduc- 
tivell or"nomological-deductivell in character. In the 
present work it is assumed throughout that linguistic 
theories and descriptions will be of an implicitly 
or explicitly deductive nature. 
Inductivism is rejected in the present work for 
several reasons. In the first place, it is not at 
all clear that inductivism is of any particular rele- 
vance to lin'guistics. Even those who have explicitly 
defended the inductivist cause have found it expedient 
to introduce arbitrary, Out appropriate sets of theore- 
tically defined and justified functions (e. g. Bloomfield's 
definitions of the phoneme and the word, etc. ) in 
advance of the analysis of texts. To the extent that 
the functions do not emerge from the inductive compari- 
son of data but are part of a preconceived language 
model, one must say that the position of inductivist 
linguists, such as Bloomfield, is at best ambiguous 
in that there always seems to be assumed some non- 
inductive element which is used as a criterion of 
relevance. Inductivism is irrelevant to linguistics 
also in that nearly all modern paradigms in the philo- 
sophy of science adopt the "hypothetico-deductivell 
or "nomological-deductivell approach in characterising 
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scientific systems and the majority of linguists 
follow that lead. It is certainly the case that 
all generative approaches to linguistics are nomo- 
logical-deductive in character (some quite explicitly 
so) and one can regard the inductive approach as 
inherently opposed to structuralism in linguistics 
insofar as structuralist theories of language 
involve an explicitly defined descriptive framework 
interrelated through a well defined ontology with 
explicit criteria of relevance. One can easily see 
that the idea of the applicability of such a theory 
conflicts with the notion of the inductive comparison 
of phenomena with a view to revealing the supposed 
inherent structure of those phenomena. In the one case, 
the structure describing the phenomena is due in part 
to the theory adopted and, in the other, such structure 
as is found in the description is intended to be - 
entirely the product of the investigation of phenomena. 
Clearly, a "preconceived" structure will be anathema 
to the genuine inductivist, whether or not the structure 
in question is non-redundant and applicable. The 
structuralist, however, will maintain that the only 
part of linguistic description which is remotely in- 
ductive is the determination of the extension of 
previously defined setsý This "additive" induction 
scarcely qualifies as true inductive methodology. 
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Although lip-service to inductivism was duly paid 
by many linguists, including Bloomfield, there is very 
little in the works in question which genuinely corresponds 
to an inductive procedure or methodology. In the case 
of Bloomfield it is quite clear that he has in mind 
a (part) theory of language, including his explanation 
of the act of speech and the set of linguistic cate- 
gories (phoneme, morpheme, etc. ) which he introduces 
by means of examples, but which has in fact been set up 
quite independently of any inductive cycle of data- 
gathering, generalisatiop, etc.. The work of Zellig 
Harris has more of the appearance of an approach governed 
by an inductive procedure. Harris claims that his 
"schedule of procedures..... is designed to begin with 
the raw data of speech and end with a statement of 
grammatical structure"? One might imagine from this 
that Harris starts with observations about speech, 
continues with experiments on the data and ends with 
general statements which are the product of classifi- 
cation, comparison and generalisation. However, it 
quickly becomes obvious that a "schedule of procedures" 
is at best a way of organising research. Harris him- 
self points out elsewhere (with some contradiction 
perhaps) that "the chief usefulness of the procedures 
is ... as a reminder in 
the course of original research 
and as a form for checking or presenting the results, 
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where it may be desirable to make sure that all the 
information called for in these procedures has been 
10 
validly obtained". It fOllOW3 that the procedures 
"do not constitute a necessary laboratory schedule 
in the sense that each procedure should be completed 
11 before the next is entered upon". These remarks seem 
to take away the force of Harris' view that the pro- 
cedures he advocates involve a stepwise progression 
from data to general statements. What is more, there 
is an enormous amount of linguistic theory underlying 
Harris' work that is not, and cannot be, justified 
by any form of induction. Every procedure requires, 
in fact, a theoretical justification which cannot, 
without circularity, depend upnn the inductive 
observation of data. For example, the division of 
linguistic study into phonology and grammar and the 
establishment of the distributional criterion of 
relevance and the notion of "context" are the most 
striking of the theoretical ideas introduced a priori. 
Clearly, Harris could not set up a phonology/ 
grammar distinction or a distributional criterion of 
relevance as inductive generalisations resulting 
from the application of his procedures. This would 
be circular since his procedures already involve the 
phonology/morphology distinction and the the distri- 
butional criterion of relevance. Harris justifies 
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his conceptual approach in terms of its inherent use- 
fulness and, since a priori reasoning is excluded from 
the approach and inductive reasoning leads to circu- 
larity, this is the only possible justification. But, 
if usefulness is the only justification for the pro- 
cedures advocated and, hence, for the theoretical approach 
underlying those procedures, then the theory can be 
rejected simply because it fails to give us a justi- 
fication for its most important statements, i. e. the 
highest level of general theoretical statements about 
language. The approach is theoretically bankrupt. 
WC 100uld say2 then, that it simply does not matter 
(methodologically speaking) whether one chooses to 
set up hypotheses and then to test them using Harris' 
procedures or whether one makes a painstaking and pro- 
bably impossible collation of data and application 
of the procedures in order to produce a hypothesis 
as a result. But in that case we are left with a 
free choice between a viable hypothetico-deductivism 
(the first alternative) and an unrealistic inductivism 
(the second). If this is the Gase, however, one simply 
fails to understand Harris' insistence on an inductive 
methodology and an ordered schedule of procedures, 
since there seems to be no virtue in the approach what- 
ever ( and Harris himself does not seem to claim any 
virtue for it). 
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The idea of an inductive methodology as the hall- 
mark of a science undoubtedly held an ingenuous 
fascination over linguists such as a Harris. The 
problem with Harris' defence of inductivism in lingu- 
istics is, however, fundamental. The problem is that 
of moving from the charm of inductivism to the form- 
ulation of a mechanism of reasoning (in linguistics 
or anywhere else) which could be acceptably justified 
and applied in scientific activity. Harris produces 
a set of procedures but he fails to find any serious 
justification for them. It is not even clear that 
the procedures can be applied rigorously (as Harris 
admits (above)). In fact, much of the justification 
of inductive methodology in linguistics relies on the 
assumption that the so-called "problem of induction" 
can be solved and that an acceptable inductive logic 
can be set up which would justify our undoubted use of 
inductive arguments based on experience. We have to 
take a certain amount on trust, although no real 
reason for our doing so is given. This is not the 
place to discuss the wider question of the "justifi- 
cation of induction" but we can remark that the Canons 
of Induction proposed by Mill and which were associated 
with the "scientific method" by many linguists and 
philosophers of science a-like (in fact, they were what 
was meant by "inductivism") must be rejected. As Harre 
has pointed Out, 
12 the canons of induction frankly do 
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not stand up. The "principle of accumulation" by which 
a science is deemed to consist in the accumulation of 
new facts and to grow by adding new facts to some 
supposed store of knowledge is simply false. All sciences 
involve theory building and our theories not only 
determine the way we interpret the facts but also 
play a large role in determining what we consider the 
facts to be. The "principle of inductive inference" 
will not stand up because it cannot help us to decide 
between competing solutions. It is always backed up 
by a debatable "principle of simplicity". Finally, 
the "principle of instance confirmation" by which our 
belief in a law increases in proportion with the number 
of phenomena conforming to the law is, perhaps, the 
weakest point of all. Most obviously, this princiýle 
cannot account for the fact that theories can be over- 
thrown no matter how often their 'laws' have been 
seen to be instanced. Furthermore, the value of a 
theory is not determined by simply adding up the number 
of times its laws hold good. The law does not exist 
independently. The theory must constitute a coherent 
system of ideas, perhaps with surprising or unforseen 
consequences. It is this system as a whole which must 
be tested and, if we are not to be blinkered by our 
own laws, the theory must be tested against new types 
of phenomena. 
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The most serious difficulty with naive inductivism 
is that, as we have hinted above, those who advocate 
the oulook do not put it into practice. Neither linguists 
nor any other scientists are actually observed to behave 
in the manner we would expect if the canons of induction 
were a faithful picture of scientific activity. In 
particular, no scientist is especially interested in 
the simple accumulation of facts ; his interest is in 
the theories which explain those and, he hopes, other 
facts., The attraction of deductivist views of the 
philosophy of science is that they do reflect the 
interests of scientists. Deductivist views of the 
philosophy of science lay the emphasis on the right 
place ; viz. on systems of ideas and not on the facts 
which those systems of ideas attempt to explain. As 
Hempel has said, naive induction "could never get off 
13 the ground". 
One can argue that induction has a very important 
place in the development of different (alternative) 
14 . forms of logical analysis, i. e. non-deductive logics 
which do not utilise the notion of logical necessity 
in their inference patterns. However, for the non- 
logician at least, there remains the debate over the 
so-called "justification of induction" and the apparent 
1115 failure of attempts to overcome the "problem of induction . 
These difficulties added to the irrelevance of inductive 
techniques in most modern philosophical approaches to 
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science are quite sufficient to demonstrate the reasonable- 
ness of concentrating on deductive approaches to linguistics 
to the exclusion of non-deductive ones. 
We now turn to some of the major contributions to 
linguistic meta-theory. We consider those of Hjelmslev, 
Chomsky and Lyons. The ideas of Shaumjan are considered 
as they arise in extenso in other parts of the text 
along with more minor contributions. It will be obvious 
that the present work takes Mulder's contributions 
as a starting point and his ideas are discussed in 
their appropriate places. 
a. Hjelmslev 
In establishing the "prolegomenall to a science of 
language, Hjelmslev was, undoubtedly, many years ahead 
of his time-in taking seriously the epistemological 
considerations involved in linguistic theorising. 
Although we are in disagreement with a number 
of Hjelmslev's positionswe do not wish to minimise 
the great value of Hjelmslev's contributions to the 
epistemology of linguistics or the fact that Hjelmslev 
was the first to discuss the matter in any depth. One 
should also note that . 
there are a number of Points 
in the present text where we are in perfect agreement 
with Hielmslev's views. We agree, for instance, 
that a 
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linguistic theory, although appropriate with respect 
to the speech data, is arbitrary with respect to them 
also and we agree that a linguistic theory contains no 
"existence postulate" and that a linguistic theory is 
a conceptual model of (descriptive) models with des- 
criptions as models of phenomena. It is fairly self- 
evident that one cannot judge the acceptability of 
a linguistic theory or linguistic description without 
having a clear conception of the conditions which will 
decide whether a given theory or description is acceptable 
or not. Herein lies the importance of epistemological 
considerations in linguistics. Hjelmslev's approach 
to this problem is summed up in his Principle of 
Empiricism and his Principle of Simplicity. Both of 
these principles are capable of criticism. 
Hjelmslev introduces his topic by remarking that, 
"Une th(ýorie, pour e"tre la plus simple possible, 
ne doit rien supposer qui ne soit strictement requis 
par son objet. En outre, pour rester fidele a son 
but, elle doit, dans ses applications, conduire a des 
.I 
resultats conformes auxlldonnees de llexpe"riencell re'elles 
1,16 ou presumees telles . 
One may glean from these comments that Hjelmslev envisages 
that there must be some ultimate level of testing lin- 
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guistic descriptions against observable experience. 
Such an assertion would seem indisputable. What one 
may wonder, however, is how Hjelmslev could believe, 
as he apparently did, that the satisfaction of his 
Principle of Empiricism would lead to the fulfillment 
of this condition. HjelmslmAsPrinciple states ; 
"La description doit etre non-contradictoire, 
exhaustive et aussi simple que possible. Llexigence 
de non-contradiction llemporte sur celle de description 
exhaustive et llexigence de description exhaustive 
.0 17 llemporte sur celle de simplicite. " 
This principle applies both to linguistic theory 
18 
and to linguistic description, as Uldall points out , 
and following on from this Hjelmslev defines his 
Principle of Simplicity, as follows ; 
"Si le calcul permet d'etablir plusieurs procede"s 
possibles con. duisant toutes a une description non- 
contradictoire et exhaustive dlun texte et dlune 
langue quelconques, on doit choisir parmi ces proce*dures 
celle qui assure la description la plus simple. Si 
f 
plusieurs procedures permettent des descriptions dont 
les resultats ont le meme degre"de simplicite". on doit 
choisir celle qui emploie la voie la plus simple. 1119 
We will take the Principle of Empiricism first. There 
are three major objections to be made against it. 
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The first and, in some ways, the most important 
objection to this principle is that it is scarcely 
an empirical requirement at all (at least in the normal 
sense of the word "empirical"). Various writers have 
objected to Hjelmslev's principle on the grounds that 
it is oddly named. 
20 
This typically'esoteric piece 
of Hjelmslevian terminology is certainly oddly named 
in that, although, supposedly, a Principle of Empiricism, 
it makes no reference to the empirical testing of des- 
criptions, at least in the usual sense of the term 
"empirical", i. e. with respect to observable phenomena. 
One would normally be inclined to say that a description 
was "empirical", if its validity depended not merely 
on the definitions of, and permissible operations on, 
the terms involved but also on other external factors. 
The other factors invovled are usually deemed to be 
the experience and observation of contingently existing 
phenomena. Thus the validity of an empirical statement 
would normally be held to depend on the relation be- 
tween the content of a statement and the behaviour of 
existing observable objects, and the same goes mutatis 
mutandis for (empirical) descriptions. It would, 
therefore, seem reasonable to expect of a principle 
of empiricism that it require of linguistic descriptions 
empirical validity. That is to say that the condition 
should somewhere be embodied in an empirical principle 
that a linguistic description shall not be deemed 
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acceptable, unless it be valid with respect to the 
phenomena. which it purports to describe., The only 
part of Hjelmslev's requirement whitht-iapprox2imates to 
such a condition is the condition of "exhaustiveness 
However, it cannot be maintained that a linguistic 
description will be empirically valid, in the appro- 
priate sense, solely because it is exhaustive. Nor 
are the other conditions. of "consistency" and "simplicity" 
of any assistance here, since no conjunction of these 
three conditions will ever constitute a sufficient 
test of the empirical validity of a linguistic des- 
cription, at least in the usual and, to my mind, 
perfectly reasonable sense of the word. The point is 
that neither ( "formal" or "internal") consistency, 
nor "exhaustiveness", nor a conjunction of these two, 
will ensure that a linguistic description is either 
empirically interpretable or, when empirically in- 
terpreted, consistent with respect to the set of 
describienda. 
What makes the situation even odder is, of course, 
that Hjelmslev, as we have seen, explicitly requires 
that linguistic descriptions be empirically interpret- 
40 
able in terms of 'Iles donne"es de llexperience". 
However, the situation is by no means as simple as it 
may appear at first blush. The point is that, in 
Glossematics, the Principle of Empiricism applies on 
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several levels including the level of "theory" or 
11general descriptive apparatus" 
21 
and, also, that 
linguistic descriptions are to be derived from 22 
(deduced from) the general linguistic theory. 
Hjelmslev would be on perfectly solid ground in app- 
lying his Principle at the level of theory, since, 
as he points out; 
A 
"La theorie elle-migme ne de'pend pas de llex- 
0 
perience. Rien en elle nlindique si elle aura des 
applications en rapport avec les donnees de l1ex- 
.f. 
perlence ou non. Elle nlim-plique en elle-meme aucun 
postulat d'existence. Elle constitue ce que lIon a 
J* % ? t23 appele un systeme deductif pur. 
If this is so, and if the "empirical principle" 
applies to the theory, then, clearly, it would be 
self-contradictory to formulate the "empirical prin- 
ciplell in such a way that the theory was subject to 
empirical testing of the usual sort with respect to 
phenomena. Equally, if particular linguistic descrip- 
tions are to be derived from the theory, and if these 
descriptions were to be subjected to empirical testing, 
then the theory would itself be indirectly made sub- 
ject to empirical testing and this would, of course, 
lead to exactly the same contradiction. Putting the 
matter another way we can say that Hjelmslev conceives 
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linguistic theory as a purely a priori construction, 
the validity of the statements of which depends 
solely on the definitions of terms and the permissible 
inferences within the theory. To introduce a necessary 
condition of empirical testing with respect to obser- 
vable phenomena would be self-contradictory within 
the confines of such a theory. It follows that Hjelmslev's 
Empirical Principle would be, as a purely formal con- 
dition, entirely applicable to the level of theory. 
It is precisely a set of formal con%, -'ýitions which are 
enunciated in the Principle of Empiricism. The most 
important of these conditions are those of consistency 
and exhaustiveness. These two conditions assert, 
respectively, that the theory shall be deemed incon- 
sisten. t., if it contains any two statements, or if 
any two statements can be derived from it, such that 
the one statement asserts or implies the negation of 
the other (i. e. if the theory asserts both p and - p) ; 
and the theory shall be considered exhaustive, if it 
is sufficient fDV the deduction of all necessary 
theorems required for linguistic description. 
If it is correct to assert that the Principle 
of Empiricism is a formal condition of acceptability 
applicable to the level of theory, then one can see 
that the principle is all the more oddly named. On 
the other hand, one must observe that the principle 
is intendedg in the first place, to be applicable to 
the level of description. If so, then, as we have 
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noted, the principle signally fails to be an "empirical" 
condition. Although one can and must be able to apply 
the formal conditions embodied in the Principle of 
Empiricism to descriptions as well, what distinguishes 
linguistic descriptions from linguistic theories is 
precisely the additional constraint on linguistic 
descriptions that they be not merely formally accept- 
able but also subject to empirical testing with respect 
to the phenomena. In failing to see this, Hjelmslev 
is committing a cardinal error and this brings us 
to our second objection against the Principle of 
Empiricism. This is that Hjelmslev fails to distin- 
guish linguistic theory from linguistic description 
and this leads him to subject both to the same condi- 
tions of acceptability, whereas formal conditions alone 
are insufficient for the testing of linguistic descrip- 
tions. If, however, linguistic descriptions are to 
be deduced from linguistic theory, then it becomes 
impossible within a glossematic framework, as we have 
said, to apply without inconsistency tests of the empirical 
validity of linguistic descriptions with re spect to 
phenomena. This would mean that the absence of such 
empirical testing in glossematics was a fault in 
principle due to the failure to draw the distinction 
between linguistic theory and linguistic description. 
That Hjelmslev has failed to draw this distinction 
is particularly evident, when he remarks that, 
110n peut donc decider de la valeur de la theorie 





re I sultat, tout en re"pondant aux exigences de non-con- 
tradiction et dlexhaustivite, est en meme temps le 
Plus simple possible. 
"Clest, donc seulement par rapport au 'principe 
dlempiri3mel quIelle a enonce que la th4orie du lan- 
24 gage doit etre jugee. " 
The assertion that linguistic theory and its applica- 
tions (= descriptions) are equally subject to the 
Principle of Empiricism without the further quali- 
fication that the descriptions of particular texts 
must be subject to empirical testing is typical of 
the glossematic blindspot with respect tc the empiri- 
cal aspect of linguistics and shows particularly acutely 
the absence of a clear distinction between theory and 
description. 
We can make the notion of subjecting linguistic 
descriptions to empirical testing in confrontation 
with phenomena clearer through a consideration of the 
hypothetico-deductivism of an epistemologist like 
Popper. This brings us to the third point concerning 
Hjelmslev's empiricism. Whereas Hjelmslev is typically 
concerned with the testing of linguistic descriptions, 
Popper is concerned with the attempt to refute them. 
The point is that when we are concerned with the 
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description of infinite classes and infinite sub-classes 
of phenomena, as is the case in linguistics, it is 
clearly the case that no absolute verification of 
any given linguistic description of those phenomena 
is even in princip e possible. However, if we can 
show that a universal, empirical hypothesis referring 
to a potentially infinite class of speech phenomena 
is false in at least one valid instance or set of 
instances, then this will be sufficient to establish 
the empirical invalidity of the description in question. 
As Popper says, 
"It must be possible for an empirical system to 
be refuted by experience. " 
25 
The criticism which one would have to make of Hjelmslev's 
Principle of Empiricism is that this principle, being 
essentially formal in nature, does not give us any 
possible way of achieving the empirical refutation of 
a glossematic linguistic description and, consequently, 
one would have to say that the principle is simply 
insufficient as a condition of the acceptability of 
linguistic descriptions. In order to make it suffi- 
cient for this purpose it would be necessary to 
introduce a method of potential empirical refutation. 
Given these faults in the Principle of Empiricism, 
it is quite clear that the Principle of Simpldcity, 
as a subsidiary principle, cannot save the position, 





required. In fact, the Principle Of Simplicity comes 
down to a head-count of descriptive objects and operations. 
Unfortunately, a reduction in the number of objects 
in a description generally leads to an increase in 
the number of operations, as Fischer-JOrgensen has 
pointed out, and thus "simplicity" in one area of 
the description, e.. g. in the number of taxemes, may 
be offset by complications in other areas, e. g. real- 
isation statements. In any case, such a strong use 
of the Principle of Simplicity as we find in Glosse- 
matics has the danger that considerations of convenience 
may override empirical testing and this seems to have 
been what was at stake in the discussion of "underlying 
elements" in glossematics. The "underlying element", 
/n/, was set up in French in a post-vocalic, syntag- 
matic position in the description, where it did not 
always correspond to a separate choice in the chain. 
The phoneme, /n/, combined with a preceding vowel Was 
to be realised as-(part of). a single nasalised phoneme. 
Thus, Cbo'3 was rendered phonemically as /bon/. This 
leads to a reduction in the number of taxemes and is 
useful in relating such allomorphs as "bon" and "bonne", 
for example, which were phonemically /bon/ and /bono/ 
respectively, where in the feminine /n/ is prevocalic 
and so does not combine with /o/ 
ý6 As we can see, 
phonological realisation statements are complicated 
by 
this solution. However, the analysis is convenient. 
Nevertheless, the questions remair whether it is con- 
sistent with the theory (can two syntagmatic elements 
A 
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correspond to a single choice in the chain ?) and what 
empirical tests are available to examine the solution 
of convenience ? It is precisely this kind of question 
that Hjelmslev seemed unable to answer and which the 
Principle of Simplicity obscures. 
As is well known, Hjelmslev's approach was highly 
abstract. He often takes the view that a linguistic 
description should be a kind of abstract algebra of 
linguistic entities. In this he seems to be thinking 
of the abstract calculi of logic and, one might suggest, 
he appears to adopt in his Principle of Empiricism 
a version of the "coherence theory" of truth from 
the philosophy of logic. This theory of truth holds 
that the truth of a logical system depends on its 
consistency and completeness 
27 (exhaustiveness). This 
theory of truth is not normally held for empirical 
theories, where a "correspondence theory" of truth 
seems more applicable. A "correspondence theory" of 
truth, such as we adopt for linguistic descriptions 
here, requires that the truth of an empirical system 
depends at least in part on the observation of pheno- 
mena and their relation to the statements of the des- 
cription. As we have seen, it is precisely this sort 
of requirement which is absent from the Principle of 
Empiricism. We have also seen that there was some 
confusion in glossematics between the general theory 
'A 
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and the empirical description (which was only rarely 
seen as distinct from the general theory). It may 
be that Hjelmslev applied the coherence theory of truth 
to both general linguistic theory (which was reasonable) 
and to empirical descriptions (which was not reasonable). 
The Principle of Simplicity was then invoked simply 
to overcome the deficiencies caused by the lack oE 
a genuine empirical criterion. 
b. Chomsky's views on "adequacy" 
Ij 
Chomsky's main contribution to linguistic if, 
meta-theory comes in a general argument in favour of 
a theory of generative grammars and against what he 
calls "taxonomic" models in linguistics and falls 
into four main parts, in which he describes ; 
(a) the central task of linguistics as he concives 
it. 
(b) the nature of taxonomic and generative models 
in linguistics. 
(c)the "levels of success" to be achieved by grammars. 
(d) the application of evaluation criteria in 
specific instances. 
Chomsky considers that ; 
"The central fact to which any significant 
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linguistic theory must address itself is this :a 
mature speaker can produce a new sentence of his 
language on the appropriate occasion, and other 
speakers can understand it immedia. tely, although it 
is equally new to them .... normal mastery of a. language 
involves not only the ability to understand immediately 
an indefinite number of entirely new sentences, but 
also the ability to identify deviant sentences and, 
28 
on occasion, to impose an interpretation on them". 
This leads Chomsky to conclude that, "a theory 
of natural language that neglects this "creative" 
aspect of language is of only marginal interest'. 
29 
Chomsky means by "linguistic theory", "systems of 
hypotheses concerning the geae-ml features of human 
language put forth in an attempt to account for a 
30 
certain range of linguistic phenomena", The range 
of linguistic phenomena which must, in the first 
instance, be accounted for is this "creative aspect" 
of language. Consequently, a linguistic theory, 
from Chomsky's point of view, may be regarded as 
(principally) a system of hypotheses accounting for 
the creative aspect of language. As this 
"creative 
aspect" of language is explained (above), 
it clearly 
refers to the capacity of an individual speaking 
a 
particular langaage, since Chomsky defines 
this 
"creative aspect" as part of "normal mastery of a 
language". It would seem that, on this account, 
it 
is not human language which 
is creative but particular 
A 
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languages. Now, Chomsky ttlls us that linguistic 
theory is concerned with the general features_of hurn_an 
language. It follows that the problem of the infinite 
creativity of particular languages (which may be taken 
as a characteristic of languages in general) may be 
posed in two opposed ways. Either we may say that, 
since each language is infinitely creative, each 
particular language may be regarded as an instantiation 
of the general features of human language ; or, we 
may say that each language is infinitely creative 
and the means by which this infinite extension is 
attained, are langvage specific. The first of these 
two alternatives involves an inference which is clearly 
not a valid deduction ; the mere fact of the infinite 
extension of all natural. languages does not imply that 
this infinite extension is achieved as a reflection 
of any general features at all. The second alternative 
is not a valid deduction either, since the mere fact 
that one cannot assume or deduce the validity of the 
notion of "the general features of human language" does 
not imply that the means by which this infinite extension 
is achieved are language specific. Since neither, of 
these formulations is acceptable, one must conclude 
that we are left with the trivial observation 
that 
all natural languages are of infinite extensicn, unless 
further evidence can be given to support one position 
or the other. The point has been made 
by Hjelmslev 
and Buhler (among others) and leads 
directly to what 
Martinet calls the notion of "linguistic economy". 
A 
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The importance of linguistic economy lies in the 
observation that the infinite diversity of natural 
languages is attained not in an ad hoc manner nor 
by a simple infinite list of all the signs of a 
language but by the use of a finite inventory of items 
which are capable of being manifested in infinitely 
many constructions in combination with other entities. 
Martinet would, no doubt, go on to argue that a natural 
language requires complexity of this sort on two 
ontological levels of phonology and grammar in order 
to achieve the maximum "economy". It can be argued, 
at any rate, that some principled method must be found 
by mefans of which the infinite extension of any natural 
language may be accounted for in terms of a finite 
set of statements. Such a principled method will con- 
stitute a theory for the description of linguistic 
phenomena in a uniform manner. The uniformity in question 
does not imply any assumed universalism but is a necessary 
condition of the comparison of particular linguistic 
descriptions. One must be careful to distinguish those 
aspects of a description which are imposed by the theory 
and those which are peculiar to the linguistic pheno- 
mena under consideration. Any theoretical category, 
such as "phoneme" or "transformational rule" will, of 
necessity, be universally instanced, if the descriptive 
framework of the theory requires that any description 
contain such categories. On the other hand, the 
particular set of phonemes or transformational rules 
within a linguistic description will depend on the 
phenomena under description, if we are not to beg the 
que. ---, ---scriptive method 
is implied by 
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a desire to compare linguistic structures. 
This point, however, brings us back to one made 
earlier, that only grammars of the same type may be 
evaluated by comparison one with anotý-: er. It is this 
point that forces Chomsky to attempt to reconcile two 
incompatible interests. On the ore hand, Chomsky must 
produce two inherently different models of linguistic 
description for comparison, viz. the taxonomic and 
the transformational-generative. On the other hand, 
no evaluation of grammars is possible, unless these 
grammars are of inherently the same type, since the 
criteria of evaluation may be applicable to one type 
of grammar but not the other. 
The second section of Chomsky's argument involves 
a characterisation of the two models and the attempt 
to show that the taxonomic model may be formulated 
as a generative grammar. In this way the models 
are supposed to be rendered comparable in that each 
contains a generative phrase-structure component. It 
seems to be assumed that the only grammars worth con- 
sidering must be generative grammars, since only 
generative grammars, so the argument goes, account 
for the infinite creativity of natural languages. 
Now, it has already been argued that "generativity" 
is a trivial consequence of a scientific structural 
grammar, i. e. one which aims to make predictions about 




from a different point of view, then, a structural 
description may be considered generative. Some 
structural approaches, e. g. glossematics, contain 
an explicit and specific framework leading from the 
highest hierarchical entities to the "phonetic-noetic" 
consequent hypotheses implied by them. This descriptive 
framework is set up, in the case of glossematics, as 
a structure of contextually selected classes. It 
is not a set of algorithmic processes. What is 
objectionable, then, about Chomsky's argument is 
not his contention that structural grammars may be 
viewed as generative grammars but the impoverished 
way in which he describes the generative aspect of 
those grammars. 
Chomsky remarks that, "it should be noted that 
modern grammars are typically not conceived as Serera- 
tive grammars, but as descriptive statements about 
a given corpus (text). Hence, the taxonomic model 
is no more than an attempt to formulate a generative 
grammar, which is in the spirit of modern procedural 
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and descriptive approaches". If it is true that 
structural grammars or taxonomic grammars are not 
generative grammars, then there is no basis for the 
evaluation of structural and transformational grammars 
in any way, let alone the way Chomsky suggests, since 
Chomsky's evaluation procedures concerning levels of 






only with generative grammars. This would mean, 
however, that structural and transformational grammars 
could not be compared and that, therefore, Chomsky's 
argument in favour of transformational grammars 
collapsed. The evaluation procedure would simply not 
be an independent test. It would say, in effect, that 
a certain grammar was preferable to another if it was 
a generative grammar while the other was not. The 
real question is why anyone should accept such a test. 
However, it is clear from the above that all structural 
grammars can be viewed as generative grammars (although 
they might not take the form Chomsky suggests). However, 
if it is the case that, 
"It is clear that the question of explanatory 
adequacy can be seriously raised only when we are 
presented with an explicit theory of generative grammar, 
that specifies the form of grammars and suggests a 
mechanism for selecting among them (i. e. an evaluatiom 
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procedure for grammars of a certain form", 
then Chomsky's criteria for comparing levels of adequacy 
of structural and transformational grammars will simply 
lapse. It is no reflection on either the structural 
or transformational model that they cannot 
be compared 
in terms of Chomsky's levels of adequacy. 
But it is 
a reflection on the criterion in question7 
if it demands 






In fact, then, it is simply not the case that 
structural grammars are not trivially generative. 
Secondly, some are explicitýy generative. Thirdly, 
the whole burden of Chomsky's argument in favour of 
transformational grammars against structural grammars 
falls upon the acceptance of Chomsky's formulation 
of the taxonomic grammar and the acceptance that 
the taxonomic grammar is the inevdtable form of any 
(generativised) structural grammar. If the taxonomic 
model can be shown to be the inevitable form of any 
structural grammar when it is viewed as a constructional- 
generative device, then, and only then, will Chomsky's 
argument hold. The reason for this is quite simply 
that, unless Chomsky's formulation of taxonomic grammar 
is accepted. as the generative version of some or all 
structural grammars, no comparison between the t, ý,, o 
types of grammar (in terms of Chomsky's evaluation 
procedures) can be considered in any way meaningful. 
However, it is not clear why structural grammars, 
when turned into generative grammars, must take the 
form of the taxonomic model. It may be, for instance, 
that a structural grammar could generate all and only 
the strings of a language through the application of 
set theory or the propositional calculus, let alone 
all the more recently developed techniques of systemic 





some of the logical methods mentioned are actually used. 
Chomsky characterises the taxonomic model in the 
following way, 
"The taxonomic model is simpler, more "concrete" 
and more "atomistic" than the transformational model. 
We can characterise it in the following way. Each 
rule is of the form : element A has the member (variant, 
realisation) X in the context Z W. Let us call such 
a rule a. rewriting-rule.. The syntactic component 
consists of an unordered set of rewriting rules, each 
of which states the membership of some phrase category 
or formative category in some context. The structural 
description it provides can be regarded as a labelled 
bracketting of the string of formatives, indicating 
the category of each sub-stringý which is a constituent. 
Let us call such a labelled bracketting, obtainable 
automatically from a single derivation, a phrase-marker 
of this string of formatives. The phonological com- 
ponent consists of two distinct sets of rewriting rules. 
The first set (morpho-phonemic rules) states the 
phonemic constitution of morphophonemes or formatives 
with respect to stated contexts. The second set (phone- 
tic rules) states the phonetic constitution of phonemes 
with respect to stated contexts. Each of these sets 
is unordered" 
33 
This formulation is implausible from several points of 
'A 
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view. Firstly, and most significantly, Chomsky i- 
dealing in a mammoth generalisation here. He clearly 
has no particular theory or grammar in mind when set, t-ing up 
this taxonomic model. It seems, therefore, to refer 
to every and no structural grammar in particular. 
The first point in this respect is that very few lin- 
guists would be interested in a description which did 
not go beyond the confines of some "corpus", as 
Chomsky puts it. In fact, such a grammar could not 
account for the infinite extension of a language by 
definition. Secondly, Chomsky gives no particular 
reason why a taxonomic model must be of this form. 
In fact, it can be argued that this form of algorithmic 
approach is inadequate. It contains, for instance, 
no semantic component, no statement of the types of 
synic, actic and phonoloSical. distributional structure, 
which determine the structure of particular phrase- 
markers. (Yet this is the very point of structural 
linguistics. ) It contains, furthermore, no specification 
of the structure of phonological complexes in terms of 
distinctive features or statement of intonational 
structure and it contains no inventories of the 
entities which, at any particular level, may enter 
the syntactic or phonological structures defined 
for 
the language in question (there are no paradigms to 
go with the structures). In short, 
the syntagmatic 
and paradigmatic aspects of the description which are 




We can see that structural linguistics, on Chomsky'S 
account, when reduced to the taxonomic model, adds up 
to no more than statements of realisational variance 
in grammar and phonology. The average structuralist 
might well be forgiven for thinking that his theory 
was a good deal more subtle than Chomsky's taxonomic 
model. 
Another very important point which is, in fact, 
the corollary of the above criticism is that the 
phrase-structure grammar, presented as the taxonomic 
model, is largely confined to statements of realisation 
on the syntactic, morphophonemic and phonetic levels. 
Althouýh such statements of realisational variance 
are necessary in relating hypothetical entities 
to classes of observed phenomena, the explicit formalisa- 
tion of realisational statements is of only marginal 
interest to the structural grammar. It is required 
that any descriptive hypothesis be ultimately testable 
in confrontation with some observable data via its 
realisational statements ; it is not required, or 
even very interesting, that this can or should be done 
by means of some formal explicitly generative apparatus, 
although a true descriptive framework, as one finds in 
glossematics, will indeed lead from the most abstract 
descriptive hypothesis to the statements of realisation. 
The main point isý however, that the taxonomic model 
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is greatly impoverished, if it is to be concerned solely 
with statements of contextual variance, which, in any 
case, presuppose the structural descriptions involving 
distribution, syntactic and phonological structures, 
etc. . 
It must be pointed out, furthermore, that it is 
not necessarily the case that a structural description 
will be interested in "labelled bracketting" (it may 
be a dependency grammar) or I'morphophonemic rules" 
(it may not contain the notion I'morphophoneme"). 
Lastly, many structural, approaches require an ontological 
distinction between the levels of gram. --liar and phonology, 
which is simply not catered for in Chomsky's formulation. 
There are, then, many reasibns why Chomsky's 
formulation of the taxonomic model is unacceptable 
and it is hard to accept that a generative view of 
structural models leads inevitably to the taxonomic 
model. It is scarcely surprising, then, that , on the 
one laand, Chomsky finds the model inadequate or that, 
on the other, he can find no-one who actually maintains 
such a position. Further pursuit of this question 
must be, in view of this, strictly speaking otiose. 
However, the widespread conviction that this argument 
and arguments of its type demonstrate the inadequacy of 
structural approaches to linguistics requires us to 




Chomsky introduces three levels of 'Issuccess" 
for grammars. These are the levels of "observational", 
"descriptive" and "explanatory" adequacy. "Observational 
adequacy" is the lowest level of success and "is achieved 
if the grammar presents the observed primary data cor- 
34 
rectly". "Descriptive adequacy" is achieved "when 
the grammar gives a correct account of the linguistic 
intuition of the native speaker and specifies the ob- 
served data (in particular) in terms of significant 
generalisations that express underlying regularities 
34 in the language". Finally, "explanatory adequacy" is 
achieved "when the associated linguistic theory provides 
a general basis for selecting a grammar that achieves 
the second level of success over other grammars consistent 
with the relevant observed data that do not achieve 
34 
this level of success". In such a case, "we can 
say that the linguistic theory in question suggests 
an explanation for the linguistic intuition of the 
native speaker. It can be interpreted as asserting 
that data of the observed kind will enable a speaker, 
whose intrinsic capacities are as represented in this 
general theory to construct for himself a grammar that 
1134 characterises exactly this linguistic intuition . 
Now, supposing anyone were foolhardy enough to 
defend the taxonomic modelp is there any reason why 
he should accept these "levels of adequacy" as relevant 
tests ? Certainly, Chomsky suggests none and they each 




In the first place, it is far from clear what 
is meant by presenting the observed primary data 
"correctly". Would "observational adequacy" be achieved 
by, for instance, a tape-recording ? Or, perhaps, 
a phonetic protocol ? In any case, it seems that the 
"achievement" of observational adequacy could be attained 
by something that was not even a grammar, let alone a 
generative grammar, purporting to account for the 
infinite extension of some language. Equally, it is 
not clear what is meant by "a correct account of the 
linguistic intuition of the native speaker". How, 
one may ask, is this correctness judged ? Whilst one 
might test whether a specific hypothesis in a grammar 
corresponds to observed utterances or generally agreed 
utterance types, one could not conclude from that 
that the native speaker's intuitions were "correctly" 
described. One would be dealing in different orders 
of data. One could, of course, simply require native 
speakers to intuit in order to test hypotheses for 
correctness but, whilst a native speaker's judgment 
may be relied on when it comes to testing particular 
3entence3 for acceptability a3 surface 3tructures, 
(as particular utterance types), the claim of descriptive 
adequacy could not be tested in this way. 
One should also make the point that there is no 
particular reason for the apparent assumption that 
expressing significant generalisations about a language 
has anything at all in common with describing 
the 
intuitions of the native speaker. 
Only under the 
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previous idealisation could this position be maintained 
but then, of course, this would be tantamount to 
defining a language as the intuitions of the idealised 
native speaker of that language. This is not only 
circular. It suggests the redundancy of the notion 
of the Ilidealised native speaker". 
The conclusion of this argument is, therefore, 
that descriptive adequacy and, hence, explanatory adequacy 
are not attainable even in princi_ple_, since, in order 
to be descriptively adequate, a grammar must give "a 
correct account of the linguistic intuition of the 
native speaker" and this correctness not only falls 
outside the scope of empirical linguistic methods, it 
can in no way be attained. It follows that the tests 
of adequacy proposed by Chomsky would be unacceptable 
to the defender of the taxonomic model, or anyone else. 
The fourth stage of Chomsky's argument involves 
both a demonstration of how the levels of adeqaacy are 
put into operation as tests and a proof of the superiority 
of transformational grammars over taxonomic grammars 
with respect to these levels of adequacy. Both sides 
of this stage of the argument rely on the treatment of 
specific examples. It is clear, hcwever, for anyone 
who maintains the distinctions between theory, 
descriptions 
and phenomena, that arguments invoked directly 
from 
the treatment of particular phenomena in particular 
descriptions presuppose the application of the 
theory 
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to the data in question. Such arguments cannot 
without circularity be used to support the theory 
which is presupposed. Furthermore, the validity of 
a description (grammar or particular descriptive 
solution) can be only a necessary condition of the 
validity of the theory (see below). It can never be 
a sufficient condition of the validity of the theory 
that some description made using that theory as a 
basis of analysis "correctly" accounts for data 
(i. e. the description is not refuted). If this is 
the case then one may draw two consequences. In the 
first place, only descriptions made under the same 
theory can be compared directly for relative adequacy 
and, in the second place, theories cannot be compared 
indirectly via descriptions made under them. The reasons 
for these two assertions are quite simple. Given that 
two solutions employing different theories are equally 
consiStent with both the data and their respective 
theories, the adequacy of each description is a necessary 
condition of -' 
the validity of its respective theory 
but the comparative adequacy of one description with 
respect to another is neither sufficient nor necessary 
for the validity of either theory. One theory's 
failure is not another theory's success. At best, 
comparative adequacy could be a measure of the relative 
elegance of the solutions and this might give a higher 
evaluation to one theory over the other (or it might 
mean that one linguist had simply done a neater job 
than another). However, it must be borne in mind 
tý, at 




cription. is proposed as an application of a theory to 
certain data. Consequently, since each descriptive 
statement in each description is justified at least 
in part by a set of theoretical statements, which is 
disjunct from each other set of theoretical statements 
(theories), which separately justify other descriptions 
(perhaps of the same data), it follows that particular 
(sets bf) descriptive statements under different theories 
are non-comparable in this respect. So, theories 
cannot be compared indirectly via their respective 
applications. On the other hand, it is a necessary 
condition of the validity of any description that it 
be the most adequate under the theory in question 
with respect to the data in question. Furthermore, 
competing solutions under a single theory are justified 
with respect to the same set of theoretical statements. 
It follows that competing descriptions under the same 
theory contain comparable stC-:: Ltements. It follows 
from this that only descriptions under the same theory 
can be compared for relative adequacy, since only 
such descriptions are theoretically comparable. It 
also gives us another reason for saying that theories 
cannot be compared indirectly via their applications, 
since the descriptions involved imply different theories, 
We maintain that theories may be compared directly 
and that they must be compared with respect to fields 
of phenomena. (see above). 
.1 
It has been assumed throughout that we are dealing : 
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different theories (i. e. disjunct or partially disjunct 
(overlapping) theories), or the same theory. There 
remains the case of the proper inclusion of one theory 
within another (i. e. the class of theoretical statements 
in the one theory is properly included within the class 
of theoretical statements of another). Given that the 
two theories are equally consistent, the theory with 
the larger extension will be preferable, if it is totally 
applicable to some aspect of the data, to which the theory 
with lesser extension is in principle incapable of 
application, provided that the data which the theory is 
extended to cover constitute valid primary observations 
and provided that the additional scope of the theory 
implies no contradiction with the properly included class 
of theoretical statements. (If this last condition is 
not met, either thetheory as a whole is inconsistent or 
the including theory must be modified. If the theory 
is inconsistent, criteria of adequacy are irrelevant and, 
if the theory is changed, we may speak of the original 
and new theory as disjunct. 
It is clearly proper inclusion that Chomsky has 
in mind when he compares taxonomic and transformational 
grammars. The transformational component may be viewed 
as additional to a phrase-structure generative grammar. 
The transformational component gives greater scope 
and elegance to grammatical description and the 
transformational-generative model properly includes 




actually defends or is required to defend the taxonomic 
model, the argument seems to be against a cardboard 
opponent. However, it is important to see that even 
the arguments in favour of a "transformational comp. onent" 
are fallacious and that the levels of adequacy that 
the transformational model satisfies are such that 
a) only a transformational grammar could meet them 
b) they are irrelevant to most structural grammars and 
c) they rest on unsupported assumptions of an unacceptable 
nature. 
These points are particularly evident when we 
come to consider Chomsky's syntactic examples. For 
instance, Chomsky asks us to consider the sentences, 
John is easy to please. 
John is eager to please. 
(Chomsky's numbering). Chomsky tells us that these 
sentences are wellformed and goes on to claim : 
"A grammar that achieves only the level of observa- 
tional adequacy would merely .... note this fact in one 
way or another (e. g. by setting up appropriate lists). 
To achieve the level of descriptive adequacy, however, 
a grammar would have to assign structural descriptions 
indicating that John in (3) is the direct object of 
please (the words are grammatically related as in 
"this pleases John")q while in (4) it is the logical 
subject of please (as initJohn pleases someone', 
'). A 
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theory of grammar that coes not allow structural 
descriptions of this sort cannot achieve the level 
of descriptive adequacy, since information of this 
kind cannot be represented in the phrase-marker 
that it provides as the full structural description 
on the syntactic level. " 
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The implication is clearly that a transformational- 
generative model can achieve this level of adequacy, 
whereas a taxonomic model of the phrase-structure sort 
cannot. Whilst this is no doubt true, it is rather 
trivial, since no-one actually defends the taxonomic 
model. This is far from all, however. 
In the first place, one might well wonder why 
observational adequacy could be achieved by a grammar 
that "set up appropriate lists". Such a. description 
could be on many levels, phonetic, phonemic, morphemic, 
etc., and Chomsky does not make clear which. Such 
a description would be infinite and, as Chomsky himself 
maintains, Ibne requirement that a grammar must certainly 
meet is that it be finite ... hence the grammar cannot 
be simply a list of all morpheme (or, word) sequences, 
36 
since there are infinitely many of these". It seem 
that a description that simply set up "appropriate 
lists" would not be a grammar at all. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to imagine anyone so lunatic 
as to go around making lists of utterances and calling 
himself a grammarian. The criterion of observation--:, l 
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adequacy is, on this showing, quite irrelevant. 
As far as the question of descriptive adequacy 
is concerned, as it is outlined here, one can only 
say that it begs various questions. In the first 
place, it is not clear why it is a necessary question 
of descriptive adequacy that a grammar should assign 
structural descriptions indicating that John is the 
direct object of please in (3) and the logical subject 
of it in (4). Since we are given no definition of 
either direct obect or logical subject, the allocation 
. ýJ -- -- ---- 
of John to these categories must be taken on trust. 
Furthermore, the criterion of descriptive adequacy, 
which utilises this notion, clearly presupposes that 
any grammar should represent this information. What 
Chomsky never tells us is why this should be so. One 
would like to enquire why data about grammatical relations 
should be treated simultaneously and on the same level 
as data about logical form. The contentioný that any 
grammar which failed this criterion of descriptive 
adequacy by failing to represent the desired information 
in the phrase-marker must be rejected, merely reinforces 
the unacceptably a priori assertion that this information 
should be represented. Any taxonomic linguist who 
rejects the simple a. priorism of unjustified and undefined 
categories such as those borrowed wholesale from traditional 
grammar by Chomsky will simply ignore the criterion of 
descriptive adequacy on the grounds that it is irrelevant 
'A 
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and involves an unjustified assumption. The non-trans- 
formationalist could go on to argue that the trans- 
formationalist, by dealing in non-linguistic data, 
was simply not doing linguistics. On the other hand, 
it would be possible for Chomsky to maintain that 
taxonomic grammars are reducible to phrase-structure 
grammars and, since phrase structure grammars utilise 
these categories of description, tý-e objection still 
holds. Unfortunately, Chomsky never makes this 
"reduction" clear and any such "reduction" would lead 
to further problems. If taxonomic grammars are now 
taken to be equivalent to traditional grammars (by 
some process of reduction), which is a condition ap- 
parently required by Chomsky's argument, then the only 
bone of contention between the structuralist and Chomsky 
involves the scope of linguistic descriptions. (Actually, 
this must be so, if the transformational model properly 
includes the taxonomic model. ) The difficulty is, of 
course, that of finding some reason why we should 
think that taxonomic grammars constructed under struc- 
turalist theories were equivalent to traditional grammars 
either in descriptive scope or in the set of theoretical 
statements of each (insofar as traditional grammar is 
a theory at all). On the other hand, if the taxonomic 
model is equivalent to the traditional grammar model, 
then Chomsky contradicts himself to the extent that he 
contrasts the two. As fap as "explanatory adequacy" 
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is concerned, Chomsky tells us ; 
"To achieve this level, the theory must provide 
for the selection of a descriptively adequate grammar, 
given such data as (3), (4), "John's eagerness (*easi- 
ness) to please ... 11, "to please John is easy (*eager)", 
"John is an easy (*eager) fellow to please", "it pleases 
John", "John pleases everyone", "John is easy (*eager) 
for us to please", "it is easy (*eager) to please John'19 
"John is a person who (it) is easy to please ... and 
many other similar and related structures. 
"The general theory would have to make possible 
the formulation of the underlying generalisationsthat 
,, 37 account for this arrangement of empirical data.... 
Chomsky would no doubt claim that only transforma- 
tional-generative grammars are capable of achieving 
the explanatory level of adequacy and that this shows 
the superiority of the transformational approach over 
the taxonomic. Unfortunately, it is quite clear that, 
if the criterion of explanatory adequacy requires the 
formulation of grammars with underlying generalisations 
about the data of the sort quotedg then the proof is 
circular. The reason for this is that only a 
transformational grammar would attempt to relate these 
disparate structures and only a transformational approach 
would countenance evidence from syntactically totally 
unrelated structures as decisive in the description 
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of some string. It follows that Chomsky claims the 
superiority of transformational grammars on the 
grounds that they are explanatorily adequate ; 
unfortunately, it is clear that the criterion of ex- 
planatory adequacy states, in effect, that a grammar 
achieves explanatory adequacy, if it is a transforma- 
tional grammar. 
In fact, the only reason for choosing to treat 
all this data under one rubric stems from the a priori 
analysis of it into the categories of traditional grammar, 
for only then can one determine that the various in- 
stances of John or any other item perform analogous 
roles within the sentences in question. It follows 
that transformational analysis without the presumed 
categories of traditional grammar cannot exist (as 
one would expect, since the transformational model 
properly includes the formalisation of traditional 
grammar that one finds dn the phrase structure model). 
The point is, however, that, in this set-up, no 
transformational grammar can refer directly to 
primary data, since the data relied on by a transforma- 
tional grammar includes a traditional grammatical analysis. 
(Otherwise there is no justification for treating the 
various data above under the same or related structures. ) 
In other words transformational grammars refer to quite 
different aspects of data from the data referred to by 
structural grammars. Secondlyq the scope of the trans- 
'A 
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formational grammar is acceptable only, if one is willing 
to accept the vague and intuitive classifications of 
traditional grammar. Whereas a transformational grammar 
may properly include a formall-sed traditional grammar, 
it certainly does not properly include any structural 
grammar, since structural grammars typically refer 
directly to classes of "phonetic-noetic" complexes 
specifically without the mediation of intuitive notions 
of schoolbook grammar. The notions which mediate in 
a structural grammar are those theoretical notions 
which are applied in constructing empirical descriptions 
drawn from the structural theory in question. Chomsky's 
appeal to independent empirical evidence is illusory 
since the evidence has already been modelled in a way 
which favours transformational grammars. Structural 
and transformational grammars are, therefore, disjunct 
and non-comparable, except through the comparison of 
structural. and transformational theories. Just what 
will not wash is the idea that structural. grammars 
can be simply reduced to taxonomic grammars and be 
dismissed as inadequate. Even if such a. reduction 
were possible, the additional scope of the transforma- 
tional grammar is acquired at the price of making 
the grammar unacceptable. 
c. Lyons' descriptive adequacy 
I 
-. 
Chomsky's conditions of adequacy may be rejected 
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as little more than an attempt to justify transforma- 
tional grammar at the expense of other approaches. 
One cannot dispense with a criterion of adequacy 
altogether, however. Clearly, adequacy in some sense 
is a necessary conditicn of the validity of theories 
and descriptions. In general, an appropriate definition 
of adequacy must take into account both the theoretical 
and empirical issues involved. 
This appears to be what Lyons means when he sets 
up his conditions of "operational" and "material" 
adequacy. Lyonslactual formulation of conditions of 
adequacy may be regarded, in some respects, as somewhat 
unfvrtunate but it is a step in the right direction. 
Lyons tells us that a linguistic theory (in his case 
a semantic theory, within linguistics) "must employ 
concepts that are operationally definable in terms 
38 
of empirical techniques". This is operational adequacy. 
Lyons' condition is unexceptionable, if it is taken to 
mean that descriptions under the theory in question 
must refer to observables or be reducible to observables 
and that the descriptions must be empirically testable 
by clear-cut and unambiguous means. However, it could 
not be maintained that the concepts of the theory 
could be defined in terms of empirical techniques, 
although the theory must contain a methodology which is 
consistent with the concepts of the theory and applicable 




may be regarded, from a Hjelmslevian point of view, 
as appropriate but arbitrary. It follows that the 
concepts of the theory are arbitrary in having no 
empirical content although having empirical application 
as a product of their appropriateness. The concepts 
of the theory would not, then, be empirically definable 
by any means. What may be maintained is that, given 
some theoretical category, it must be the case that 
there is available for that category both some clear 
definition of it and some co-ordinated methodology such 
that the category in question takes its place in the 
theory and may be applied to data in such a way as to 
produce descriptive solutions testable via empirical 
means (see below). 
In fact, without some method of testing descriptions 
against observables for the purpose of the attempted 
refutation of the descriptions, the mere reference or 
reduction to observables is an insufficient condition 
of operational adequacy. 
Unfortunately, Lyons, account of material adequacy 
may be criticised on two counts of irrelevancy. 
Neither the condition that a linguistic theory "is 
to that degree more adequate, if, based on operationally 
definable concepts, it gives results which are in sig- 
nificant agreement with the native speaker's 
feelings 
about his language" 
39 
nor the condition of "saving the 
'A 
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appearances" (i. e. Itompatibility with the known or 
apparent facts of language learning and language use") 
40 
can be regarded as a sufficient or necessary condition 
on the validity of theories. Of course, any linguistic 
description must be compatible with the known facts 
of language use in a given community tut, then, it 
is these facts that a linguistic description purports 
to describe (i. e. it boils down to operational adequacy). 
While the facts of language learning seem to be simply 
irrelevant to a linguistic description of a language 
state, the requirement of agreement with the feelings 
of the native speaker seems bizarre. It is comprehensible 
if it merely means that no description should be contrary 
to fact in a way which is recognised as predicting 
utterances which are unacceptable to native speakers - 
but this is operational adequacy in a another form. 
However, if the description is required to capture 
in some way the feelings of the native speaker about 
his language (whatever these may be), Lyons seems to 
be moving out of the realm of the empirically observable. 
One may as well require that a physical theory be in 
significant agreement with the native earth-dwellers' 
feelings about his universe. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORIES, DESCRIPTIONS AND PHENOMENA 
-1 15- 
In the. foregoing we have assumed throughout that 
one can legitimately maintain a distinction between 
"linguistic theories" and "linguistic descriptions". 
Such a distinction may seem intuitively self-evident. 
We cannot, however, rely on this intuitive self-evidence. 
It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate the nature 
and necessity of this distinction in a precise fashion. 
The reason for this is that the distinction between 
linguistic theories and linguistic descriptions is 
of vital importance to the present discussion, since, 
without it, linguistic theory and linguistic description 
would collapse into a single entity and one would not 
be able to maintain a distinction tetween meta-theore- 
tical conditions to be satisfied by theories and those 
to be met by descriptions, i. e. one would not be able 
to specify to what a particular condition applies. 
Also, one would not be able to distinguish the theoretical 
conditions to be met by descriptions from the meta- 
theoretical conditions to be met by descriptions. In 
view of the difficulties encountered by "two-level" 
approaches to linguistics (such as that of Shaumjan 
and othern, see below), these consequences would be 
highly undesirable. As we shall see, a two-level 
linguistics, according to Shaumjan, is one which re- 
cognises a distinction between a level of scientific 
linguistic constructs and a level of linguistic pheno- 
mena, where the phenomena are modelled by the linguistic 
constructs. We shall argue that such a view (which is 
impliciti. y adOPted by the majority of theoreticians) 
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is inadequate and that it is necessary to recognise 
a further distinction within the class of constructs 
between a level of theoretical constructs and a level 
of descriptive linguistic constructs. We call this 
latter view (adopted explicitly by axiomatic functional- 
ists and implicitly by some others) a "three-level" 
linguistics. It is important to note that the 
distinction between linguistic theory and linguistic 
description is itself an important meta-theoretical 
matter. 
a. Previous approaches to the distinction 
The distinction between linguistic theory and 
linguistic description has been latent in the Prague 
School. (and Neo-Prague School) and in the glossematic 
approach to linguistics without, however, the distinction 
having been made entirely clear and explicit until 
recently. Casting a brief glance over the history 
of linguistics, one can see that the attempt to set 
up a homogeneous and coherent theory which could be 
applied in the description of any set of speech 
phenomena was first made explicitly by the Prague School 
linguists in their famous "Projet de Terminologie 
#0 1 Phonologique Standardiseell- The improvements to this 
projected set of definitions and their corresponding 
notions suggested by Vachek 
2 take the form of an 
implicitly deductive set of definitions. This theore- 
tical work culminated in Trubetskoy's Principles of 
Phonologyp in which$ however, the systematically 
deductive 
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aspect of phonological theory is, perhaps, not so 
evident. The notion of linguistic theory as a deduc- 
tive or axiomatic-deductive system of definitions seems 
I' to have been introduced to the Prague School by E-uhler's 
3 
Sprachtheorle, and his , 
Axiomatik der Sprachwis, -enschaf- 
4 
ten" . One should not forget Bloomfield's ill-fated 
"Set of Postulates for the Science of Language ,5 in 
this respect. (A deductive system of definitions with 
application to linguistic descriptjon is, of course, 
not the same as a (hypot-hetico-)deductive description. 
Hypothetico-deductive linguistic descriptions can be 
said to begin, in an explicit manner, with Saussure's 
M J* emoire) 
A later Praguian, Martinet, implicitly drew the 
distinction between linguistic theory and linguistic 
description, when he wrote, 
IlDecrire urie langue clest proprement indiquer ce 
en qud)i cette langue differe de de toutes les autres 
langues connues, existantes ou possibles. Restera 
hors de' la description tout ce que cette langue a 
116 
necessairement en commun avec toutes les autres 
langues. 
Clearly, to maintain that linguistic description 
is concerned with the properties which 
distinguish a 
given language from all others and 
that it excludes 
the properties necessarily common 
to all languages 
implies that we have some linguistic theory whose role 
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is to state the properties necessarily held in common 
by all languages. That is, one would distinguish between 
a level of descriptive constructs and a level of theore- 
tical concepts. Such a theory would state the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for membership in the class 
of languages and would constitute a theory of language. 
One cannot set about describing languages, deductivist 
linguists of Martinet's ilk would maintain, unless one 
can recognise individual languages. A theory of lan- 
guage such as ia implied (but never developed) by 
Martinet would allow us to recognise individual I-an- 
g', ýages and would be logically distinct from particular 
descriptions of entities satisfying the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for membership in the class of 
languages. This position is adopted, albeit implicitly 
and sporadically, by the glossematicians. Uldall, for 
instance, writes, 
"The Principle of Empiricism applies on several 
levels ..... because the term 
"description" can be inter- 
preted as-, referring to either a particular description 
of a particular object or the general descriptive 
,, 7 apparatus 
If we look at glossematic theory in these terms, 
we can see that this difference of interpretation 
corresponds to a potential dtstinction between linguistic 
theory (the general descriptive apparatr-is) and parti- 
cular linguistic descriptions 
(of particular sets of 
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phenomena). It must be said immediately, however, 
that this distinction was never put to any use by the 
glossematicians nor was it particularly well understood. 
Uldall goes on to say, for instance, that glossematic 
algebra "is a general description from which all 
particular descriptions, actual or potential, must 
8 
be deducible" . It is, in particular, not clear why 
the "general descriptive apparatus" should be sufficient 
to allow the deduction of all particular descri. ptions 
from it. It would seem more reasonable to suSgest 
that the application of the descriptive functions 
contained in the general descriptive apparatus, to 
some field of phenomena should lead to (facilitate) 
particular descriptions, since one does not see how 
an arbitrary general theory (introduced a. priori) 
can be expected to jmplv. (materially ?)a set of 
possible (?! ) empirical descriptions. Uldall might 
have meant that one can deduce abstract models from 
the theory, some of which are actually ins-antiated 
(although it is not clear what he did mean). This latter 
view is the one advanced by Hjelmslev? Under this 
view a particular description would be a model of 
the general theory, rather than logically deducible 
from the theory. However this may be, one should note 
that neither Martinet nor the glossematicians make 
a distinction between linguistic theory ard linguistic 
descriptions in any consistent or regular manner, nor 
do they make out detailed arguments 
for such a distinction. 
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Their reasons remain of an implicit nature. They do 
not, furthermore, draw any of the consequences of 
adopting such a position. 
b. The theory/description distinction_in Axiomatic 
Functionalism 
It has been left to Mulder 10/11 to give an 
explicit explanation of the distinction between 
linguistic theory and linguistic description. This 
distinction is closely related to the question of the 
status of linguistics as a science. 
It would be generally agreed that linguistics 
may be defined globally as the scientific study- of 
12/13 language. This is the definition given by, for 
example, Lyons, Martinet and many others. In general, 
as we have said, the adoption of a "scientific" approach 
to linguistics implies the attempt to gain knowledge 
about given intersubjectively agreed phenomena. In 
order that this knowledge transcend mere "natural 
history" or random observation, one requires that the 
investigation of given phenomena be carried cut on 
14 
a principled tasis, i. e. in accordance with some theory, 
A theory, as we have suggested, may be regarded as 
providing us with a coherent and sufficient set of 
functions which constitute an analytical basis (as in 
axiomatic functionalism, standard functionalism, 
glossematics, (less formally) tagmemics and others). 
Now, we can call. the presentation of acquired knowledge 
-121- 
15 about a given set of phenomena a "description". Since 
one of the aims of linguistics as a discipline is here 
taken to be the acquisition of knowledge about given 
fields of speech phenomena 
16 
that is intersubjectively 
testable 17 we may assert, along with Mulder, that it 7 
is an aim of linguistics as a dicipline "to make 
possible the scientific description of any chosen field 
18 of speech phenomena", In order to achieve this, as 
Mulder points out, "linguists have to provide a theory 
as a device... without such a device this aim cannot 
19 be achieved". 
It is a reasonable and a reasonably self-evident 
reflection that, in order to make a description of 
the sort in question, one requires both a set of pheno- 
mena and a principled way of describing those pheno- 
mena. It is for this reason that Mulder asserts that 
"any description presupposes both a theory and a field 
20 
of phenomena". The field of phenomena, the describiendum, 
in the case of linguistics can be agreed upon as an 
arbitrarily selected set of speech phenomena. The 
description may be regarded as "the application of a. 
particular linguistic theory to a selected field of 
21 
linguistic phenomena". Now, it is clearly tý. e case 
that there are as many fields of phenomena to which 
22 
one can apply a given theory as one cares to delimit, 
i. e. the selected fields of phenomena are virtually 
infinite in number. Since the theory may be applied 
to any of these fields of phenomenaý or all of them 
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separately, it follows that there are correspondingly 
many descriptions in potentiality. We may say, then, 
that there is a one-one relation between a given field 
of phenomena and the corresponding description of that 
field of phenomena (as an application of the theory 
in question) ; however, there is a one-many relation 
between, on the one hand, the theory and the descriptions 
and, on the other, the theory and the fields of phenomena 
to which the theory may be applied. One may distinguish 
the notinn "linguistic theory" from the notion "linguistic 
description" in the same way that one distinguishes a 
set of statements purporting tc describe a given object 
from the terms in which one chooses to make the set 
of statements in question. Clearly, the general des- 
criptive apparatus of a given theory may be applied 
to each set of phenomena separately and, thus, a given 
descriptive method (set of analytical functions) would 
be distinguished from the descriptions of particular 
fields of phenomena using those functions. "Is a 
phoneme", "is a moneme", etc. are analjtical (propositional) 
functions of a theory. 11/p/ is a phoneme" and "plural 
is a moneme" are descriptive statements about English, 
where it is stated that /p/ and plural meet respectively 
the conditions of the analytical functions 
"is a phoneme" 
and "is a monemell of some particular theory 
(and /p/ 
and plural have specific empirical interpretations). 
One important consequence of a rigorous application 
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of this distinction is that it leads to a clear-cut 
dichotomy between theoretical and descriptive Etatements. 
As Martinet suggests, (above) it is the job of linguistic 
descriptions to state the particular properties of 
given fields of phenomena. 
of languages are excluded. 
The necessary properties 
Thus, if the double articu- 
lation is a necessary property of languagg then it will 
not be a descriptive term appearing in the description 
of any language - any given language will possess 
double articulation by definition. On the other hand, 
if /p/ is a phoneme of English, this will be a property 
of English and a peculiarity of that language not present 
by definition - thus, the statement, 11/p/Ilis a phoneme 
of English", will be relevant in the description of 
that language but will not be a statement of linguistic 
theory. (In fact, the properties of /p/ depend on 
the particular features of English, which determine 
that it has the distinctive features, /labial, voiceless, 
stop/, as opposed to the phoneme /p/ in Russian which 
ha. c, the features /labial, stop, voiceless, unaspirated/. ) 
No descriptive statement appears in the theory, because 
there can be no identity between the terms employed 
in the descriptive statements about different fields of 
phenomena - except the theoretical functions involved - 
as will be clear from the two descriptively different 
phonemes, /p/, in English and Russian. This position 
implies, for instance, that there can be no meaningful 
universal definition of, say, "aspect" 
23 
since what 9 
-a 
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we call "aspect" in Criglish and, say, Russian is a 
quite different phenomenon) grammatically and semantically, 
in the two languages. ("Aspect" in English (in an 
axiomatic functionalist description) is a syntactic 
entity whereas Russian "aspect" is morphological. ) 
This makes clear the view implicit in Martinet's 
statement (which we accept) that linguistic descriptions 
are concerned with those features which vary (or may 
vary) from language to language, whereas linguistic 
theory is concerned with the defining properties of 
language and those analytical functions which are re- 
quired for linguistic description (leaving aside the 
question whether Martinet actually adopts this view). 
An important consequence of adopting this position is 
that it excluded the possibility of empirical linguistic 
universals. 
The necessity of making this distinction in 
linguistics may be seen when we consider that it is 
related to the fact that there is a one-many relation 
between the theory and the fields of phenomena. Since 
the theory may be used as a device for, or is applicable 
iný the description of potentially an infinite number 
of fields of speech phenomena - and the fields of 
phenomena may be regarded as discrete from one another- 
it follows that no "theory" could be a theory or 
description of all fields of phenomena simultaneously. 
In popperian terms, the refutat. ion class of such a 
theory would belhon-homotypic t, 
24 Consequently, it is 
necessary to set up a level of "description" 
distinct 
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from a level of "theory", such that each description 
is related to a single, homogeneous refutation class 
of "potential falsifiers". It should be clear from 
this that the notion of description, as used here, 
is similar to the notion of "empirLcal theory" a3 
used by Popper. The major difference between the 
position adopted here and the position adopted by 
Popper is that, in the present "three-level" approach 
(involving separate levels of "theory", "descriptions" 
and "speech phenomena"), the level of empirical 
constructs (linguistic description) implies some 
further level of n_on-empirical constructs (linguistic 
theory) since a linguistic description is an application 
of some linguistic theory to a field of speech phenomena. 
Any linguistic description requires a conceptual appara- 
tus in terms of which it is constructed. No such 
separate level of "conceptual apparatus" is implied 
in Popper's use of the term theory. 
Comparison with the "two-level" view 
Popper, along with any other defender of a "two- 
level" approach to the philosophy of science (involving 
two levels of "observable objects" and "empirical 
constructs"), would probably object to the use of the 
term "theory" as it is understood in the "three-levelft 
approach advocated here on the grounds that a "scientific 
theory" (for Popper and others) should be confrontatle 
with empirical data in order to test its empirical 
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validity or falsehood. Such a course is barred to 
us, if we set up the "theory" in a three-level approach 
in such a way that it is a purely logical construction 
incapable of experiential refutation or confirmation 
25 (following Mulder and Hjelmslev). Mulder and Hjelmslev 
would be on strong grounds, however, in refusing to 
admit that theories introduced a priori could have 
empirical validity and in insisting that the construction 
of such theories is unavoidable (at least in linguistica, ). 
One should be careful not to confuse the essentially 
trivial terminological matter of the use of the term 
"theory" with the important question of whether the 
philosophy of science recognises one level of constructs 
or two levels, one of which is not an empirical level. 
There is no dispute between the parties that scientific 
systems require at least one level of empirical constructs. 
Defenders of the two-level view will have to be con- 
vinced that a level of non-empirical constructs is 
necessary and practicable. If such a level is necessary, 
we will require a considerable modification of the view 
of at least one science on the part of many people, 
viz. linguistics). 
The above argument for a "three-level" approach 
to linguistics relies on the view that no linguistic 
description will be acceptable, unless it is theoretically 
justified, i. e. all such descriptions involve such 
defined predicates as "is a phoneme", "is a sign", 
"is a grammatical relation", "is a phcnctagm" , etc. 
none of which contains the name of an empiiýical 
object. 
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These expressions should form a coherent system (they 
should not be ad hoc). It seems to be the case that, 
in fact, we always assume a level of non-empirical 
objects (phoneme, sign, grammatical relation, phono- 
ta_gm, etc. ) in setting up a lingulstic description 
and the names of these objects appear in the theoretical 
predicates mentioned. This argument seems irresistible. 
It may be pointed out, in part explanation of the 
absence of the distinction in the philosophy of science, 
that the philosophy of science has been typically 
concerned with the logical and empirical sciences which 
deal with a single universe of phenomena. As Popper 
says , 
11the system called Illempirical science" is intended 
to represent only one real world : the 'real world' 
26 
or the 'world of our experience'", 
whereas linguists have not been typically concerned 
with a single universe of phenomena. The argument for 
a "three-level" view of science is not based on any 
argument involving the notion of "multiplicity of 
logically possible worlds". The point is, rather, 
that Popper seems to have overlooked the possibility 
that a sirigle scierce may be concerned with a potentially 
infinite number of real worlds of experience or, at 
very least, real universes of discourse, each of which 
requires discrete and separate descriptive 
treatment. 
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Such, as we have argued, is the position in linguisticst 
i. e. one is concerned with a potentially infinite 
set of possible fields of speech phenomena, which one 
aims to describe from a single, homogeneous point 
of view (using a single general descriptive apparatus). 
As Mulder has pointed out, 
"Though, perhaps, in the natural sciences, it 
is unnecessary to distinguish sharply between theory 
and description, in linguistics it is imperative to 
do so. This is because linguistics is not concerned 
with the description of ONE universe - all speech 
phenomena (taken as a whole) - but with a virtually 
1127 unlimited number of PfýRALLEL universes... . 
The importance of the present considerations lies in 
the fact that the case of linguistics is one where 
a "two-level" approach to the philosophy of science 
is inadequate and where it is necessary to distinguish 
between the business of empirical description and the 
task of constructing a theory to be applied in describing 
28 
given fields of phenomena. In general, as with Popper 
(above), philosophers of science have been concerned 
with disciplines dealing with one field of phenomena 
and so, as Mulder has said, 
"Because any given natural science only deals 
with one universe, there is no overwhelming need to 
keep theory and description strictly apart. " 
29 
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That is, the meta-theoretical distinction between 
theory and description is not of vital importance 
when dealing with a single universe of experience. 
One may wonder, however, whether this is entirely correct. 
In general, the investigation of some part of the 
universe is carried out in accordance with some, 
more general (perhaps, all--embracing) theory (e. g. 
quantum theory) or model. One may usefully distinguish 
between, say, the general theory of molecular structure, 
on the one hand, and particular investigations into 
the structure and properties of, for example., 
particular proteins on the other, where such parti- 
cular descriptions presuppose the more general theory. 
One should also note that it is imperative to distinguish 
a theory and a model of a theory (as Popper 
30 
now does), 
where an @bstract calculus (e. g. Lobachevskian geometry) 
receives an empirical interpretation or modelling 
(as in astrophysics). In such 2. case, the theory is 
not per se empirical, although the models of the theory - 
which show the applicability of that theory - must be. 
That is to say that, even in the case of the natural 
sciences, there seems to be good reason to distinguish 
a non-empirical level of constructs. 
A similar POsitt6n is adopted by Carnap, who 
abstractýlltheoreticalll predicates from "empirical 
"observational predicates" (see below)ý' The distinction 
between a theory and a model of a theory (see below) 
is of great importance in overcoming the confusion 
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between the "deductive" and the "hypothetical" aspects 
of "hypotetico-deductive! lapproaches. For this reas. on 
also it is necessary to distinguish a level of abstract 
scientific constructs (see below for further discussion). 
What we have been saying is that linguistics differs 
from, at least, some other sciences-in that it is 
concerned with more than one universe of phenomena. 
This is one of the facts that make it imperative to 
distinguish linguistic theory from linguistic description. 
We now look at some possible objections to this view. 
One way of attacking our position would be to maintain 
that the field of linguistic phenomena constitute 
a homogeneous set of explananda and that this set 
cannot be arbitrarily divided into discrete, separate 
fields of speech phenomena. This argument is irresistible 
if we regard speech phenomena in their entirety and 
ignore the fact that linguistics imposes its own point 
of view in selecting certain aspects of the phenomena 
as relevant. In particularg linguistics is concerned 
with speech phenomena as communicational tokens and 
with determining those conventions which 
"govern" 
communication in a given speech community. 
Given that 
this is the case, we maintain that the alternative 
position of viewing all speech phenomena as 
an undif- 
ferentiated set from the point of view of 
linguistics 
is unreasonab le. That is, to maintain 
that the field 
of linguistic phenomena was a single 
universe of speech 
'A 
-131- 
phenomena would imply that the speech phenomena found 
in London and Peking, on the Left Bank in Paris and 
in Lagos, etc., constituted a single, homogeneous 
class of phenomena. This is clearly not a reasonable 
position to adopt, unless it is maintained that 
linguistic communication can be achieved by any two 
individuals each using any set of communicational 
tokens ; i. e. that a knowledge of the conventions 
of either Chinese or English is sufficient for a 
non-bilingual English speaker to achieve linguistic 
communication with a unilingual Chinese speaker. 
Although some form of communication might take ple.: -ce, 
it is obviously absurd to think that linguistic 
communication could be achieved. It would, in principle 
but absurdly, be possible to construct a simultaneous 
description of the speech phenomena of Chinese and 
English (although one fails to see the point cf such 
an exercise, where communication is not achieved). 
It is self-evidently more reasonable and more useful 
to treat very different fields of phenomena separately. 
This is quite different from the situation prevailing 
in many other sciences, especially those with which 
the philosophy of science is principally concerned, 
although even in those sciences, perhaps, there 
rray be room for a "three-level" view. 
It may be maintained, of course, that not all 
fields of communicational speech phenomena are as 
'A 
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grossly different as are those of English and Chinese. 
There are undoubtedly marginal cases, where any division 
would be to some extent arbitrary. In describing the 
dialect of the Leeds-Bradford conurbation, does one 
include or exclude the speech phenomena of Pudsey, 9. 
The difficulty of such a question is entirely illusory. 
Because the decisions as to the exact "range! lof speech 
phenomena to be taken into account are inevitably 
arbitrary, one may say that it is equally possible to 
describe the communicational phenomena of Leeds-Bradford 
with or without the inclusion of Pudsey. In the 
deductive method of scientific description a linguistic 
description is projected onto a field of phenomena 
and may, thus, be empirically valid for that area of 
speech phenomena but not valid for a slightly larger 
area of speech phenomena. Thus, a description of the speech 
phenomena of the Leeds-Bradford area without Pudsey 
might well have to be changed in order to account for 
Pudsey speech phenomena. One cannot escape the conclusion, 
however, that the selection of one's field of phenomena 
is ultimately an arbitrary matter, although it is 
justifiably so, if we wish to account fcr grcssly 
dissimilar fields of phenomena separately and avoid 
a cline of likeness from English to Chinese. 
It is of vital imPOrtance to remember that this 
conclusion can be reached only if we allow 
linguistic 
theory to determine that linguistics is concerned, in 
the first place, with the communicational aspect of 
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speech phenomena. Consequently, we must revise our 
previous view that the "third level" of a three-level 
approach to linguistics is the speech phenomena, in 
order to say, somewhat pedantically perhaps, that 
it is instead the communicational speech phenomena. 
Otherwise, the distinction between linguistic theory 
and linguistic description will collapse, because 
speech phenomena per se undoubtedly can. be treated 
as a single universe of phenomena. This requirement 
of specifying the aspect of speech phenomena with 
which linguistics is concerned may be satisfied, for 
example, by the choice of a theory which incorporates 
the notion of "distinctive function with respect to 
communication" as in all varieties of functionalist 
linguistics and glossematics. The important point 
is that the argument in favour of a single universe 
of phenomena in linguistics cannot be sustained. 
Another line of attack could be as follows. It 
might not be clear to everyone why one should want to 
adopt a single theory for the construction of different 
linguistic descriptions of a virtually infinite set 
of different fields of phenomena. After all, it might 
be argued, each field of phenomena calls for a 
separate theory as an explanatory construct 1-Tith respect 
to the phenomena in questioný2 Such a view would 
apparently require us to maintain the two-level view 
of linguistics ; i. e. for each set of phenomena 
there 
would be one set of constructs. Such a situation would 
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apparently be more akin to the situation in the natural 
sciences. There are three points to made in this 
connexion. 
Firstly, no one actually adopts, this attitude 
(at least, in this extreme form), since, necessarily, 
one could never arrive at any general understanding 
of Language that is the same for each field of pheno- 
mena described, whereas it would be generally accepted 
that it is the business of linguistics to develop 
such a. conception. That is to say ;a general theory 
would have to arise from descriptions in which either 
there were no common methods, analytical types, relations, 
etc. or where all the theoretical terms (or some of them) 
were identical but differently defined in each case. 
For instance, we could not take a generative phonological 
description in English and a functionalist description 
of the phonology of French and hope to come out with a 
general theory of phonological structure (even in the 
unlikely event of our wishing to do so). Equally, many 
theoretical terms are common to Bloomfield and Martinet 
(phoneme, morpheme, etc. )but it is perfectly obvious that 
we could not arrive at a general linguistic theory by 
comparing descriptions of a Bloomfieldian type with 
those of a Martinet type. These two cases are, in fact, 
the same except that in the second case we have the 
additional confusion introduced by the use of the same 
terms defined differently in different linguistic theories. 
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But this merely takes us back to the main point I wish 
to make ; viz. that there is an important theoretical 
level of linguistic debate distinct from that of empirical 
linguistic description and presupposed by empirical 
description. This theoretical debate requires some 
framework for the comparison and discussion of theories 
(meta-theory). 
Secondly, if a separate theory were set up for 
each set of phenomena, it would be either the case 
that all descriptions of given fields of phenomena 
were constructed using the same theoretical terms )r 
(and definitions), in which case one is left with 
precisely the task of setting up a general descriptive 
apparatus of the sort we are calling "theory", or that 
one set up a new theoretical apparatus for each new 
description. In this latter case, however, one is 
still left with the problem of setting up a theoretical 
apparatus distinct from the description of phenomena ; 
otherwise , the "description" would 
be entirely ad hoc 
(in the absence of any theoretical justification one 
would scarcely want to speak of "description" at all). 
If we were to set up a different theoretical apparatus 
for each new description of a field of phenomena, this 
would be not only highly uneconomical, it would not 
be possible to draw even inductive generalisations 
about the nature of Language. This is due to the fact 
that the employment of different analytical bases 
would render the descriptions in question non-comparable 
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except (absurdly) via the different theories of language 
involved. (This is the only way we can compare, 
for instance, a functionalist description of English with 
a description based, say, on the Aspects model - even 
the extensions ("scopes") of the two models involve 
different classifications (descriptive claims about) 
of the "range" of phenomena. ) 
The third point concerns matters of convenience. 
As we have said, the phenomena may be looked upon in 
two different ways. Regarded simply as describienda, 
arbitrarily selected speech phenomena constitute the 
"range" of the description, i. e. that set of phenomena 
to which the linguistic theory may be meaningfully 
applied and of which a particular linguistic description 
is a descriptive model. As such, speech phenomena 
constitute the initial motivation ("explananda") for 
the setting up of linguistic theories and descriptions. 
On the other hand, phenomena may be regarded as the 
set of observable entities, each of which satisfies 
the_conditions of the description fDr analysis. In 
this latter case, the communicational speech phenomena 
constitute the II. Topell or "extension" of the description. 
As pure describienda (range) , speech phenomena 
(com- 
municational or otherwise) are simply contingently 
existing events ; but the entity which is constituted 
by a phenomenon in its capacity of satisfying an 
analytical function is itself a functicnt the function 
of the event and the analytical or descriptive 
function. 
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In this second sense, each such phenomenon is part of 
the extension or scope of the description and may be 
described by what Whitehead and Russell call an un- 
ambiguous (singular) description ý3 A singular descrip- 
(ox)1133 tion. has the general formula, 11f (tx) , which is 
the function of some particular entity in its capacity 
of satisfying the descriptive function, A x). Now, a 
set of entities is described by that function which 
each member satisfies. It follows that it is necessary 
to select a set of descriptive functions for the 
description of the describienda (range). This selection 
of functions will constitute what we call altheory" 
34 
If the theory selected for, say, the description of 
(ýa-) , 
qb, -) Chinese contains the set of functions, xx 
C (, n. ) x and the theory selected for the 
description of the speech phenomena of English contains 
aA. b, -. c- n" the set of functionsy (yx), (yx), (yx),..... g( r X) 9 
such that - (3y) (y=t), then it is clearly the case 
that there is no basis for the inductive comparison 
of the descriptions, of the two different sets of 
phenomena. That is, 
abc 




The description of English =f (x (? x) VV (Y'x) Vv 





One can see that only the above theories can 
be compared 
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and the theories determine the differences between the 
descriptions (assuming that the range of phenomena is 
selected in the same way in both cases). Put more 
simp y the two theories select different aspects of 
the different fields of phenomena: It follows, further- 
more, that the respective scopes of the descriptions 
are different and, hence, it is not possible to arrive 
at inductive conclusions about Language on the basis 
of descriptions made using different theories and 
concerning different phenomena ranges. If we set up 
a different theory for each set of phenomena, the aim 
of making general statements about the two sets of 
phenomena conjointly could not be achieved. (Also, 
if general statements could be made, they would be 
meta-descriptive and so a third level of linguistic 
constructs would automatically be implied. ) 
The same points could be made, if we were to apply 
different theories in the description of the same 
range of phenomena, e. g. the speech phenomena of Chinese. 
Since the analytical functions would be different in 
the two cases, it follows that the respective scopes 
of the two descriptions for the same range of phenomena 
would be different and, thus, incapable of anything 
other than theoretical or trivial comparison. (This 
would be the case, for instance, where one set of 




but not archiphoneme and the other contained archi- 
phoneme but not morphophoneme as in the contrast between 
Bloomfieldian and functionalist approaches to phonology. ) 
In other words, the "bi-uniqueness" of linguistic 
descriptions implies a three-level linguistics. 
One may assert, then, that it is advantageous to 
adopt the same theory for the description of different 
35/36 and parallel fields of phenomena in linguistics. 
Again, the "two-level" view of linguistics cannot be 
maintained. The comparison of theories is clearly I--- 
a different and meta-theoretical matter. 
Radical universalism 
It might be possible to maintain a "two-level" 
approach to linguistics, if one were prepared to take 
the view that all of the information required for 
each linguistic description were to be contained in 
the theory. One could then maintain that the theory 
would be directly refutable in confrontation with all 
and any set of phenomena. This would be the position 
of the radical universalist. That is, one who holds 
that the differences between languages are entirely 
superficial and that all languages share a common 
structure which the linguist attempts to model in his 
theory. This common linguistic structure would then 
be related to each set of speech phenomena by rules 
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of interpretation. Whereas the rules of interpretation 
might be different for each particular language, since 
they would account for the allegedly superficial dif- 
ferences between languages, the theory of linguistic 
structure would be invariant. In principle, such a 
37 view seems to be adopted by many transformationalists. 
In effect, this point of view denies a level of descrip- 
tion separate for each language except insofar as 
linguistic description could be equated with establishing 
rules of interpretation for the theory with respect 
to sets of speech phenomena. 
Now, this is a very radical proposal. It seems 
to underlie the view that a child learning a language 
is disposed to select a particular type of grammar 
of a narrowly defined sort on the basis of its linguistic 
experience and its innate capacities 
ý7 It is not clear, 
however, that this proposal disposes of a three-level 
view of linguistics quite as neatly as might appear. 
The main point is that one can never dispose entirely 
of the sort of theoretical predicates of which we have 
already spoken. In transformational-generative grammar 
it becomes necessary to introduce and to define concepts 
which are not empirical but theoretical. Thus, for 
instance, concepts such as that of tree and tree-structure 
or the notion of transformation as a kind of mapping 
are theoretical and not empirical in nature. Even in 
I--- I 
A 
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transformational-generative grammar it jis necessary 
to define the types of unit over which operations 
take place. That is, we require definitions of terms 
such as morpheme, verb, noun phrase, etc.. To admit 
these things, however, is merely to admit a level of 
theoretical debate and modelling different from that 
of the modelling of empirical data. 
There is another point. This is that the position of 
the radical universalist, viz. that the underlying 
structure of each language is tý, -e same and that lan- 
guages differ only superficially, is itself a matter 
of contention. The argument between the universalist 
and his opponent is not to be resolved in any empirical 
manner. It is only on the theoretical plane that the 
dispute can be decided, if at all. The reason for this 
is quite straightforward. Any empirical deficiency in 
the universalistIs theory can be remedied in one of 
two ways. Firstly, the universalist can introduce a 
new set of interpretation rules for the set of data 
under consideration. Since any two objects in the 
universe can be related, there must exist for any pair, 
<theory, set of data), some set of rules connecting 
the members of this pair. Secondly, in extremis, the 
universalist can change his theory, i. e. his actual 
claim as to what the universals of language are. But, 
as we can see, the universalist is not required on the 
basis_o_. f empirical evidence to abandon his initial 
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position, since changes in either way leave him free 
to maintain still that languages differ only superficially 
and not in their underlying structure. The dispute 
between the proponent of universalism and his adversary 
thus cannot be resolved on empirical grounds. The 
universalist's initial position is adopted as an axiom. 
Conversely, it is not possible to prove the universalist's 
case to his opponent by empirical arguments. Even if 
it can be shown that some theory with appropriate 
interpretation rules can account for all known sets 
of speech phenomena, the non-universalist always has 
two counter-arguments. Firstly, he can attribute the 
success of the universalist theory to the arbitrariness 
of its interpretation rules and, secondly, again in 
extremis, he can point out that there are in principle 
any number, of theorýes which can account for a single 
set of speech phenomena and that, in principle, there 
must be an infinite set of theories which can account 
for all sets of speech phenomena granted appropriate 
interpretation rules. The non-universalist can say, 
then, either that the universalist has not made out 
his case for having established a genuine linguistic 
theory or that he has not made out his case 
for having 
established the unique, empirically valid 
theory intended. 
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the dispute cannot 
be resolved on the empirical plane. 
The proof which 
we have given is, incidentally, meta-theoretical. 
Only 
by discussing theories, -can any position 
be taken in this 
A 
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dispute. But to say that implies a distinction between 
empirical and theoretical concerns in linguistics, i. e. 
it. imp3ies a tliree-level linguistics. 
e. Phenomena and the "three-level" approach 
One should note that it is in respect of the 
comparison of descriptions using the same 
analytical basis that the distinction between 
independently existing phenomena and independently 
existing linguistically describable phenomena becomes 
important. Whereas the range of phenomena is merely 
independently existing, the scope of the description 
is determined by the limits of applicability of the 
linguistic theory used in constructing the description. 
Most phonological theories exclude phonostylistic 
phenomena, for example. It is in this sense that a 
theory determines its own scope, i. e. the set of pheno- 
mena (and the aspect of those phenomena) which will 
be considered as relevant to linguistic. description 
under that theory. This sameness of theoretically 
determined scope (through the set of analytical functions) 
ensures the comparability of descriptions. In terms 
of the above symbolization for one theory we obtain, 
av(b fx)V (f, The description of Chinese = f( x( X) X) vv 
(ex) ) 
and 
y The description of English =f(yV (fy) V (Jýj) Vv 




A second important point about tl7ie scope of pheno- 
mena determined by a linguistic theory is that it is 
the notion of scope of linguistic theory which is crucial 
to the idea of a three-level linguistics. We have 
already said that the range of speech phenomena may 
be considered per se as a single universe of phenomena 
(and it is sometimes so regarded by phoneticians). It 
is only when we determine the scope of the linguistically 
describable phenomena by introducing, for example, 
a specifically communicationally oriented linguistic 
theory that we can speak of 'communicational speech 
phenomena'. Furthermore, it is only when we take the 
aspect of communication into account that we are justi- 
fied in taking the position that a linguistic theory 
may reasonably be regarded as standing in a one-many 
relation with a virtually infinite set of fields of 
communicational speech phenomena. Hence, the notion 
of scope and its correlated determining factor in the 
linguistic theory must be distinguished from the notion 
of range of speech phenomena. Without a criterion of 
relevance to determine the scope of a theory, such as 
the functionalist principle that only objects separately 
relevant to communication are members of semiotic sets, 
it is difficult to see how even grossly dissimilar fields 
of phenomena could be kept distinct. Without the 
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distinction between fields of phenomena the distinction 
between theory and description would collapse and we 
should arrive at an absurd position ; the set of speech 
phenomena would be totally undifferentiated. The 
distinction between theory and description would come 
into question, under such circumstances, becausse we 
would no longer be dealing with a multiplicity of 
universes of phenomena. 
A compromise suggestion has sometimes been made 
that, given various 'paradigms' for linguistic descrip- 
tion (e. g. witem and arrangement", "word and paradigm" 
and "item and process" morphology) it should be possible 
to determine, for each set of data, the best or most 
38 
appropriate paradigm. 
This attitude implies that, given the poss-ibility 
of establishing a description in terms of each of the 
descriptive paradigms concerned for each field of 
phenomena, it is possible to determine by empirical 
means which is the "best" or "correct" one. However, 
if our previous argument was correct, no conclusive 
empirical argument can be adduced to prefer one tl,. eory 
over another even for particular sets of phenomena. 
If the different descriptions are equally adequate from 
both the formal and empirical points of view (and orte 
would not wish to compare descriptions unless, 
they were 




no method of empirical evaluation apart from considera- 
tions of elegance or simplicity, most of which are 
naturally of a subjective nature and none of which is 
very satisfying. What one can do is to apply a set 
of meta-theoretical conditions to each description 
and theory in turn. Of course, we would prefer one 
description and its concomitant theory, if it survived, 
where others failed, tests of formal and empirical 
adequacy. In such a case, however, it is not so-much the 
comparison of descriptions which gives a result from 
empirical data as the application of independent conditinns 
to each description in turn. One should note that 
this method does not lead to a cline of language types 
ranging from WP through IA to IP. Rather, one comes 
to reject one or more of the proposed theories. In 
any case, it would be very difficiAlt to compare descrip- 
tions, since, in this case, the scopes of the respective 
theories are different. So, we are left with the 
process of eliminating theories of language. 
The conclusion that we should aim to establish 
meta-theoretical conditions to be met by theories and 
which can serve as a method of determining the adequacy 
of theories should not be too surprising. The main 
argument against the proposal of a range of language 
types classified according to theory is that this 
proposal simply hides the central theoretical conflict 
between theories. WP, IA and IP, for example, simply 
'A 
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have nothing in common. They are different concepts 
of language (or part of it). They are in competition 
with respectIto all_languages. 
One great difficulty with comparing different 
theories through their respective descriptions of 
specified fields of phenomena is how to determine when 
a given theory has actually failed to lead to an 
empirically adequate solution. There is always the 
possibility that the comparer has simply failed to 
apply each of the conflicting theories equally well. 
SCr. ip4- 4C Linguistic de -Iýn is, after all, partly an art 
form requiring ingenuity. A case in point, as we 
have seen, is Chomsky's comparison of the "phrase- 
structure model" with the "transformational model", 
where Chomsky's transformational model is presented 
with far more inventiveness than the clearly unaccep- 
table and very primitive phrase-structure model. As 
many writers have since pointed out, with sufficient 
inventiveness, the phrase-structure model can be 
set up so as to performs the tasks Chomsky requires 
of it 
ýq 
In the comparison of linguistic theories, there 
is only one case where we can arrive at a straightforward 
decision and that is the case where one 
theory properly 
includes the other. In the case of two disjunct 
theories, 
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one would require some sort of external criterion of 
evaluation, which may or may not be generally acceptable, 
or one might invoke a simplicity measure. Since, however, 
theories determine their own scopes, it is not at all 
clear how a simplicity measure might be applied in 
evaluating different, equally applicable, linguistic 
theories. In the case of disjunct theories, for the 
same reason, one could not speak of one theory being 
"more inclusive" than another with respect to phenomena. 
From the above arguments one will. conclude that 
the best course to adopt involves the establishment 
or consideration of a single theory at a time for 
the separate description of many fields of phenomena 
and the development of a set of meta-theoretical 
conditions of acceptability so that each linguistic 
theory and description may be judged in terms of the 
same standards. 
f. The "two-level" approa. ch_revis-ited. 
The best known defender of the "two-level" approach 
in linguistics has been Shaumjan, who writes, 
"Contemporary logic of science demands that in each 
theoretical discipline two levels of abstraction be 
strictly distinguished ; the level of observation and 
the level of constructs. On the level of observation 
we deal with directlY observable objects, properties and 
-i 
relations, which are usually called elementary. Con- 
structs are objects, properties and relations which 
are not directly observable. " 
40 
On this interpretation, linguistics is required to 
set up explanatory models on the level of constructs 
in order to account for the set of empirical data on 
the level of observation. In this way the empirical 
adequacy of a system of constructs is tested. As 
Shaumjan says, 
"Each abstract model of natural languages presents 
itself as nothing other than an artificial system of 
symbols, an artificial language imitating natural 
languages. " 
ýi 
trans. P. R. R. ) 
Furthermore, "constructs are linked with the level 
of observation by means of so-called rules of corres- 
42 
pondence". Shaumjan goes on to distinguish the "static" 
and "dynamic" forms of linguistic investigation ; 
"Statics includes the network of taxonomic relations 
in '. 1-anguage (by "taxcnomic" I mean the relations between 
the elements of lang,, ugge which can be investigated by 
"taxonomic", i. e. "classificatory", methods) ; and 
dynamics is the network of inner relations in language, 
connected with the laws for generating linguistic 
I. 
units of all ranks fror the simplest primitive elements, 
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1 1143 of language. 
According to Sh&umjan this distinction corresponds to 
the distinction between the Ilaxiomatic" and the 
"genetic/constructional" methods of constructing 
scientific systems. Thus, "a generative device is 
44 
a mathematical system based on the genef. ic metY. od", 
whereas the "axiomatic method" is concerned with 
"classification"/"taxonomy". Shaumjan describes a 
generative device as consisting of three components 
as follows, 
a set of elementary grammatical objects from 
which complex grammatical objects are generated. 
(2) a set of operations which apply to the ele- 
mentary grammatical objects and serve to generate the 
complex grammatical objects. 
a set of structural specifications which are 
given to each complex grammatical object generated 
(in this way a hierarchy of generate(ý complex grammatical 
objects is set up). " 
45 
One can see that it is not possible to maintain a 
"two-level" approach to linguistics on the basis of this 
outline. An axiomatic, "taxonomic" theory for the 
description of observable speech phenomena (e. g., 
presumably, glossematics) must clearly contain both 
an analytical basis distinct from a particular 
taxonomy 
and, on Shaumjaný, s account, the proposed classification 
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of objects ; otherwise, the descriptive classification 
can be disregarded as ad hoc. One cannot treat the 
analytical basis on the same level as an application 
of it - the two entities are of different orders 
of abstraction. If, however, there is an analytical 
basis distinct from a particular taxonomy of the speech 
phenomena of a particular group of speakers, then one 
must recognise a three-level linguistics, since the 
need arises to ensure that the analytical basis is 
46 itself adequate and not self-contradictory. Only if 
the analytical basis satisfies such conditions of 
acceptability can one accept the linguistic descriptions 
which are based on it. 
On the other hand, a constructional/generative 
device of the sort described must either presuppose 
some taxonomy of initial objects (i. e. one must have 
at least the theoretical predicate, "is an elementary 
grammatical object"), in which case the device in 
question clearly presupposes the theory used to make 
the classification in question ; or, alternatively, it 
may be argued that the set of elementary grammatical 
objects requires no further justification than an 
empirical adequation via the rules of correspondence 
with the class of observables. If this is maintained, 
however, then it will be impossible to set -. upv, a- relation of 
correspondence between any grammatical object and any 
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set of observables, unless it is possible to determine 
the nature of the grammatical object in question, i. e. 
it must be a member of a defined grammatical category 
in such a way that the class of observables, which 
satisfy the conditions of the grammatical object, 
constitute the correspondence class of the grammatical 
object in question. It is presumably for this reason 
that Shaumjan requires that each complex grammatical 
object be given a structural specification. However, 
it will not be possible to determine the correspondence 
class of any grammatical object which is not an instance 
of a theoretical object, i. e. there must be clearly 
defined conditicns to be satisfied by putative members 
of the correspondence class of a given instance of a 
theoretical object (otherwise, the rules of correspondence 
will be simply arbitrary). For instance, if X is a 
syntactic complex in L, then we will need to know the 
definition of the theoretical predicate, "is a syntactic 
complex" before the correspondence class, C, of ob- 
servables can be determined for X. Of course, we will 
need to know many other factors in the description of L, 
e. g. the constituents of X, but such information simply 
increases the number of theoretical terms needed (e. g. 
"is a constituent ofjj)ý7 This level of theoretical 
definition is clearly absent in the two-level approach 
and, where there is such definition to be found, one 
clearly has an implicit three-level approach. Indeed, 
to say that structural specifications must 
be assigned to 
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complex grammatical objects implies that it is possible to 
justify both the grammatical methods used to determine 
these structural specifications and that there is some 
general theory of the type and form of the generative 
processes to be adopted. That is to say that the 
48 
notions "structural specification" and "generative 
operationlY and the definitions of them are to be distin- 
guished as theoretical objects from any particulari 
insta. n. tiation of them and from the empirical justifi- 
cation of any such instantiation. These notions are 
exactly the sort of theoretical concepts which, Shaumjan 
49 
himself tells us, require definition. It follows 
that, even here, a two-level approach is untenable 
in linguistics. Of course, the untenability of the 
two-level approach is yet more evident, if it ts- 
decided that the set of observables is not undifferen- 
tiated, i. e. that a single set of grammatical constructs 
is insufficient to describe all fields of speech pheno- 
mena. The effect of this decision would be to impose 
a distinction between the general theoretical model 
(in Shaumjanian terms "genotype") of natural language 
and the set of its instantiations as descriptions of 
particular natural languages ("phenotype" languages). 
one can regard this "genotype/phenotype,, 
distinction 
as an implicit reliance on a three-level approach 
to 
linguistics. Shaumjan's insistence on the "two-level" 
approach may be seen as an attempt to squeeze 
linguistics 
into an epistemological mould to which 
it is not suited 
A 
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and which was not created with linguistics in mind. 
Conclusion 
shall assume, in view of the present arguments, 
that any approach to linguistics will be inadequate, 
unless it recognises a distinction between linguistic 
theory and linguistic descriptions as well as the already 
well founded distinction between the level of observation 
and the level of empirical constructs. We shall call 
the level of empirical constructs "linguistic description" 
although this usage conflicts with Popper's use of the 
term "theory". The point of view adopted here is that 
the term "theory" may be best reserved for the most 
abstract and general level (that of non-empirical 
constructs), whereas the term "description" is most 
appropriate to name particular empirical constructs 
related to given fields of phenomena. The main point is 
that a three-level linguistics is required, as opposed 
to the two-level approach advocated in most treatments 
of the philosophy of science and linguistics. 
We now append diagrams to provide a visual 
representation of the relations between theory, descriptions 
and phenomena in the case of (a) a single theory and 









ET OF PHENOMENA 1 
ET OF PHENOMENA2 
SET OF PHENOMENA 
Diagram to show the one-many relation of theory 
and description, the one-many relation of theory and 
phenomena and the one-one relation of description and 
set of phenomena (under a single theoretical approach). 
Under a single theoretical approach there is ideally 
a one-one relation between the description ("empirical 
theory") and the phenomena ("class of homotypic 
ialsifiers"). 
If we consider a plurality of theories we obtain 

























In diagram 2 we see that there is a one-many relation 
between descriptions and phenomena when we take n theories 
into account. This is the non-uniqueness of linguistic 
2 
A 
THEORY A THEORyB 
........ THEORYN 
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descriptions. The multiplicity of descriptive solu- 






NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
See the "Reunion Phonologique Internati, )nale tenue 
N. 
a Prague (1930)". 
2. See J. Vachek, "Phonemes and Phonological Units". 
11 3. K. Buhler, Sprachtheorie. 
Im logischen Aufbau, im Begrundungsgefuge der 
11 Satze einer empirischen Einzelwissenschaft gibt es 
stets zwei Grenzen, an deren einer Protokollsatze 
tt 
und an deren anderer Axiome stehen ... 119 K. Buhler, 
,, 
Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften", p. 19. 
L. Bloomfield, "A Set of Postulates for the Science 
of Language". 
A. Martinet, La Description Phonologique, p. 11. 
H. Uldall, Outline, p. 22. 
8. H. Uldall, ibid., p. 22. 
9. L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomenesq pp. 24 - 30. 
10. See, imparticular, J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,.... 11, 
11. It is interesting, to note that a similar distinction 
is to be found in an absorbing, but virtually unknown, 
book, Was ist Sprache?, by H. Dempe. He writes, 
'Sprache' .... 
bezeichnet : (1) Sprache als unwirkliches 
Wesen, als Idee, z. B. in der sokratisch gemeinten 
Frage Was 
ist Sprache V' (2) Sprache als 
lebendiger Sprechakt....; (3) Sprache als Ergebnis 
des Sprechaktes, als Ausspruch, Satz, Rede,...; 
(4) Sprache als Voraussetzung des Sprechaktes, als 
allgemeine, zusammenfassende Regeleinheit 
des von 
Menschen einer bestimmten Kulturgemeinschaft Ge- 
sprochenen ...... 







Sprachwissenschaft ist aber in der Idee der Sprache 
zu suchen, die, da sie Sprechakt, Rede und Allgemein- 
sprache gleichermassen ermoglicht, das einheitliche 
Bezugszentrum aller der Merkmale darstellt, die 
diesen drei Momenten wesentlich sind, womit zugleich 
ausgedruckt ist, dass SprechenAusspruch und Grammatik 
nur Besonderungen eines einheitlichen Phanomens 
11 
sind, das die Wissenschaft planmassig und in 
bestimmter Richtung zu bearbeiten hat", p. 26. 
This position clearly involves distinctions between 
the theoretical study of Sprache als Idee" and 
6ýi the descriptive study of Sprache als zusammen- 
fassende Regeleinheit des von Menschen einer 4ýý 
ýI -'- 
bestimmten Kulturgemeinschaft Gesprochenen" and ! 
Sprache als Sprechakt.., the particular speech 
11 
acts of individuals which form the phenomena of 
linguistic analysis. 
J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, 
p. 1, and A. Martinet, Elements of General Linguistics, 
15. 
E. Itkonen, for one, would disagree ; for discussion of 
hic position, see below. 
This sort of position is presumably what Lyons has 
in mind when he says, "by the scientific study of 
language is meant its investigation by means of 
controlled and empirically verifiable observations 
and with reference to some general theory of language 
structure", Introduction, p. I (for discussion, 
see below) . 
This is the Position adopted by Hjelmslev when he 
-16o- 
16. 
says, "nous arrivons %a llintelligence ou a la 
connaissance dlune langue par le meme chemin qui 
mene a llintelligence des autres objets, a savoir 
par une description", Le Langage, p. 29, and "on 
peut donc dire qulune thýorie, au sens ou nous 
entendens ce terme, a pour but dlelaborer un proc4del 
au moyen duquel on puisse decrire non-contradictoirement 
et exhaustiveqient des objets donnes dlune nature 
supposee. Une telle description permet ce que llon 
a 11habitude dlappeler reconnaissance ou compre P- 
hension de llobjet en question ; aussi pouvons 
nous ... dire que la the"orie a pour but dlindiquer 
P une methode de reconnaissance ou de compr4hension 
1% d1un objet donne"", Prole'gomenes, p. 26. 
See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory, ... 11. Mulder has 
remarked that, "most sciences, for example physics or 
chemistry, aim at a DESCRIPTION of phenomena", 
"From Sound to Denotation", p. 170. A similar 
position is taken by M. Bunge in his Meta-Scientific 
Queries, p. 36. This is not all, however, since 
most sciences aim to be "explanatory" also, as 
Bunge says ; "scientists are not satisfied with 
detailed descriptions ; besides inquiring how 
things are, scientists try to answer 'whys", op. 
cit., p. 51. of course, an explanation implies 
an adequate description of how things are in a given 
field and one should not take too restrictive a 
view of what it is to be a I'descriptioh". 
Linguistic, 
- 
descriptions may be "explanatory", for example, 
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17. 
when viewed in conjunction with the general theory 
or when viewed as a calculus or when related to 
a particular communicational explanandum. 
For 11intersubjective testability". see K. Popper, 
The Logic of Scienti fic Di scovery, pp. 44 ff. 
One might note that Uldall has pointed out that 
one advantage of a scientific approach is that 
"the selection of functions to the exclusion of 
all other aspects of the universe has made it 
possible to give one comparatively simple explanation 
of an enormous mass of details that would have 
otherwise appeared unconnected", Outline, p. 14. 
The implication is that the mass of details in 
observable speech phenomena require similar 
treatment, if one is to achieve understanding 
of these phenomena. 
18. J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory .... *119 p. 89. 
19. J. Mulder, ibid., p. 89. 
20. J. Mulder, ibid., p. 92. 
21. J. Mulder, ibid., p. 92. 
22. The selection of fields of phenomena is discussed 
at length by J. Mulder in, "Linguistic Theory,.... ". 
23. See, for instance, M. Golian, 'La Definition de 11 
Aspect" and ensuing discussion. 
24. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 89 - 90. 
25. See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,. -. 11, p. 959 
where he says, "unlike in descriptions - 
the statements 
in a theory are not hypotheses, i. e. 
they are not 
immediately testable in confrontation with facts" 
and L. Hjlemslev, Prolegomenesq p. 
24, where he says, 
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'Iles donnees de 11experience ne peuvent jamais 
ni confirmer ni infirmer la validite de la theoriell. 
26. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 39. 
27. J. Mulder, "From Sound to Denotation'19 P. 170. 
28. Perhaps this is an instance of what Hjelmslev meant 
when he wrote, in rather outspoken fashion, Ithat 
"clest par sa contribution a lle*pistemologie 
generale que la linguistique revelera incontestable- 
ment son importance", Prolegomenes, p. 12. 
J. Mulder, "From Sound to Denotation", p. 170. 
30. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1972, 
P. 74ý fn. 2) see below. 
31. See R. Carnap, "Observation Language and Theoretical 
Languag e" (and below for further discussion). 
32. In such a case each linguistic description would be 
a separate theory of a single universe of experience. 
Of course, this is, in a sense, the function of a 
linguistic description, but it would be terminologically 
confusing to employ the term "theory" in two 
distinct senses and aslo it is difficult to see why 
the empirical description of a set of speech 
phenomena should be called "theoretical". 
33. See A. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, 
pp. 69 - 70, P. 173 et passim. 
34. A. Juilland and H. H. Lieb have described linguistic 
description as equivalent to a "classification" (K) 
of (speech) phenomena (B) according to a set of 
properties (,, Eigenschaftenll'ý E), which are the 
classificatory criteria for the description of 
phenomena. Any such classification containing 
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35. 
an equivalence relation (R) with the describienda 
implies a set of criteria (or "theory" in our 
sense). They write, , 
Ist K eine strenge Klassifikation 
von B nach R, so gibt es ein E, dass K eine strenge 
Klassifikation von B nach E ist", lKlassel und 
'Klassifikation' in der Sprachwissenschaft, p. 36. 
This has been maintained by Mulder, see "Linguistic 
Theory, 
36. The terms "range" and "scope" as used here are 
similar to the terms "range" and "scope" used 
by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica, 
pp. 15 - 17. 
37. This is the position apparently adopted by Chomsky 
and many others. 
38. See P. H. Matthews, "Recent Developments in Morpho- 
it logy . 
39. See, for instance, R. Hudson, English Complex 
Sentences, etc.. 
40. S. K. Shaumjan, Principles of Structural Linguistics, 
14. 
41. S. K. Shaumjan, Philosophical Problems of Theoretical 
Linguistics, p. 10. 
42. S. K. Shaumjan, Principles. of Structural Linguistics, 
14 . 
43. S. K. Shaumjan, ibid., p. 16. 
44. S. K. Shaumjan, ibid., p. 18. 
45. S.. K. Shaumjan, ibi .9 p. 18. 
46. See A. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia, pp. 12 - 13, 
who sa y, "the pr oof of a logical system 
is its 
adequacy and coherence". 
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47. See P. R. Rastall, "A Note on Formalisation in 
Transformational Grammar". 
48. Shaumjan suggests, for instance, "let us adopt 
the hypothesis that subject and predicate should 
be considered fundamental linguistic universals" 
(P. R. R. ), Philosophical Problems..., p. 15, 
It would seem that this hypothesis leads to the 
possibility of setting up structural specifications 
in terms of "subject" and "predicate". This 
"hypothesis" is established a priori and seems to 
be axiomatic. However, since no definition of these 
terms is provided, they are inapplicable. In any 
case, the mere establishment of such a hypothesis, 
as opposed to its application in the description of 
particular languages, implies a covert (axiomatic) 
theoretical level. 





LINGUISTICS - "THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LANGUAGE" 
4'. ý- 
: ." 
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a. Preliminary 
It is one of the claimed benefits of adopting a 
"three-level" linguistics that the establish--, ient of 
a general linguistic theory with no "existence postulate", 
i. e. one which is an abstract conception, avoids the 
hypostatisation of such entities as Language. Such 
entities are regarded from the three-level point cf 
view as mere. conceptions, the applicability of which 
may be tested in the description of phenomena. The 
adoption of a three-level approach in linguistics is, 
as we have noted, also related to the idea that linguistics 
may be regarded as a "science". These questions are 
interrelated through the problem of the relations 
between the range of speech phenomena and the abstract 
conception of such theoretical models as "language" 
and instances of these models found at the level of 
description. The problem may be stated as one of 
formulating the conditions under which the models on 
the level of theory may be considered "applicable" 
1 
in the construction of empirical descriptions, while 
maintaining the abstract nature of the level of theory 
and certain aspects of linguistic description (see 
below) . 
In general, we can exclude any meta-theoretical 
condition on linguistic theories which demands that 
a theory depend on prior experience of linguistic 
A 
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phenomena. The rea3on i3 that the fulfilment of thi3 
condition would lead to an ultimate circularity. 
Equally, the suggestion made in some glossematic texts, 
2 discussed earlier, that the general descriptive apparatus 
should be sufficient to entail any linguistic description 
may be dismissed as either introducing aýllsynthetic 
a priori" theory 
3 (which may be rejected as untenable) 
or for relying on the fallacious notion that an abstract 
theory may have empirical consequences, i. e. ones which 
are directly testable in confrontation with the experience 
of observable phenomena. A more reasonable proposal, 
4 
which has often been suggested, is that linguistics, 
qua discipline , be required to be "scientific" . We 
shall enquire what such a requirement would entail, 
to which facets of linguistics it might meaningfully 
be applied and whether (and to what extent) the condition 
may be satisfied by, or is consistent with, a three- 
level linguistics. 
We may approach these problems via a consideration 
of what may be regarded as "external linguistic reality" . 
Hypostatisation is a particularly inviting trap for 
the wary and unwary alike. Shaumjan, for instance, 
as we have seen, maintains that, "constructs are objects, 
5 
properties and relations which are not directly observable" 
and that "any abstract model of natural languages 
presents itself as nothing other than an artificial 
6 






if this is the case, it is not possible to claim that, 
"in abstract linguistic models a considerable role is 
played by hypothetical concepts, which one may call 
,, 7 linguistic constructs The reason is quite simply 
that linguistic models cannot both contain linguistic 
constructs (non-observable objects, properties and 
8 relations) and also imitate them, i. e., if constructs 
are - postulated unobservable entities in reality, 
they are not parts of an abstract model and, if they are 
parts of an abstract model, then they are not postulated 
unobservable entities in reality (although they may 
!: 
't be models of such entities) In the li-ht of this 
we can see that, although Shaumjan is undoubtedly right 
to raise thelýroblem of the ontological status of lin- 
guistic objects described by abstract linguistic models'19, 
his particular formulation of the problem is self- 
contradictory. The point is that, if it is asserted 
that a linguistic model is an abstract system of symbols 
which is formally sufficient to generate analogues of 
given phenomena, then one cannot claim that there is 
necessarily any linguistic entity in reality with which 
the model is in correspondence. Although a model may 
generate analogues of phenomena and, we may believe, 
unobservable processes are involved in the creation 
of those phenomena, these reasons do not permit us to 
conclu(fe that the constructs of the model correspond to 
the unobservable processes or objects one believes 
to exist. 
Tho= i-vrna r%f nnczii-inn held by Shaumjan can be defended 
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in two ways. On the one hand, it may be claimed that 
the model is a descriptive construct or that it contains 
descriptive constructs, which imitate or attempt to 
imitate unobservable linguistic linguistic realities. 
(In this case it becomes absurd to speak of an "abstract" 
linguistic model, since the relation between the model 
and the unobservable system is plainly intended to be 
empirical, although, apparently, incapable of direct 
empirical testing ; i. e. one should speak of an 
empirical linguistic model. ) On the other hand, one 
may say, even more strongly, that the model is isomorphic 
with some system of unobservable linguistic objects, 
properties and relations in reality. In fact, Shaumjan 
10 
adopts this latter course. In either case, however, 
it is necessary to make some hypostatisation. In the 
first case, one is forced to assume the existence of 
a coherent system of linguistic objects (existing 
separately and, presumably, identically in every mind) 
to be imitated and, in the other case, one is forced 
to invent an external reality with just the properties 
of the model in order that the model be isomorphic 
with something. In neither case can we arrive at a 
sufficient condition of the empirical validity of the 
model. Extensional empirical validity relative to 
the speech phenomena is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the empirical validity of the model 
as a model of an unobservable system. It is important to 
note that we do not deny that, for exampleý linguistic 
knowledge is a real but unobservable entity - what we 




be made available, no linguistic model can be used 
to make conclusions about the nature of that unobser- 
vable knowledge without untestable and unwarrantable 
existential presuppositions. 
Clearly, Shaumjan has fallen for the fallacy of 
attributing the properties of his theories to reality. 
L, qually clearly, no linguistics which depended on this 
form of assumption or hypostatisation could be con- 
sidered scientific or acceptable. As we shall see, 
the definition of linguistics as a scientific study 
depends on its ability to establish models with an 
observable and empirically testable relation to ohser- 
vable realities on the level of phenomena. For example, 
both Lyons and Martinet (amongst many others), as we 
have said, define linguistics explicitly as the 
"scientific study of language" and stress this empiri- 
cal relation. This would seem to be a reasonable ap- 
proach considering i ts global nature. The defini tion 
clearly turns on what is to be understood by the 
words "scientific" and I'languagell. The explanation 
of these terms requires some care. 
Whereas particular theories are, of course, 
concerned to explain what is meant by the term I'lan- 
guage", the explanation of the word "scientific" is 
often brushed aside. This is, perhaps, understandable 
in the rush to "get on with linguistics" rather than 
be held up by preliminary problems. Howeverg the 
definition is imPortant to the extent that the require- 
A 
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ment that linguistics be,. in some sense, "scientific" 
is a condition of the acceptability of a given linguis- 
tic theory or description. Chomsky, by contrast, 
asserts that the question of whether linguistics is 
to be considered "scientific" or not is a purely 
"terminological" matter and that the answer to this 
question "seems to have no bearing at all on any 
11 
serious issue". There- is no doubt that the que-stion 
whether linguistics may be called a science or 
whether it is to be considered scientific is a 
"terminological" matter in the sense that what is 
and what is not to be considered a science or, scien- 
tific is a matter of convention, i. e. the convention 
which is the definition of the term "science" or the 
ff 12 term "scientific . Chomsky's objection 
is beside the 
point, however, since the "terminological", or other, 
nature of the classification of linguistics ýwhich 
is no doubt a trivial matter) cannot affect the 
question of what it would mean for a linguistic theory 
or description to meet the conditions of a scientific 
theory or description (which is not a trivial matter). 
The adjective "scientific" or the predicate "is a science" 
cannot be regarded as honorifics awarded for academic 
conduct above and beyond the call of scholarly duty. 
The "serious issue" involved is, clearly enough, that 
of deciding what conditions a given linguistic 
theory 
4 
or description must meet, if we are to 
take it seriously 
in the pronouncements it makes concerning 
the phenomena 
it purports to be dealing with. 
By convention, we can 
call any theory or description which 
satisfies these 
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conditions a "scientific" theory or description. Tý, at 
is to say that such conditions will constitute some 
of the requirements of acceptability on theories and 
descriptions in linguistics. 
Shaumjan has repeatedly pointed out that, in 
order to be considered "scientific", a theory must 
be constructed with due regard for some specific atti- 
tude in the philosophy of science. A more cautious 
attitude is adopted here. We require the theory or 
de3cription to meet certain meta-theoretical require- 
ments (to be stated), some of which will be drawn from 
the philosophy of science. There is no serious shortage 
of proposals concerning the nature of scientific 
explanation and the criteria distinguishing scientific 
from non-3cientific theorie3 and de3criptions. 
All the more surprising it is, then, when those 
who do explicitly define linguistics as a "scientific 
study" do not state precisely what is to be understood 
by the term "scientific", or do so only inadequately. 
Lyons, to take a well known example, remarks that, 
".. by the scientific study of language is meant 
its investigation by means of controlled and empirically 
verifiable observations and with reference to some 
ure" 
13 
general theory of language struct 
Martinet, on the other hand, tells us, 




founded on the observation of facts and refrains from 
picking and choosing among the facts in the light of 
certain aesthetic or moral principles. Thus, "scientific" 
is opposed to "prescriptive"" 
14 
It turns out that the phenomena in question are the 
phenomena of speech in the case of linguistics. 
Both of these statements are innocuous enough 
and both seem to require a measure of empiricism. It 
is to be realised, however, that Martinet's remarks 
will not take us very far along the road to understanding 
the distinction between "science" and "non-science" 
and Lyons' account contains elements which are confusing. 
Martinet's statement seems to imply that any scientific 
approach must begin with "the observation of facts". 
This appears to indicate that Martinet favours an in- 
ductive approach to linguistics which is not found in 
his clearly non-inductive (and probably deductive) 
exposition. While it is true that there must initially 
be some intersubjective agreement on the delimitation 
of some range of explananda, if we are to set up non- 
vacuous theories and descriptions (and, perhaps, this is 
all Martinet wants to say), it is by no means the case 
that hypothetico-deductive theories and descriptions 
imply or rely on any logically or actually prior 
(observed) 
phenomena (Indeed, one risks circularity by setting 
up observations as logically or factually prior 
to 
theory or description. ) What makes hypothetico-deductive 
theories and descriptions "scientific" 
is their test- 
A 
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ability in confrontation with phenomena 
15 
Lyons, although advocating what is apparently a 
form of hypothetico-deductivism, gives a confusing 
account of the nature of the approach. It is not, 
for instance, the observations which are "controlled 
and empirically verifiable" (although experiments with 
phenomena might be), but the hypotheses within a certain 
description or theory which are controlled and empi-pically 
tested with respect to phenomena. Observations them- 
selves cannot be either verified or refuted but are 
simply constatations of experience. (Of course, not 
all observations are equally acceptable - this is the 
force of the requirement that intersubjective agreement 
be reached on the range of phenomena. . -. s the term 
"phenomena" is already, to an extent, a "theory-laden" 
concept, dispute over observations may relate to data- 
gathering techniques or to the aspect of phenomena which 
is under consideration in a given theory or description. ) 
Not all observational data are relevant to a given 
hypothesis and, perhaps, this is all Lyons means by 
"controlled observations". 
Another difficulty with Lyons explanation of the 
term "scientific" concerns his requirement that linguistics 
investigate "language" by means of empirical observations 
making reference to some general theory of "language- 
structure". Without wanting to be too nit-picking, one 
must wonder what the relation is between 
"language as an 




a theoretical entityll. Clearly, language and lanEuage- 
structure are either the same or different. If the 
theoretical language-structure is a hypothesis about 
some entity language, i. e. if the two are distinguished, 
then language-structure may be regarded as a device 
for studying or modelling the entity language. In this 
case, we are left in the dark about language, which 
appears to be a simple hypostatization, since we have 
no reason to believe that any such entity exists. 
Alternatively, language may be regarded as a pure 
conception. In this latter case, however, one cannot 
distinguish the conception language from the general 
theory of language-structure, since a theoretical 
language-structure is a conception of language (unless, 
somewhat absurdly, language-structure is a conception of 
a conception language or a model of itself), i. e. in 
this case the notions are not differentiated. On the 
one hand, there are no observation3, empirical or other- 
wise, which could be relevant to the investigation of 
a hypostatization and, on the other, a theoretical 
conception would be a purely a priori matter and, hence, 
its validity would depend solely on formal conditions; 
that is, one cannot imagine how the investigation of 
the conception language or language-structure could be 
"empirical" in this case. Since such a conception would 
have no empirical content, no amount of empirical ob- 
servations could be at all relevant to the testing of 
it. The empiricism of linguistics, its hallmark as a 




on either interpretation of the relation between 
language and language-structure. 
Clearly enough, if the definition of the term 
"scientific" involves a measure of empiricism, as it 
surely does, one would conclude that, if "the investi- 
gation of language" is a non-empirical matter, then 
it is self-contradictory to maintain that linguistics 
is a scientific study (at least on the definitions 
given so far). What one could do, of course, is 
to investigate the applicability of a theoretical con- 
ception language theory of language structure) in 
the description of given fields of phenomena, as we 
have already suggested. In this case, one could 
legitimately speak of investigating languages by means 
of the application of a given theory of language-struc- 
ture to empirical observanda. (It is possible that 
this is what Lyons has in mind, although his ambiguous 
use of the term language to mean both a set of pheno- 
mena and a system of constructs is confusing. ) In this 
way, particular linguistic descriptions satisfying 
the conditions of the meta-model language could be 
called particular language-models. Thus, the investi- 
gation of languages, but not the investigation of 
language, would turn out to be an empirical matter, 
since the relation between a given language-model and 
a specific set of observables could be subject 
to em- 
pirical tests in ways determined by the application 
of the theory of language to observables. 
It is, 




linguistics may be said to have empirical interests 
16 and, indeed, to be an empirical science. Now, it 
should be obvious from this that, if we require of 
a study that its descriptive constructs be empirically 
testable in order for it to count as a science, then 
we can say that the study of languages is (or ought to 
be) a scientific enterprise, whereas the study of 
language as a theoretical entity is not. Thus, if we 
accept the convention of demarcation as set up by 
Popper that, 
must be possible for a scientific system to 
17 be refuted by experienceil, 
then the empirical, scientific interests of linguistics 
18 
will be confined to linguistic descriptions. 
It now remains to be seen whether Popper's criterion 
of demarcation can be unreservedly accepted and whether 
there is any sense in which we can reasonably maintain 
that on the level of linguistic theory we are also 
concerned with a type of scientific activity. 
b. The study of language and the criterion of demarcation 
The distinction between the conception of language 
as a theorematic possibility of a given theoretical 
calculus and languages as descriptions of given 
fields 
Of phenomena (normally speech phenomena) was 
introduced 
by Mulder. Languages in this sense, are 
descriptive and 
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explanatory models of the speech phenomena. For this 
reason we called them "language-models" above. The 
distinction between language and languages or language- 
models runs parallel to the distinction between theory 
and descriptions. In fact, it is simply part of that 
distinction. The speech phenomena, or rather arbitrarily 
selected fields of such phenomena, may be regarded in 
two ways. We can think of the phenomena simply as sets 
of contingent describienda 
20 
or we can think of them-as 
a set of functions of particular events, each in its 
capacity of satisfying some descriptive function. The 
distinction depends broadly on how we are considering 
the phenomena. If we think of the phenomena as simply 
an independent set of events, eI, e29..... en, about 
which we know only that it is a-set of communicational 
events in which we are interested, then we have the 
range of phenomena. The range of phenomena is particularly 
important for the testing of linguistic hypotheses, 
because it is independent of descriptive functions. 
The scope of phenomena is importan4j. if,, ý%e want to deal 
with the empirical interpretation of a descriptive 
function or hypothesis. The scope of phenomena allows 
us to think of a communicational speech event as an 
instance of a descriptive function. For 
instance, if 
the function, f, classifies phonetic events as voice- 
less, aspirated, bilabial stops and ei meets 
these 
conditions, then (f e1) is an event 
in its capacity 
of satisfying a descriptive function. 
If voiceless, 
a, spirated, bilabial stops are allophones 
of a given 
phoneme, say /p/ in English, then 
(f e is an inter- 
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pretation of the pheneme /p/ ; it is one of the com- 
municational events classified by /p/ and, by implication, 
its behaviour is predicted by the phoneme model /p/. 
A language, or language-model, is here regarded 
as a principled structure, each descriptive model in 
which stands directly or indirectly in a relation of 
correspondence with a, potentially infinite class of 
speech phenomena, such that each phenomenon separately 
satisfies the conditions for description by that model. 
The phenomena are in this case regarded as the scope 
of the description. Broadly, we may say that ideally 
the scope and range of a description totally overlap 
and that'any asymmetry or discrepancy between the range 
of describienda and the scope of a description will 
21 
constitute an empirical refutation of the adequacy of 
the description. To pursue the analysis of the previous 
paragraph, if the description predicts that, for example, 
(e) (f e -4 g e), then we have a test of the empirical 
adequacy of the description simply by inspecting all 
cases in the range, eI, e2........ en. Those members 
of the range which satisfy f should also satisfy g. 
The description will be refuted, if we find that 
(E el) 
ýf el) &- (g e1 If g means "is in compleme,, 
Lary 
distribution with all voiceless, unaspivated, bilabial 
stops", then the adequacy of a phoneme-model 
IpY in 
English could be refuted, if we find a case of commutation 
between Cp3 and Cp 
h J. That is, in such a case, there 
would be a discrepancy between 
the interpretation, or 
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scope, of a model and the range of phenomena. (We 
turn to more complicated, concrete examples of empirical 
testing in later chapters). 
Language may be regarded as a sub-type of the 
class of theoretically possible semiotic systems. It 
is a conceived and purely theoretical entity, which 
constitutes the theoretical meta-model containing the 
set of conditions to be satisfied by any description 
purporting to be constructed in accordance with the 
theory in question, i. e. to be satisfied by any pur- 
ported language-model constructed using that theory. 
Language is, in this sense, the intension of the class 
of languages (= language-models), the set of descriptions 
which satisfy the conditions of being languages. It 
is a necessary condition of the acceptability of any 
conception, language, that empirically adequate language- 
models may be constructed which indeed satisfy those 
conditions. The construction of empirically adequate 
language models is, however, neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition. of the empirical validity of a 
conception of language, or theory of language, since, as 
we have seen, there can be no claim to empirical validity 
on the level of theory (which is where the conception, 
language, is found) , unless the meaning of 
"empirical" 
is shifted and by "the empirical validity of a theory" 
is meant the adequacy of the theory as a means 
to estab- 
lishing empirically testable descriptions, while 
the 
the theory itself remains not empirically testable 
by 
any direct means. 
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As we have seen, Mulder distinguishes concomitantly 
between the levels of theory, descriptions and pheno- 
mena. A principled description, as noted above, implies 
both. its describienda and a means of making the descrip- 
tion. This latter is the theory for making descriptions. 
Such a theory stands in a one-many relation with the 
descriptions justified by the theory. The theory implies, 
on this account, neither the descriptions which may be 
constructed in applying the theory nor the phenomena 
which the descriptions purport to describe, although 
it would be pointless to set up a theory which had 
no application to phenomena or for which there was no 
initial motivation in the form of a set of explananda, 
i. e. such a theory would be inapplicable and, hence, 
useless as an instrument for gaining knowledge about 
fields of phenomena. (We consider below the conditions 
under which such a theory is considered applicable. ) 
On this view, language is a theoretical entity - 
a calculated possibility within a semiotic theory. It 
is not an objectively existing entity outside the theory. 
Language must be regarded as a pure conception in this 
sense. A language obviously belongs to the level of 
description and contracts a one-one relation of corres- 
pondence with a select field of speech phenomena ; as 
Juilland and Lieb 
22 (above) say, such an object is a 
classification of a certain set (range) of phenomena. 
Again, there is nothing in what we may call "objective 
reality" which is a language corresponding 
to the 
structural description of the phenomena. 
(The set of 
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classificatory functions are, after all, arbitrarily 
selected and notlin any sense, "natural"). The alter- 
native to this position is to maintain that "languages 
actually exist". Such an assertion would 'i-n-FoLl-ve -3 
assumption of the existence of a mysterious and un- 
observable entity, never involved in the empirical 
testing of descriptions, but which is conveniently 
considered to be isomorphic with the description 
(i. e. Shaumjan's position, above). Such an entity 
clearly calls for the application of Ockham's razor. 
What do exist are, of course, the speech phenomena 
as the range of the description, which one claims to 
describe using a theoretically justified set of ana- 
lytical functions. From this point of view, the scope 
of a description, i. e. the set of phenomena in their 
capacity of satisfying the conditions for analysis 
under the description has existence only in virtue 
of the selected set of functions. 
Of course, one does not want to deny that the 
linguistic knowledge of particular individuals exists. 
Even so, it is dubious whether linguistics is really 
concerned with the linguistic knowledge of individuals, 
although describing the linguistic knowledge of sets 
of individuals might be of interest. However, 
the 
linguistic knowledge of sets of individuals is even 
more inaccessible than the knowledge of particular 
individuals. We have no direct access to the linguistic 
knowledge of individuals and the linguistic 
knowledge 
of a set of individuals is aln -a-b'atraction' ' from' -th-e know- 
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ledge of particular individuals. In any case, to claim 
that a description which successfully describes the 
speech phenomena of a community a fortiori constitutes 
a model of the linguistic knowledge of the speakers 
of that community is clearly unwarrantable. The notion 
of a correspondence between a successful linguistic 
description of speech phenomena and the linguistic 
knoý%, ledge of an individual or of a group of individuals 
should be abandoned partly because of the absence of 
direct, empirical testing procedures and partly because 
the existence of one linguistic description which 
successfully models the phenomena does not preclude 
the possibility or even the existence of other success- 
ful descriptions. The absence of alternative, non- 
linguistic checking procedures means that we have no 
external evidence for preferring one or other competing 
solution. What a linguistic description does do is to 
describe and explain the means by which communication 
is achieved in a particular speech community ; and this 
is no slight task. 
Let us now see in what sense this conception of a 
three-level approach can be said to be "scientific". 
The conditions to be met by theories and 
descriptions 
which purport to be scientific generally 
fall into 
two categories ; the formal 
(concerning the purely 
logical properties of the system) and 
the empirical 
(concerning the relation between the system and 
that 
area of experience with which 
the system in question is 
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concerned). We have noted that the demarcation between 
science and non-science (meta-physics, as Popper calls it) 
involves the notion of empiricism. Formal conditions 
of acceptability (e. g. consistency, axiomatisability, 
etc. ), however, apply to scientific and non-scientific 
systems alike. Let us say, provi3ionally, that, in 
order to be considered "scientific" ,a linguistic theory 
or description must be testable for empirical validity. 
The notion, empirical validity, clearly involves the 
testing of hypotheses in confrontation with observable 
phenomena. That is to say that the validity of a uni- 
versal, empirical statement, or hypothesis, depends 
on the relation between the empirical claim of the 
statement or hypothesis and the observed behaviour 
of the phenomena (which may be reported by singular, 
observational statements) which the statement or 
hypothesis purports to describe. Since the statements in 
a linguistic theory or description are universal state- 
ments referring ultimately to potentially infinite 
classes, we may adopt Popper's notion of falsifiability 
as the necessary condition of empiricism. That is, 
although no absolute verification of descriptive state- 
ments is possible (when dealing with potentially or 
actually infinite classes), we shall require the state- 
ments in question to be, in principle, empirically 
falsifiable in confrontation with the phenomena 
(in 
order to be considered "empirical statements") no 
sy, gtem would be considered 
"scientific", unless it 
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contained such statements. Empirical statements will 
be empirically adequate statements, if, although falsi- 
fiable, they are not, in fact, falsified after testing 
24 
The above initial formulation follows the kind of 
conditions laid upon scientific systems by Popper. The 
question is now whether we should, in fact, accept 
Popper's criterion of falsifiability as also the cri- 
terion of demarcation between science and non-science 
in quite this form. Clearly, as we said above, if we 
adopt this convention, then linguistic descriptions, 
but not linguistic theories , in a three-level approach 
will be considered "scientific". That is to say that, 
if we maintain that entities at the level of theory, 
such as language, cannot without hypostatization or 
absurdity be regarded as more than "abstract conceptions" , 
then it is clearly the case that there can be no phenomena 
which can be used for the empirical testing of these 
conceptions. A theory of language will, then, be non- 
scientific - it will be a meta-physical system. 
Further- 
more, there is a sense in which linguistic descriptions 
are also "abstract conceptions" - viz. when we set up 
deductive or predictive systems in order to enumerate 
all and only the well formed entities 
in a language. 
Without a level of empirical interpretation such systems 
remain merely abstract calculi. Secondly, as we 
have seen, 
a linguistic description has an existence postulate 
only with respect to a set of phenomena - 
communicational 
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events. There is no existence postulate with respect 
to any purported unobservable 'tystem to be described" . 
It is only with reference to the set of phenomena that 
a linguistic description is "empirical". There are 
important respects, then, in which it is reasonable to 
say that even linguistic descriptions are "abstract" ; 
i. e. they involve abstract calculus and abstract objects 
(classes and classes of classes) and operations on these 
objects , although each of these classes and operations 
has an extensional, empirical interpretation. (This 
may be what Shaumjan had in mind when he wrote of abstract 
linguistic models. ) 
We can say, then, that linguistic descriptions 
are extensionally empirical and thus satisfy Popper's 
criterion of demarcation. It is not the case that 
linguistic descriptions are empirical in every point 
of detail or in every respect, although linguistic 
descriptionsq viewed as a totality, will be empirical 
systems. From the popperian point of view, a linguistic 
description of the sort imagined would be a scientific 
system (given the above provisos) and a 
linguistic 
theory would be a meta-physical system. 
This would be an embarrassing solution when we 
take into consideration the intimate relation 
between 
linguistic theory and linguistic description. 
We would 
have to say arbitrarily that one 
bit of linguistics is 
scientific and the other is not - 
despite their close 
corrCir-f-'i nr PiirtbPrmore, 
insofar as linguistic theories 
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are required to be applicable and insofar as this implies 
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that linguistic theories must be material system 7 
linguistic theories are not mereiv logical calculi and 
are intended to have (and must have) a purpose in lin- 
guistic description. 
Moreover, if we admit Popper's criterion of 
demarcation into linguistic meta-theory as it stands 
and apply it to the three-level approach, we are led 
to at least an apparent clash of meta-theoretical con- 
ditions. That is, thevries are necessarily "meta-physical" 
in Popper's sense but, by another meta-theoretical con- 
dition, linguistics is required to be "scientific" and, 
hence, empirical. There appear to be two possible 
attitudes to this problem. On the one hand, one can 
minimise the difficulty and admit linguistic theories 
as "meta-physical" and descriptions as "scientific", i. e. 
accept the criterion of demarcation as it stands along 
with its consequences. On the other hand, we can argue that 
Popper's criterion is inadequate at least in the context 
of linguistics and attempt to replace or revise it. 
I shall argue that, although the criterion of fal- 
sifiability is indispensable as a necessAry condition of 
empiricism, a broader conception of science is needed than 
is allowed for by Popper's criterion. Our broader con- 
ception of science will include Popper's criterion of 
falsifiability ;1e. we will try to revise the criterion 
of demarcation. The first reason for this 
is that Popper's 
criterion of demarcation is intended 
to operate in the 
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context of a two-level approach to the philosophy of 
science. We have argued that, at least in linguistics, 
this approach is untenable. We would conclude that the 
criterion of demarcation must be amended to take into 
account the three-level view of the philosophy of science. 
It would be my view that the two-level approach 
must be regarded as something of an oversimplification 
of the state of affairs obtaining in any science. One 
would not wish to call, for instance, atomic theory 
anything other than a scientific theory, yet it bears 
the same relations of being presupposed and of abstract 
modelling to particular descriptions constructed in 
accordance with it as linguistic theories bear to 
descriptions, viz. one-many relations. One observes 
a similar division of labour into abstract theoretical 
modelling and practical description in astronomical 
and biochemical investigations. 
However this may be, in linguistics (as in other 
sciences) linguistic descriptions presuppose and are 
justified by a given linguistic theory. Consequently, 
we can say (in the second place) that, although 
lin- 
guistic descriptions have an important empirical con- 
tent, they also depend to a large extent on 
the lin- 
guistic theory employed in thetr construction, 
i. e. at 
least part of their justification 
is non-empirical and 
non-formal - some of the 
justification of linguistic 
descriptions is "theoretical". That 
is, a linguistic 
description must meet the conditions of 
some general 
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theory of language. If it fails to do so, then it will 
be in some large measure ad hoc and, perhaps, (strictly 
speaking) incomprehensible. In a functionalist des- 
cription of, say, language L the phonological component 
of the description will have theoretical justification 
to the extent that all of the decriptive models (e. g. 
/p/, /bilabial/, /P/, etc. ) meet the conditions of 
theoretical predicates of some specified theory of 
language (e. g. ttis a phoneme", "is a distinctive feature", 
"is an archiphoneme") -, rc ) and no descriptive model 
fails to satisfy such predicates (e. g. Ilp'l-It, /p/ /x 
and Ilp" -+ /b/ / Y9 as morphophonemic rules, would 
find no theoretical justification in a functionalist 
description : they would be theoretically unjustified). 
As a result of this, one can assert that linguistic 
descriptions in the three-level approach are not exactly 
analogous to 'theories' in the popperian sense, which 
do not involve any additional theoretical and, hence, 
meta-physical justification. For this reason also the 
tempting conclusion that Popper's criterion of demarcation 
can be reconciled with a three-level approach as it 
stands is to be resisted. 
Another important point in this respect is that a 
linguistic description cannot be regarded as an undif- 
ferentiated whole. We have already seen that a linguistic 
description contains empirical models, empirical statements 
and a predictive calculus. No predictive calculus ca--, 
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be adequate, unless it is a formally sufficient, deduc- 
tive device. The difficulty is, as we shall see below, 
that, if a description is an undifferentiated totality 
or single system of statements, then it becomes impossible 
to distinguish what is "hypothetical", "nomological" or 
"empirical" from what is "deductive". This, in turn, 
leads to serious epistemological difficulties. The 
two-level view treats scientific theories as single 
systems of statements. 
Although Popper distinguishes, as we have seen, 
between the formal and theempirical conditions to be 
placed on what he calls 'theories', he fails-to dis- 
tinguish (at least in the earlier versions of his views) 
26 
between what is formally deductive about scientific 
theories and what is empirical and hypothetical about 
them. (The same goes for Hempel's "nomological ded- 
uctivism, although it must be pointed out that both 
of these scholars now accept that a distinction must 
be made between 'theories' (in their sense) and 'models 
of theories'. One should add that, in the first place 
most followers of these thinkers (and others like Curry 
who put forward similar views of the philosophy of 
science) have failed to see the importance of this dis- 
tinction 27 and, in the second place, in the case of 
Popper, it is not clear how, or if, his criterion of 
demarcation would have to be amended in the light of 
the 'theory - model' distinction. 
Only Carnap, to the 
best of my knowledge, has attempted a revised picture 
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of the philosophy of science in the light of the 'theory - 
model' distinction - see below. ) 
The failure to draw the distinction between a formal 
calculus and its empirical interpretation has some im- 
portant consequences. Broadly (and we return to this 
topic later), we can say that, when we test a scientific 
system for its formal properties, such as consistency 
and sufficiency, we are not interested in the empirical 
claims of the system. In fact, it is important that 
the premises of the system be a priori, i. e. first 
principles or knowledge derived from first principles. 
Without such premises we could not arrive deductively 
at the consequence class of the system, the set of 
theorems of the system. Here the empirical claims of 
the system are irrelevant. On the other hand, the 
empirical testing of the conse4uence class of the system 
involves the presumption of the formal consistency and 
sufficiency of the system. (If we cannot generate a 
known conse4uence class, then the 4uestion of the em- 
pirical validity of the claims about reality made by 
the statements in that class cannot even be raised. ) 
In empirical testing we are past the stage of formal 
testing. We can distinguish quite clearly the points 
at which formal and empirical tests respectively apply. 
Just what we cannot do, however, is to regard a scientific 
system as an undifferentiated totality which is both 
an emPirical system anda. formal calculus at one and 
the same time. The problem is that, to do so would 
involve us in saying that all the theorems in the 
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system were tautologically true (within the system), 
i. e. true in virtue of the premisesq definitions and 
rules of inference involved, but yet, at the same time, 
their truth wa3 dependent on experience, i. e. that the 
statements in a scientific theory were both analytic 
and empirical at the same time. Since "empirical" here 
means "capable of refutation with respect to experience" 
and the truth of analytic statements by definition 
does not depend on experience, such a conclusion would 
be unacceptable. Furthermore, if all statements in 
the theory must be empirical, as Popper requires, then 
the axioms or premises of the theory must be both a 
priori and empirical, which is also unacceptable (see 
below) . 
What we are saying is that the criterion of 
demarcation distinguishes an empirical theory from a 
non-empirical theory but it is too crude, if it is 
considered as the dividing line between science and 
non-science. This is especially true when we consider 
the complications in the view of a scientific theory 
introduced by the 'theory - model' distinction, which, 
as we have said, requires us to separate the formal, 
deductive calculus of the theory from the empirical 
interpretation or model of it. In linguistics, we 
certainly find that a linguistic description contains 
not only empirically interpretable models (e. g. the 
set of phonemes in English, the set of distinctive 
features, the properties of the distinctive. features 
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and phonemes and the operations relating these classes) 
but also a calculus which allows us to formalise our 
descriptive models and to make predictions or to derive 
the consequences of the description. Clearly, descriptive 
models do not have conse4uences nor do they contain 
or allow us to make predictions. Descriptive models 
are a certain sort of abstract object. If we wish to 
make predictions or derive conse4uences, we must deal 
with statements or systems of statements. The statements 
of the calculus cannot contain descriptive models. The 
statements contain the names of descriptive models. and 
the names of their properties and relations. If the 
statements are fully organised into a system, then we 
have a calculus. This calculus will be a purely deduc- 
tive system. That is, the class of statements derived 
as conse4uences of the calculus, the conse4uence class, 
will be determined by purely deductive means (by 
deductive inference patterns). We can arrive at an 
empirical interpretation for the calculus via descriptive 
models or "structures". But this does not mean that 
every statement of the calculus will be empirically 
interpretable. There is no doubt that no such calculus 
could work without at least some premises drawn from 
the theory. The statements of the theory are, as we 
have seen, all non-empirical. Furthermore, any formal 
calculus will inevitably contain abstract objects (vari- 
ables, logical constantsq operators, formation rules, 
inference rules, "grammatical" symbols, definitions, etc. ). 
Notably, descriptive constants, predicate and relation 
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names (e. g. "is a phoneme", "is the nucleus of"), come 
from the theory and are defined in the theory ; they 
are not defined empirically, although they have empirical 
applications in the description of given fields of 
phenomena. 
Let us give a simple illustration of these points. 
Imagine a model in which there is a set of phonemes and 
a set of distinctive features, for language, L. We 
can set up a calculus to describe the connection between 
phonemes and distinctive features in L. In such a 
calculus we will re4uire the premises, drawn from the 
theory, that "all phonemes are equivalent to simulta- 
neous n-tuples of distinctive features, where n 
Now, suppose that there is a phoneme in the model, which 
we name 11/p/1'. Then we can form the existential statement, 
is a phoneme in L", where the predicate, "is a 
phoneme", comes from the theory and is defined in the 
theory. These two statements clearly imply that there 
is some n-tuple of distinctive features in L equivalent 
to /p/. That is, "there is an n-tuple of distinctive 
features e4uivalent to /p/ in L" is a member of the 
consequence class of the calculus. Of course, this 
argument is not fully formalised, although we can see 
how such a system might be constructed. Also, one can 
express this argument in a more abstract form; viz. 
gy) 
x1). x= /p/. 
(9 
wI ý-- etters, 
f and g, s tan df or "is a 
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phoneme" and "is a simultaneous n-tuple of distinctive 
features" respectively. This abstract way of expressing 
the argument brings out some of the abstract symbols 
necessary for the calculus and it--also shows the deductive 
nature of the argument. 
By interpreting the name 11/p/11 as the descriptive 
construct /p/ in our model we can arrive at the scope 
of /p/ (using the methods indicated above). Then it 
becomes possible to make an empirical test of our conclusion. 
If there is no n-tuple of distinctive features e4ui- 
valent to /p/, then clearly there is a disparity between 
the conse4uence class of the calculus (and the contents 
of the model) and the phenomena. We would then have 
an empirical refutation of the hypothesis that /p/ is 
a phoneme of L. We would have to conclude that one 
or other of the premises (or both) is false because 
of the purely deductive inference pattern, modus tallens, 
which says in outline ; 
A-4B & -B .. -A. 
Here A consists of our two premises and B is our con- 
sequence and the consequence, B, is false. However7 
since the major premise (above) comes from the theory 
and is true by definition (we could change the premise 
only by changing the theory)), we reject the minor 
premise above, viz. that there is a phoneme /p/ in L. 
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In this case, /p/ disappears from the model and our 
calculus is revised accordingly. (Alternatively, 
if possible, the distinctive feature analysis might 
be changed. ) If there is an n-tuple of distinctive 
features equivalent to /p/, then the consequence 
and the model provisionally stand. 
The imaginary case we have discussed is a simple 
but not untypical case in linguistics. While we can 
see from it that empiricism, in the sense of the refut- 
ability of statements and systems through their con- 
frontation with phenomena, is central to the method, 
we can also see that empirical falsifiability is too 
crude a tool to differentiate between science and non- 
science. The reason for this is that many of the steps 
and components which we have described as vital to an 
empirical linguistic description would have to be re- 
garded as non-science. Most notably, linguistic theory, 
which plays an indispensable role, would have to be re- 
garded as "non-science". 
arbitrary dividing line. 
But this would be a very 
It is not at all clear why 
certain parts of the process described above (the model 
or structure and the empirical statements of the descrip- 
tion) should be described as "science" but not the non- 
empirical parts of the description or the theory employed 
in making the description. 
We distinguish between two main parts of a des- 
cription. A linguistic description, D, is a pair con- 
sisting of a calculus, C, and a model or structure, 
S7 
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which interprets that calculus, i. e., 
D= <c , 
A description is not just a structure, since a 
structure is merely a system of abstract objects and 
relations with an empirical interpretation in the field 
of phenomena under consideration (or, conceivably, even 
a potential system of objects without actual interpretation). 
We need a calculus, if we are to arrive at statements 
about the phenomena, to predict the behaviour of the 
phenomena modelled by the structure and to test the 
structure (by means of the consequences of the descrip- 
tion). A description is not just a calculus either, 
since we need a structure to give an empirical inter- 
pretation to the statements of the calculus. A lin- 
guistic description is both a calculus and a structure. 
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In this diagram we can see that the calculus 
consists of four maJLjn parts, the premises, the names 
of (structural) objects, relations, etc. (non-logical 
constants), the logical component and the consequence 
class. The premises are " initial statements, admitted 
a priori, of the system. These statements may or may 
not come from the theory, although some will undoubtedly 
come from the theory. The "Logical component will pro- 
vide the rules of formation, inference rules, logical 
constants, variables and improper symbols as usual in 
a calculus. The conse4uence class will be the set of 
statements which are logically implied in the system. 
The conse4uence class contains statements in which 
appear the names of objects, properties and relations 
(including functions) found in the structure. These 
names, which are non-logical, constants, are built into 
the calculus through the premises. The type-names of 
the non-logical constants clearly come from the theory. 
Consider, for example, such type-names as, phoneme, 
syntactic complex, etc.. Language specific names, 
the names of objects and relations in the structure 
clearly do not come from the theory ; they are descrip- 
tion specific. Examples might be the relation"article- 
noun" in English or the "aspect-verbal root" relation 
in Russian. The structure interprets the statements 
of the calculus (hence, indirectly, the theory). The 
structure is a class of abstract objects and the pro- 
perties and relations ýincluding functions) defined in 
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that class. These objects and relations, properties 
and functions are all and only those named in the cal- 
culus by non-logical constants. The structure con- 
T stitutes, in effect, as j-., ieb (quoted earlier) has said, 
a classification of the speech phenomena on a principled 
basis. The objects of the structure allow us to inter- 
pret the statements of the calculus in terms of speech 
phenomena. Empirically interpreted statements make a 
claim about the phenomena which can be empirically 
tested. 
In this way we can distinguish (at least conceptually) 
between the two important parts of linguistic descrip- 
tion - the deductive calculus and the structure of objects 
and relations. We can, furthermore, distinguish the 
respective domains of formal, theoretical and empirical 
testing. Formal testing concerns the logical properties 
of the calculus. Theoretical testing concerns the estab- 
lishment of structural models, i. e. their conformity to 
theoretically specified standards. Empirical testing 
concerns empirically interpreted descriptive statements 
(and, hence, the description as a whole). It is important 
to note, however, that empirical testing does not concern 
the objects and relations in the structure directly, 
since one cannot determine the empirical truth value of 
an object or relation. One can only speak of the truth of 
a statement. Instead, one might speak of the adequacy 
of a structural object or relation, although, obviously, 
the testing of empirical statements and the theoretical 
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adequation of structures go hand in hand and may not 
in practice be clearly distinguished. What we are 
concerned with here is, of course, how the testing 
of linguistic models works in principle. See below 
for practical examples. 
If we now turn back to the 4uestion of Popper's 
criterion of demarcation, we can make a final point 
about the notion 'theory' in a three-level approach. 
It will be remembered that we introduced the condition 
that a linguistic theory would not be considered ac- 
ceptable, unless it was applicable in the description 
of fields of speech phenomena. Any non-applicable 
theory would be considered vacuous and, hence, un- 
acceptable. Indeed, any theory yielding inadequate 
linguistic descriptions would be unacceptable. It 
was pointed out that it was via the notion of applic- 
ability that the theoretical and the empirical interests 
of linguistics were bound together. If a linguistic 
theory is to be applicable, then it must be an inter- 
preted theory (it must contain a semantics, or verbal 
28 interpretation or material aspect). Empirical inter- 
pretations of the theory are provided, rather indirectly, 
by the descriptive structures established. An appli- 
cable theory will also contain a methodology and an 
ontology ýsee below). It follows that, although a 
linguistic theory (in our sense) may be meta-physical 
(from a popperian point of view) in that it cannot be 
falsified from experience, it is not, however, a purely 
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formal theory. Although a theory meeting the condition 
of applicability would still fail Popper's criterion; 
nevertheless it is a possibility not considered by 
Popper that a meta-poysical theory might still be 
indirectly scientific via its applicability and in- 
dispensability in the construction of descriptions 
which are in principle empirically falsifiable and, 
hence, scientific in Popper's sense. We have lingudstic 
descriptions meeting the criterion of demarcation but 
the indispensable theory would be non-scientific on 
a strict popperian interpretation. Accordingly, we 
revise the criterion of demarcation as follows, 
"directly scientific" :A system will be said to be 
directly scientific, if it satisfies all formal, 
theoretical and meta-thepretical conditions of ac- 
ceptability including the condition that its empirical 
interpretation be falsifiablo via the demonstration 
that the empirical interpretation is false for a given 
range of phenomena (does not fit the facts). 
"indirectly scientific" :A system will be said to 
be indirectly scientific, if it satisfies all formal 
and meta-theoretical conditions of acceptability, except 
the condition of empirical falsifiability7 but such that 
the system in question is applicable in the construction 
of directly scientific systems and if it is necessary 
for the construction of those systems. 
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Conclusion 
In the present chapter we have examined the meta- 
th., eoretical condition that a linguistic theory or des- 
cription be scientific. In order to set up such a 
condition of the acceptability of linguistic theories 
and descriptions, it has been necessary to formulate 
a definition of the notion "scientific" which can serve 
as a criterion of demarcation. It has been necessary 
to revise the notion of "science" put forward by Popper 
and to construct a criterion which is consonant with 
the three-level approach to linguistics and with the 
'theory - model' or, rather, 'calculus - structure' 
distinction drawn at the level of description (cirectly 
scientific or empirical system). Popper's criterion 
was reformulated so as to apply to systems of empirically 
interpreted statements which are the products of 
calculi and structures. This criterion will determine, 
in effect, the systems which are directly scientific. 
In addition, however, we have found it necessary to 
set up a further notion "indirectly scientific system" 
for those theories which are not empirically falsifiable 
but which are applicable. The present formulation avoids 
all possibility Of hypostatization and of the other 
epistemological dangers alluded to. In the course of 
the chapter we have found it necessary to determine 
which system will be required to satisfy which criteria. 
Linguistic theories will be required to be "indirectly 
scientific" and, hence, applicable and linguistic 
des- 
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criptions will be required to be "directly scientific" 
and, hence, empirical as a condition of their accept- 
ability. In developing these conditions it has been 
necessary to distinguish between the formal calculus 
of linguistic theories and their semantic interpretation. 
The semantic interpretation of a theory is a necessary 
condition of its applicability and the formal calculus 
ensures its sufficiency. We have also distinguished 
the formal calculi of linguistic descriptions from 
the structures which supply their empirical interpre- 
tation. We thus distinguish between valid propositions 
of the descriptive calculus and the empirical inter- 
pretation of these propositions, hypotheses. We can 
then set up tests of the empirical validity for the 
hypotheses in question. It is a necessary condition 
of empiricism and, hence, of the acceptability of lin- 
guistic descriptions as scientific systems that they 
be in principle empirically falsifiable, i. e. it is 
at the point where we speak of hypotheses that Popper's 
criterion applies and, thus, his criterion is included 
in the notion "scientific" as it applies in a three-level 
approach to linguistics. Finally, we have 'Seen that 
a linguistic description is related to a linguistic 
theory via the applicability of that theory and that 
this applicability depends on the incorporation of 
a semantic, ý, a methodology and an ontology into the 
theory. The methodology of the theory will play an 
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important role in the justification of a linguistic 
description. We leave to later chapters the further 
discussion of the notions "applicability of a theory" 
and "empiricism of a description". 
29 
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2. See Chapter 3. 
For discussion of arguments which are synthetic 
a priori (in linguistics and in general) see below. 
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and Martinet. 
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Scientific Discovery, p. 37. 
13. J. Lyons, Introduction, p. 1. 
14. A. Martinet, Elements, p. 1. 
15. As Popper 4as said, "a hypothesis can only be 
empirically tested and only after it has been 
advanced", Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 30. 
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premises of the theory. 
16. See Chapter 1. 
17. K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 41. 
18. See below. 
19. See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,... If. 
20. In this first sense the notion of speech phenomena 
is well established. Note, for instance Buhler, 
who writes, das konkrete Sprechereignis... ist 
wie jeder Blitz und Donner und Casar's Ueberschreiten 
des Rubikon, ein Geschehen hic et nunc, das seinen 
bestimmten Platz im geographiscen Raum und im 
gregorianischen Kalendar hat.... Dasz die Linguistik 
aufs Beobachten angewiesen ist, bedarf keiner 
Erorterung ; ihr Ruf als wohlbegrundete Wissenschaft 
tl 11 
hangt zum guten Teil an der Zuverlassigkeit und 
Exaktheit ihrer Beobachtungsmethodenll, Axiomatik 
der Sprachwissenschaften", P. 19. 
21. These are, of course, preliminary formulations - 
for a fuller account, see below. 
22. See Chapter 3, fn. 34. 
23. K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 32 
et passim. 
24. K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 1- 70. 
25. See my introduction to J. Mulderls, "Postulats... ", 
where it is argued that linguistic theories are 
material systems. 
26. Avid readers of footnotes will know that Popper 
has accepted the 'theory - model' distinction, 
see Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
1972, p. 749 
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27. For example, followers of Hempel such as R. Botha, 
The Methodological Status of Grammatical Argumentation, 
or of Curry such as S. K. Shaumjan, opera cit., 
or of Popper such as G. Sampson, "One Fact Needs 
One Explanation", or J. Mulder, -Sets and Relations, 
or R. Lass, English Phonology and Phonological Theory. 
28. The term "verbal interpretation" is due to M. 
Przelecki, The Logic of Empirical Theories, p. 24. 
29. The relation between linguistic theory and empirical 
testing is explained in the appendix, "Empirical 
Testing and Linguistic Theory". 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE META-THEORETICAL CONDITIONS 
ON LINGUISTIC THEORIES 
-2lo- 
In the previous chapter we concluded that a lin- 
gUi3tiC theory should be regarded as an indirectly 
scientific system. We said that, although a linguistic 
theory could not itself be regarded as an empirical 
scientific theory, it bore a special relationship 
to empirical linguistic descriptions and we investi- 
gated that relationship. In this chapter we will 
consider the logical structure of linguistic theories 
and what meta-theoretical conditions are to be satis- 
fied by linguistic theories. Such meta-theoretical 
conditions will determine the acceptability of speci- 
fic linguistic theories. 
The epistemological conditions relating to 
linguistic theories are of two sorts. A linguistic 
theory will be required to meet formal conditions of 
acceptability and conditions of applicability. The 
formal conditions of acceptability are concerned with 
the logical properties of the form of the theory. The 
conditions of applicability are introduced in order 
to ensure that a given theory will be useful in leading 
to linguistic descriptions. That is to say that the 
conditions of applicability imposed on linguistic theories 
are conditions, the satisfaction of which will render 
a linguistic theory an indirectly scientific system. 
a. Formal conditions of acceptability 
The major formal epistemological requirements on 
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linguistic theories are fairly self-evident and have 
been amply 1 discussed 
. These are the conditions of 
consistency, sufficiency (sometimes called adequacy or 
exhaustiveness) and relative simplicity. These con- 
2 ditions were introduced long ago by Hjelmsle v and 
we will adopt Hjelmslev's conditions with certain 
modifications. 
A thPory will be consistent, if it neither con- 
tains nor implies any contradiction (the statements 
that both p and - p) and if the theory is homogeneous 
ýnot ad hoc). This latter condition will be met, if, 
for all statements contained in or implied by the theory, 
every statement is related to each other in such a 
way that any two statements may be tested for their, 
freedom from self-contradiction. This latter condition 
was not foreseen by Hjelmslev but it is clearly necessary 
as a condition requiring the "integratedness" of lin- 
guistic theories, since a theory may be free of con- 
tradiction by virtue of its eclecticism (as Mulder3 
has pointed out). A linguistic theory will be sufficient, 
if it contains or implies all necessary functions for 
the adequate description of any given range of speech 
phenomena consistent with the dimensions of relevance 
of the theory. Again, the latter condition expressed 
here (underlined) is not mentioned by Hjelmslev, although 
the condition is, strictly speaking, necessary. The 
point is that any range of describienda possesses an 
infinite variety of properties only some of which will 
be linguistically describable. The fact that some 
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properties may not be describable under a given theory 
does not automatically imply that the the theory in 
question is inadequate, e. g. if the phenomena involved 
are irrelevant with respect to the dimensions of rele- 
vance of the theory involved (and if the theory would 
as a result have to be made inconsistent in order to 
account for them) or if the properties are incapable of 
rational formulation or, finally, if the properties 
are merely random. More positively stated, it will 
be necessary to introduce a theoretical function into 
a given theory only if it can be shown that the pheno- 
mena to be described fall within the the dimensions of 
relevance of the theory in question (i. e. if it would 
be inconsistent to ignore them). 
As an example, we can say that it would be inconsistent 
to introduce the notion "transformation" into function- 
alist linguistics. Whereas one must recognise a "second 
articulation"in functionalist linguistics, since the 
level of figurae clearly increase the communicational 
economy of the system, it is not at all clear that one 
can regard transformational relations as having any 
bearing on communication (the transmission of information) 
whatsoever. If this is the case, then the observation of 
transformational relations holding between linguistic 
entities (if valid and statable at all) would simply be 
irrelevant to a semiotic study of Language. Certainly, 
one could not say that transformational relations were 
either signs, figurae or relations between linguistic 
entities in constructions. Rather, transformations are 
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mapping relations between linguistic entities. It is 
difficult to see how such relations could be of rele- 
vance to communication without accepting, in advance, 
a transformational account of Language ; i. e. if we 
assert that transformational relations hold between 
deep and surface structures. It is a transformational 
account of Language, of course, which the functionalist 
does not accept and which is inconsistent with a func- 
tionalist account of Language. The incorporation of 
transformations into a functionalist account of Language 
would be inconsistent, because any linguistic entity 
in a functionalist account has identity at a given 
level of analysis (e. g. at the level of signs). To 
say that a transformation holds between sign x and 
sign xI implies the separate identity of x and xý 
but to maintain that a transformational relation holds 
between x and xI also implies that x and xI (for 
example, pairs of active and passive sentences in 
English) are merely variants of one sign (i. e. they 
have the same identity at some level of analysis). 
This would mean either that signs could both have 
separate identities and the same identity ( which 
would be inconsistent. ) or that there is an unspecified 
meta-level of signs not provided for or justified in 
the theory. If, however, we say that transformational 
relations hold between allomorphsq then we merely assert 
the existence of unnecessary and trivial operations 
over items in free or complementary distribution (as 
with stylistic transformations). Such operations are 
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unnecessary since the variation is already captured 
by allomorphy statements and they would be as trivial 
as "concord" variation (which we do not make a fuss 
about). But it is not at all clear that the notion 
of1transformational relation" can even be consistently 
formulated within functionalist linguistics , since 
one would not be able to say what the relata of the 
relation would be. In transformational grammar, the 
relata are "forms Of sentences", or some such, but 
this naive and undefined conception, springing from 
a mixture of logic and traditional grammar, is simply 
not recognised in functionalist linguistics. This is 





Martinet for his phrase-structure view of Language. 
Martinet does not have a phrase-structure account of 
Language because he simply does not recognise the 
level of sentence, as it is understood in the "phrase- 
structure model". In any case, the "sentences" related 
by transformations (by transformationalist3) would be 
(for functionalists) either lexically different or 
syntactically different or both. If lexically different, 
they would not meet the conditions for transformations. 
If syntactically different (or both syntactically and 
lexically different) , one has no need to relate 
the 
sentences in formal grammar at all. If the sentences 
are lexically the same but grammatically different7 
then one is concerned with a semantic relation, viz. 
synonymy. However one looks at the matter, one is 
confronted with a problem that cannot be formulated 
Without inconsistency or obfuscation. Under such 
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circumstances one could hardly expect functionalists 
to take the problem of transformational relations 
seriously. Even if the problem were statable in 
functionalist terms, it would, as we have seen, 
fall outside the dimensions of relevance of the 
theory and lead to contradiction. Thus, we can say 
that the absence of the notion "transformational 
relation" in functionalist linguistics does not 
automatically imply the inadequacy of functionalist 
linguistics and illustrates the necessity of the 
above condition of sufficiency, viz. that of consis- 
tency within the dimensions of relevance of the theory. 
(It is possible that it is this kind of consideration 
that Hjelmslev would have covered through the criterion 
of appropriateness. One should not forget also that 
the condition of consistency is, as Hjelmslev says, 
logically prior to the condition of sufficiency. It 
can be argued that these two factors imply that 
sufficiency should be taken to mean "sufficiency 
within a particular domain", i. e. within the dimensions 
of relevance of the theory. ) 
We turn finally to the most notional of the above 
formal conditions relative simplicity. There is no 
doubt that any theory should aim for simplicity as a 
kind of elegance. It is not clear, however, that 
anything more than a notional definition of simplicity 
for a theory can be given, but we will say that a theory 
will be relatively simple, if it achieves its tasks, 
consistently and sufficiently, without redundancy and 
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in the fewest possible number of operations 
6 
and if 
the theory achieves maximum generality (within its 
dimensions of relevance)ý In popperian terms, maximum 
generality relates to the largest possible class of 
"potential falsifiers". We do not accept that linguistic 
theories are empirical and so we interpret maximum 
generality to mean "applicability in the greatest 
possible number of descriptions". 
It may be argued, in addition, that a linguistic 
theory should be, preferably, an axiomatic or axiomatised 
8 theory. The reasons for this are numerous. Axiomatic 
systems possess greater rigour (than, for example, 
lists of definitions), greater simplicity and greater 
transparency. They possess a resistance to circularity 
which is the product of the introduction of axioms 
(a priori) ;a system of definitions, such as that 
proposed by Hjelmslev, is potentially limitless and 
this involves either infinite regress or circularl 
Finally, an axiomatic system reduces the number of 
primitive notions to an explicit minimum. If a theory 
is an axiomatic theory, however, it must (clearly) 
meet the conditions of axiomatic systems over and above 
those already mentioned. These are, principally, that 
the axioms of the system should be non-interderivable 
and that there should be no superfluous axiom (no 
redundancy) 
Insofar as these conditions touch the purely formal 
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mechanism or calculus of the theory, it is evident that 
we are concerned with a system which contains a set 
of axioms which introduce theoretical predicates and 
relations as propositional functions which are constants 
within the system (see below). In order that the 
calculus may work, we will require also a logical 
meta-language for the theory containing variables, 
logical connectors, grammatical symbols, rules of 
formation and rules of inference ( and any other 
necessary logical apparatus). 
The propositional functions of the theory will 
not be mere variables ; they will be non-logical 
constants, because each such function will be determinate 
within the theory and will be assigned a determinate 
semantic interpretation. The reason for this will be 
evident. The propositional functions of the theory 
will be such theoretical predicates as "is a phoneme", 
"is a moneme", etc. and the theoretical relations will 
be such as "contracts a syntactic relation with" or 
"commutes with", etc.. Clearly, these theoretical 
terms will be quite inapplicable if left without 
interpretation. Without interpeetation we would have 
a meaningless calculus containing a set of empty 
0% *% 1% 
propositional functions, p x, q x, r x, etc., and 
relations (f ^ ^)q (g N A), etc.. Labels such as these x7y- X9 y 
would be of no assistance in the practical task of 
linguistic analysis, bearing in mind that it is the 
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avowed aim of a linguistic theory to make possible 
the acquisition of knowledge about speech phenomena. 
(It is in virtue of this that the linguistic theory 
is an indirectly scientific system). It follows that 
the kind of linguistic theory we have outlined would 
be an interpreted or material axiomatic system. That 
is to say that the propositional functions of such a 
system would be defined and, hence, constants of the 
system. This should come as no surprise when we con- 
sider that a label such as "specific gravity" or 
"resistance" has no meaning in physics until defined. 
These seem to be the kind of considerations involved 
when Tarski wrote that, 
"The constants with which we have to deal in 
every scientific theory may be divided into two large 
groups. The first group consists of terms which are 
specific for a given theory. In the case of arithmetic, 
for instance, they are terms denoting either individual 
numbers or whole classes of numbers, relations between 
numbers, operations between numbers, etc ...... On the 
other hand, there are terms of a much more general 
character occurring in most of the statements of arith- 
metic, terms which are met constantly both in con- 
siderations of everyday life and in every possible 
field of science and which represent an indispensable 
means for conveying human thoughts in any field what- 
soever ; such words as "not", "and", Ifis", "every", 
'Isome" and many others belong here. 1110 
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The implication is clearly that in the sciences, 
although not in formal logic, it is not the so-called 
logical constants alone which are to be defined but 
one must define also the non-logical constants of the 
scientific theory in question. This is not to deny 
the importance of the operators and logical constants 
which we will find in any scientific system. What 
we do deny is that linguistics is concerned with the 
study of the properties of these (logical) constants, 
variables and operations. Linguistics is principally 
concerned to make use of logical methods in theory- 
construction. The emphasis in any scientific theory 
will be on the constants specific to the theory. In 
linguistics, as we have said, we will be concerned 
with such propositional functions as "is a phoneme", 
"is a distinctive feature", etc.. When interpreted 
semantically, these determinate functions constitute 
theoretical meta-models to be applied in linguistic 
description. 
b. Theories and Models 
If we ignore, for the moment, the semantic inter- 
pretation of theoretical terms, we can see that it is 
tempting to think of descriptive models as interpretations 
of theoretical models (or "meta-models" as they are 
sometimes called). Under this viewt a descriptive 
model would be a model of a theory in the usual sense. 
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That is, the theory, Tj contains a calculus, K, 
consisting of a meta-language (rules of formation, 
rules of inference, etc. ) and a language (axioms, 
logical and non-logical constants, variables, etc. ). 
A descriptive model would then be a pair consisting 
of the set of objects, 0, and the relations defined 
12n 
in the set, RR ye. **R The descriptive model is 
a model of the theory, if, for every relation in the 
model, each relation is put in correspondence with 
the name of that relation in the theory and the 
variables of the theory are explained as members of 
11 
the set, 0, all formulae of the theory are true. 
Thus, for example, if the theory says that, under 
specified conditions, a pair of signs in construction 
contract a relation of subordination and we find that, 
in English, "men" and "run" are signs and are in con- 
struction and meet those conditions, then "men" is 
subordinate to "run" in that construction and we have 
a model of the theory. 
This way of viewing the interpretation of a theory 
is not entirely indefensible. But it is not entirely 
correct either. The point is that a linguistic theory 
does not provide all the conceivable descriptive classi- 
fications, possible descriptive solutions, relations, 
entities, etc.. All such objects and relations must 
be justified by reference to the theory, but not neces- 
sarily contained in the theory. Thus, for example, 
the theory does not contain the paradigms, "noun" and 
"verb", but the "noun" and "verb" (e. g. in English) 
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must satisfy the conditions of paradigms specified in 
the theory. In the above example, "men" would belong 
to the paradigm "noun" and "run" to "verb". This means 
that in description we require a separate language- 
specific calculus. As we have said, a description is 
a pair consisting of a calculus and a model. The model 
of the description interprets the calculus of the 
description directly and interprets the theory only 
indirectly. For this reason, we say that a descriptive 
model is an application of the theory and not a direct 
interpretation of it. (Of course, if we look at des- 
cription as a process of describing rather than as 
a state, then the description is a product of the 
application of the theory to the phenomena). 
Now, it is possible to use the theory so as to 
generate potential models which may or may not be 
instantiated by actual descriptive models. For instance, 
we may have a theory of phonotactic structure which 
contains the notions of "paradigm", "well-formed 
phonotagm" and the relation of "subordination" and 
which operates on the set of phonemes. It would then 
be possible to set up a potential model in which the 
set of phonemes was represented by the variables, x, y, 
the notion "well-formed phonotagm" by the 
predicate letterý Wq and the relation of "subordination" 
for a post- by R for a pre-nuclear relation and R 
nuclear relation. We could suppose that in a potential 
language three paradigmst A, B, and C could be set up, 
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where the members of B and only B were nuclear and the 






(A) -4 B 4-- (C) 
We could then set up a sub-theory, as follows, 
x (A xVBxVC x) 
xyAx&By 
yzBy&CZ 
Wx BxVx FFA" yVy R"' 
and we could set up a model as follows, 
<x(x is a phoneme in L) ; W, A, B, C, R, R) 
and where we explain the members of the set of phonemes 
as interpreting the variables of the sub-theory and 
the relations W, A, B, C, R, R, of the model are 
explained as interpreting the corresponding relation 
names, W, A2 B, C2 R9R, of the theory. 
The generation of potential models of this sort 
may have interesting uses in determining the limits 
of a theory. However, we must distinguish the potential 
model of a theory from the real model of a description. 
The model in the description satisfies the descriptive 
calculus, although, naturally, it must be possible to 
establish a potential theoretical model which corresponds 
to the descriptive model. It is this possibility which 
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shows, ultimately, the theoretical justification of 
the description and the applicability of the theory. 
c. Applicability conditions 
We must turn now to a consideration of how a 
theory may be constructed in order to be indirectly 
scientific or applicable. The main problems are those 
of knowing what a theory is about and how a theory can 
lead us to knowledge of the desired sort. The first 
problem is a question of the interpretation of the 
theory and the second is a point about the components 
of the theory. The point about the interpretation of 
a theory brings us back to a previous position,, viz. 
that a linguistic theory must be a material system 
and that a theory must contain a semantics. The second 
point about the components of the theory will lead us 
to recognise components of methodology and ontology 
as parts of the theory distinct from the calculus and 
semantics of the theory. 
Logicians have long been aware of the problem of 
interpretation for scientific theories. As we have 
seen, Tarski was explicitly concerned with the problem 
of scientific definition and Russell remarks, 
"The question of interpretation has been unduly 
neglected. So long as we remain in the region of 
mathematical formulae, everything appears precise, but 
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when we seek to interpret them, it turns out that the 
precision is partly illusory. Until this matter has 
been cleared up, we cannot tell with any exactitude 
what any science is asserting.,, 
12 
As Russell implies, there are two aspects to the 
problem of semantic interpretation in scientific 
theories. The one is to determine what it is to be 
an interpretation (a philosophical problem) and the 
other is to determine what is the semantic interpretation 
of a specific scientific theory. This latter point is 
where the sciences go their several ways and, hence, 
we say that the formal relations contracted by linguis- 
tic theories and linguistic descriptions are merely 
the starting point in descriptive modelling and theory- 
building. This is why, when speaking of applied theories 
(as in linguistics) it is possible, though not strictly 
speaking desirable, to dispense with an exact formu- 
lation of the meta-language of the theory. The reason 
is that, unless a special form of logic is to be applied 
in the theory (as in glossematics), one may make use of, 
13 
say, ordinary propositional calculus or naive set theory. 
Linguists, like other scientists, are interested only in 
applying a logical framework not in the investigation of 
its logical properties. That the framework for linguistic 
analysis must be (equivalent to or translatable into) 
a logical framework is, however, a necessity. 
In accordance with our three-level conception 
of 
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linguistic analysis, we must distinguish at this point 
between the semantic interpretation, which is a matter 
of the definition of theoretical terms, and empirical 
interpretation, which is involved in the empirical 
adequation of descriptions. Semantic interpretation, 
which we call definition, is a necessary condition of 
the applicability of theoretical terms, whereas empirical 
interpretation is the determination of the empirical 
extension or scope of a descriptive model (the deter- 
mination of the set of entities satisfying the conditions 
of the descriptive model in the field of phenomena 
under consideration). It is clear that the notion of 
empirical interpretation presupposes definition, since 
empirical interpretation implies the applicability 
of some theoretical terms. Roughly, we can say that 
the distinction is one between definition as the 
establishment of analytical conditions and empirical 
interpretation as the establishment of a set of objects. 
Thus, we define the notion "phoneme" but we give an 
empirical interpretation to the phoneme /p/ in English. 
We should not forget, however, that a linguistic 
theory must be applicable in the analysis of speech 
phenomena. A theory of the sort envisaged contains 
a calculus which, except for the axioms and meta- 
language (and the definitions, if they are included 
in the calculus), is a product of a priori reasoning. 
The axioms are introduced a priori and the set of 
theo- 
rems depends ultimately entirely on the axioms, the 
meta-language and the definitions. In an axiomatic 
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(formal) system, the axioms have no claim to empirical 
truth ; in fact, they are not tautologies either. They 
are "accepted as true without in any way establishing 
14 
their validity", as Russell puts it. It follows that 
the theorems of the system cannot simultaneously be 
synthetic, since this would imply that these statements 
(and, in fact, the axioms) were both analytic, i. e. 
that their validity depended solely on the use of 
symbols, and that the self-same statements were 
simultaneously dependent for their validity on external, 
empirical factors; i. e. they would be both accepted 
as true and potentially falsifiable, which is absurd. 
It follows that the theorems of a linguistic theory 
would be tautologies, as argued above. Furthermore, 
since propositional functions do not refer to empirical 
objects (they are inherently "classificatory", e. g. 
"is a phoneme" , "is a syntactic relation", etc. 
), it 
is evident that no empirical evidence can, even in 
principle, be brought to bear in testing the theory. 
This, I assume, is what is meant by saying that lin- 
guistic theory contains no "existence postulate,, 
15 
9 
i. e. there is no empirical world in which the theory 
can be empirically tested. In popperian terms, the 
16 
class of potential falsifiers is always zero. If this 
argument is correct, then any linguistic theory will 
be quite vacuousq i. e. it will remain a mere calculus, 
unless it is applicable. That is to say thatq in order 
for a linguistic theory to be applicable 
(to be "in- 
directly scientific")ý then it must be possible 
to 




) (satisfying the conditions of or being a 
model of) the framework of theoretical terms, such that 
the descriptions in question are not tautological, 
but empirical. 
As we have seen, a linguistic theory, in order 
to meet the conditions of applicability, must con- 
tain both a semantics and a methodology. We will 
require, in addition, that the theory contain an 
ontology. This last condition is necessary because 
of the degree of abstractness involved in theory- 
construction and the necessity of providing some 
"routes" for the interpretation of descriptive models. 
In particular, we will find that entities will differ 
in their communicational dimensions. The expression 
of a sign, for instance, may be regarded as a class of 
phonological forms, ýpj, each of which contracts the 
same distinctive function in grammar (R s); they all 
have a "grammatical dimension". One should note, how- 
ever, that phonological forms are classes of phonetic 
forms, jfj , with a "phonological 
dimension" (distinc- 
tive function in phonology, R d) 
17 In order to relate 
the more abstract entities, such as signs, to observable 
entities we will require an intervening ontology which 
relates first-order functions (those which can be 
satisfied by observables) to n-th order functions. 
This can be done, as we have seen, by adding or com- 
pounding dimensions of communicational relevance). 
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We saw above the formal conditions pertaining to 
the acceptability of linguistic theories and we saw 
how these conditions could be satisfied by setting up 
the "calculus" of the theory in a certain way. We are 
now in a position to sum up the factors which ensure 
the applicability of the theory. 
Firstly, as we have noted, the calculus of the 
theory can- not be uninterpreted but the theory must 
contain a semantics. The semantics of the theory may 
be regarded either as part of the calculus, K, of the 
theory, T, or it may be regarded as a necessary con- 
dition of the applicability of the theory on a par 
with the methodology and ontology. In fact, of course, 
it is both of these. We require the set of definitions 
contained in the semantics in order to generate the 
set of theorems but we require them also in applying 
any theoretical predicate or relation in linguistic 
analysis. In order to convey this "in-between" status 
t4 
we will reDresent the seman LCs as a set of definitions 
or "verbal" interpretations, V, conjoined with the 
calculus, K. Thus, T contains (K &V The calculus, 
K, contains the set of non-logical constants, 
t. 6 
- 
Not all members of the set, 
{P3 
, will be 
defined. In 
all systems of the type outlined there is a small number 
of primitive or undefined termsý U2 such that UIC 
P. 
As a matter of policy, the role of the primitive 
terms 
will be kept to a minimum and undefined terms will 
be 
replaced by defined terms wherever possible. 
The fact 
remains, however, that a number of primitive 
terms will 
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enter the theory (for which one might only be able to 
give some notional explanation). As far as the defined 
terms are concerned, each such term-will enter an 
equivalence relation with at least one semantic inter- 
1 pretation, V The equivalence between the definiendum 
and the definiens must be such that that the definiens 
is a propositional function which contains only defined 
or primitive (immediately obvious) constants and which 
does not contain the definiendum (otherwise, we shall 
have a circularity). Thus, for each defined theoretical 
term, P there is at least one definition, Vj, such 
that Vj states the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the satisfaction of PiPi (--)Vj. (Obviously, 
the set of definitions falls under the conditions of 
consistency above; ) If the definitions are to be 
comprehensible and applicable, it follows that they 
may not be purely formal, i. e. all formal terms must 
(ultimately) receive an ordinary language interpretation, 
even if there are are instructions concerning the tech- 
nical use of particular expressions - this is the 
interpretability requirementý8 
The ontological requirement helps to ensure the 
applicability of the theory by demanding that 
(a) all 
theoretical terms (non-logical constants) be related 
in an ontological framework and (b) there 
is at least 
one first-order function, i. e. the functions of at 
least 
one ontological level must be interpretable 
in terms of 
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or translatable into a set of functions which are 
observably satisfiable predicates. This may be acnieved 
in linguistics by incorporating a level of "phonetic 
form", such that all - observably satisfiable pre- 
dicates drawn from phonetics constitute the set of 
phonetic forms, e. g. "is bilabial", "is a voiced, 
apical fricative", etc.. In semantics, the first 
order will consist of concrete messages. In this way 
we ensure that all functions of the theory are related 
to the level of phonetic form and thus render them 
ultimately translatable into empirically satisfiable 
predicates. Thus, any application of the theoretical 
functions would be directly or indirectly operationally 
related to observables in their capacity of satisfying 
particular first-order functions. The relation is 
operational because the observables are related by 
specific operations to more abstract entities. This 
ontological factor builds in the possibility of empiri- 
cal interpretation in any application of the theory 
(in any model of the theory). It is important to note 
that the possibility of translating theoretical pre- 
dicates into observably satisfiable predicates does 
not render the theory "empirical" by a back-door route. 
The satisfaction of the phonetic predicate is necessary 
but not sufficient for the interpretation of the 
theory 
in terms of phenomena. The reason is that the satis- 
faction of the phonetic predicate (being a phonetic 
form) 
does not imply the satisfaction of any criterion of 
linguistic analysis and, hence, does nnt imply member- 
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ship of any phonological form. Even when linguistic 
criteria are met, any phonetic form will be a member 
of the extension of a particular phonological form, 
i. e. it will belong to a model or application of the 
theory, a particular language (such as English) and 
not to the theory itself. Consequently, the ontological 
requirement allows for the empirical applicability 
of the theory ; it does not allow for its empiricism. 
It does so by relating the theory to predicates which 
determine the potential operands of the theory (ranges 
of phenomena). The position outlined here is in accord 
with that of Saussure, who wrote ; 
IlLes rapports de Ja linguistieue avec la physio- 
logie ne sont pas .... difficiles a debrouiller ; 
la 
Ii relation est unilaterale, en ce sens que 1 etude des 
langues demande des eclaircissements a la physiologie 
des sons, mais ne lui en fournit aucun. 1119 
Although translatability into the predicates of 
phonetics is an obvious point of connection between 
linguistic theory and speech phenomena, one must be 
prepared for the possibility that7 particularly in 
semantics, one will require a number of other first- 
order predicates. We now turn to an example of 
how 
an ontological framework relates theoretical predicates 
to one another and to phenomena. 
Let a sign, S, be a particular set of phonological 
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forms, each in its capacity of satisfying a 
particular distinctive function in grammar, s 
0 




sj ), (p 
2R 
sj )I.. 0. 
(pn R si) Now, let a phonological form, pi, be 
a particular set of phonetic forms, each in i 
-fil I 
its capacity of satisfying a particular distinctive 
function in phonology, dk so PPi <---ý 
ili 1Rdk *--ý 
J(f IRdkf2RdkfnRdk )3, where each 
phonetic form is a generalised model -ý"or the set of 
particular models of specific realisations in speech, 
the set Iii of images, such that for all realisations 
there is an i which is a memher of f, ief. That is, 
f is empirically satisfiable. So, by substitution, 
we obtain ; 
s1 f--4 t+fl R dl)7 
( J(f lRd2 
+f IRdn 
(f 2Rd1 (f nRdR sj), 
(f 2Rd2 )9. o.. (f 
nRd2R si 
(f 2Rdn )90.04(f nRdn )JR sj)3. 
It follows that, in this way, any sign is related to 
a set of observably satisfiable predicates, but not 
vice versa. Consider the sign "to bell in Engli sh. 
to be,, (--> ý( ý( Ebi jj Rdk )q .... 
IR 
sj), (j ([iz3 Rd 
R sj), ...... 
(t( Cbijir)] Rd n) R sj)3 . 
20 
The relations, Rs and R d, can be viewed as grouping 
or classificatory operations over the phenomena. 
The third condition of applicability is that of 
"containing a methodology1f. In addition to the above 
two conditions, the applicability of a 
linguistic theory 
depends on its terms being related to operational 
procedures operating on ohservables in such a way 
that 
-233- 
the satisfaction of the conditions of these methodo- 
logical operations is equivalent to, or implies) the 
satisfaction of the semantically interpreted theoretical 
term associated with those methodological conditions. 
The set of operations satisfying these conditions will 
constitute the method_ology of the theory and, for 
each defined theoretical term or non-logical constant, 
there must be a determinate subset of methodological 
operations meeting these conditions. Clearly, the 
methodology is closely related to the semantic inter- 
pretation of the theoretical terms in that it is via 
the methodology that the conditions of the definition 
of the theoretical term are satisfied. The incorporation 
of the methodology is of prime importance in testing 
the empirical applicability of the theory and in the 
empirical testing of linguistic descriptions as appli- 
cations of the theory. 
We are now in a position to express the logical 
structure of a linguistic theory, T, as a triple ; 
T=<K& 
JVJ 
, 0, M 
ý- 
Here K is an axiomatic-deductive calculus with the 
above-mentioned properties (i. e. it contains a 
'meta-language' with the rules of formation and inference 
and a 'language' with the logical and theoretical 
constants (predicates and relations), the variables 
and the axioms of the theory). K will contain all and 
only the non-logical constants (predicates and relations, 
[P3 
of the theory. Each member of the set, 
ý pj is 
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defined with the exception of a minimum of undefined 
terms. Each defined term is equivalent to at least 
one definition from the set, JVJ , i. e. (YP) (E Vj) 
(P i f-4 Vj). The semantics, Jfl, is conjoined to the 
calculus, K. 
The ontology, 0, is such that (allowing subscripts 
to represent ontological levels) ; 
0i01 (VP) (P 1RP& (YP) (P RP yX -OL 
where o( represents the first order and X and cý represent 
higher orders and the relation R0 is the relation "is 
ontologically related to". That is, all theoretical 
terms are ontologically related and all contract an 
ontological relation with at least one first order 
function (directly or indirectly). 
Finally, M is the methodology. It is a set of 
(subsets of) conditions, such that the satisfaction 
of each subset of conditions implies or is equivalent 
to a particular non-logical constant. Formally, allowing 
(m 1Pm2 
J-91M 
n) to be a subset of methodological 
conditions, we can write; 
(VP) (E (m 17m2... Im 






That is, for all non-logical constants of the theory 
which are defined, there is a subset of -I' 
the set of methodological conditionsq such that 
the 
satisfaction of those conditions by any x implies 
the 
satisfaction of a particular non-logical constant 
by that 




We turn to a much more detailed consideration 
of methodology in later chapters, where methodology 
will be seen to be of vital importance in the question 
of empiricism in linguistics. 
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e See, for instance, L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomenes 
and Resume, H. J. Uldall, Outline, H. Spang- 
Hanssen, Probability and Structural Classification 
in Language Description and J. Muldery "Linguistic 
Theory,, ", amongst many others. 
2. L. Hjelmslev, Prolelgomenes, pp. 19 - 24. 
Mulder has called this "a-consistency" ; see his 
"Linguistic Theory,... ", p. 93. 
4. N. Ruwet, Introduction_'*a la Grammaire Generative. 
P. Postal, "Review of Martinet". 
The notion of "simplicity" is, of course, hard to 
pin down. The conditions of "non-redundancy" and 
"minimum number of operations" are drawn respectively 
from J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,.... " and L. 
Hjelmslev, Prolegomenes,. 
It would seem to be the case that simplicity in- 
volves "maximum generality" ; in popperian terms, 
the greater the number of "potential falsifiers", 
the greater the simplicity of a system or statement. 
See K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
PP. 71 - 2. 
A. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, 
pp. 91 - 2. 
K. R. Popper, Logic of_Scientific Discovery, Pp. 71 - 2. 
10. A. Tarski, Introduction to Logicq P. 18. 
11. Ju. A. Shrejder, "Mathematical Models of Language", 
pp. 243 - 
12. Ju. A. Shrejder, ibid., p. 242. 
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13. Ju. A. Shrejder, ibid., pp. 243 - 4. 
14. B. Russell, Human Knowledge ; its scope and limits, 
pp. 255 - 6, (quoted by I. I. Revzin, Models of 
Language, p. 4. ). 
15. Kiefer has rightly pointed out the virtual vacuity 
of some highly abstract mathematical models of 
language for the purposes of linguistic analysis. 
This is why I emphasise the need for applicability 
in linguistic theories and say that the development 
of formal models, although necessary for the 
acceptability of linguistic theories, does not 
constitute the primary task of linguistic theorising. 
See F. Kiefer, Mathematical Linguistics in Eastern 
Europe, pp. 1- 
16. A. Tarski, Introduction to Logic, p. 118. 
17. For the definitions given here see J. Mulder, 
11 "Les Postulats 0, 
18. 
19 . 
#0 % L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomenes, p. 24. 
F. de Saussure, Cours, p. 21. 
20. The view of definition adopted here is that of 
Tarski, Introduction to Logic, p. 35, where he 
says; "every definition may assume 
the form 
of an equivalence". See also Whitehead and Russell, 
Principia, pp. 11 - 12. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IS LINGUISTICS A "RATIONAL META-PHYSICS" ? 
-239- 
It has sometimes been maintained, contrary to 
the view adopted by us in previous chapters, that the 
statements in a linguistic description are of a purely 
tautological character and that no empirical considera- 
tions enter linguistic descriptions at any point. 
Lass 
1, for example, has maintained that transformational- 
generative theory would be counted as "meta-physics", 
i. e. excluded from the domain of science, by a strict 
application of Popper's criterion of demarcation. 
Itkonen 2 has claimed that a transformational-generative 
grammar, viewed as an axiomatic-deductive device, 
is irrefutable, because it is constructed in such a 
way that it defines the "norms" of a language, i. e. 
the well-formed strings, against which it is to be 
empirically tested. For example, according to Itkonen, 
the string "the man" is defined as well-formed by the 
grammar of English and this involves the rule that 
a definite article always precedes thenoun with which 
it is in construction. Now, this being the case, 
according to Itkonen, any instance of "man the" would 
thus be defined as not well-formed and, hencet not a 
valid refutation of the rule, "article precedes noun". 
However, this would mean that this rule was in principle 
irrefutableý If all rules of grammar were of this 
nature, no grammar could be considered as 
"empirical" 
or "scientific" - 
It would seem to me that both of 
these arguments 
are simply exagg In the 




i-. hqt. lingiiistic theory is, in one respect, 
purely 
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tautologous does not imply that linguistics is purely 
a form of "rational meta-physics". As we have seen, 
empirical considerations may enter at many points. 
For example, we may say that the requirement that 
linguistic theories be semantically interpreted theories 
and that they lead to acceptable empirical descriptions 
relates the level of "abstract" theory to the level 
of description via the notion of applicability. Any 
theory which is not interpreted cannot be said to be 
a linguistic theory at all, but it is merely a meaning- 
less calculus. If we admit the possibility of linguis- 
tic descriptions of speech phenomena, where each des- 
cription is constructed using an interpreted linguistic 
theory, then it is implied that particular grammars 
are of an empirical nature. In transformational- 
generative grammar of the Chomskyan sort ( Aspects 
and after), this will mean that the generated strings 
of a grammar, in order to describe any given language, 
must be empirically interpretable in terms of observed 
speech events. This empirical interpretation implies 
the possibility Of the empirical falsehood of the 
grammar, its refutation by modus tollens through 
having empirically false consequences. Alternatively, 
the grammar may be empirically inadequate, if 
it is incapable of generating all possible strings 
exhaustively. That is to say that any validly generated 
string that did not correspond to any sub-class of 
the 
class of well-formed utterances would be sufficient 
to refute the grammar ; i. e. it would have generated 
a non-string and, hence, since the 
falsification of 
no ýA ýu 
Pt d"?, n_ ný ýC 
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any derived statement in an axiomatic-deductive system 
is sufficient to falsify the whole system, the possi- 
bility of empirical falsification is not excluded from 
the description. To accept thist however, is to accept 
that linguistic description is empirical in Popper's 
sense. On the other hand, Itkonen appears to deny 
the possibility of refutation by modus tollens in 
linguistic description. If it were the case that 
Itkonen were looking at linguistic descriptions as 
purely formal objects in abstraction from their empiri- 
cal interpretation, then, of course, it would be possible 
to deny the refutation by modus tollens and, since 
the grammar would define the strings of the language, 
the question of exhaustiveness would not arise. However, 
linguistic descriptions, interpreted in this very narrow 
way, are merely formal calculi and cannot be said to 
be grammars of anything at all, i. e. they are simply 
(algorithmic) logical systems. It is only when there 
is some kind of empirical interpretation of a formal 
system in terms of observable utterances that we can 
speak of a grammar of a language. Butq if we must have 
empirical interpretation for there to be a linguistic 
description at all, then we must allow the possibility 
that either the grammar is not exhaustive with respect 
to the phenomena to be described or that the grammar 
can be refuted by modus tollens as Popper advocates 
for scientific systems. A grammar will 
be empirically 
inadequate, if it does not generate all the well-formed 
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strings of a language. For example, a grammar of English 
will fail to be exhaustive, if it cannot generate, for 
whatever reason, relative clauses. Of course, Itkonen 
could retort that, since, for instance, the string, 
"the man who came to tea was stupid". is not defined 
by his grammar that, ipso facto this is not a string 
of English. However, this would be a particularly 
perverse position to adopt in linguistics which, after 
all, is concerned to provide a description of all the 
well-formed utterances of a language. On the other 
hand, a grammar of English would be empirically refuted, 
if it generated the string, "the who blue was here is". 
Only if the grammar of English were claimed to be 
necessarily correct i. e. if it defined all the strings 
and no non-strings, could we fly in the face of facts 
and claim this to be a genuine string of English, i. e. 
because the grammar so defines it. Again this would 
be a strange way of doing linguistics. Two other points 
must be made. In the first place, the fact that we 
must carry out a different interpretation of any formal 
system for each particular language implies that lin- 
guistics is not Purely tautologous, but is interested 
in the empirical description of different fields of 
phenomena. Secondly, the mere fact that Itkonen's 
rule of "definite article precedes noun" has not been 
validly refuted, does not imply that it could not 
be 
refuted. Furthermorep we know how we might try to 
refute this rule by empirical means. Itkonen-has Simply 
chosen an easy and convenient example 
for himself. If 
the rule is not refuted, thent to use 
Popper's term, it 
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is "corroboratedli, 
There are areas of linguistics, notably in lin- 
guistic theory and in using (the names of) descriptive 
constructs in deductive arguments to form predictions 
about the phenomena where we are concerned with purely 
deductive calculi. This does not imply that there 
are no empirical considerations in linguistics or that 
linguistic descriptions are "meta-physical" in the 
popperian sense. The reason is quite simply that there 
are clear methods of empirical testing for linguistic 
descriptions. The predictions which one can make about 
speech phenomena are, in fact, quite empty, if there is 
no empirical control on them through testing against 
phenomena. We reject, therefore, the view that lin- 
guistics is a form of "rational meta-physics" in the 
popperian sense. 
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1. R. Lass, English Phonology and Phonological Theory, 
pp. 2 15 ff-- 
E. Itkonen, "The Use and Misuse of Axiomatics in 
Linguistics". 
3. E. Itkonen, ibid., p. 187. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STRUCTURE AND THEORY IN LINGUISTICS 
-246- 
We have said that "structures" are a necessary 
part of linguistic descriptions. In general, linguis- 
tics is said to be a "structuralist" science: In 
this chapter we consider what is meant by "structuralism" 
and the place of "structures" in linguistics. 
Linguistics has been characterised by its concern 
with structures since Saussure. This concern is shared 
with many other sciences, including chemistry, psych6logy 
and physics, e. g. in the theory of "physical structures". 
Despite the wide variety of disciplines which can be 
called I'structuralist" (and some differences in the 
interpretation of the term "structure"), there is 
sufficient similarity in structuralist approaches to 
science for us to say that structuralism makes a specific, 
philosophical claim. 
The essence of this claim can be explained as 
the view that the properties and behaviour of homogeneous 
collections of observables may be accounted for con- 
sistently, exhaustively, simply and in an empirically 
testable manner by reference to abstract, self-contained 
1 
and autonomous systems or totalities. The identity of 
such systems is determined by the external dependencies 
which they contract. A totality of this sort 
is pre- 
sented by means of an analysis which postulates 
the 
component parts of the system, and establishes 
the 
functional relations which organise these component 
parts. 
-247- 
The limits of the system, its component parts and the 
internal relations of the system are determined by the 
common function or purpose of the whole. Abstract 
objects of this sort are set up in such a way that the 
observable characteristics of the collection of phenomena 
under consideration are explained as a function of the 
external dependencies of the system, its component parts 
and the relations which the components contract. This 
is achieved by specifying "rules of correspondence" 
between the objects and relations of the abstract system 
(on the level of constructs) and the observable objects, 
relations and processes (on the level of phenomena). 
A structure in linguistics is a class of those 
2 
constructs and those relations described in that class 
which are necessary to account for the communicational 
speech phenomena, (or some subset thereof) of some 
specified speech community. Such a class is identified, 
in the first place, by its external relationsg e. g. 
with other linguistic structures, with non-linguistic 
structures and with the set of phenomenap the communi- 
cational conventions of which it purports to describe. 
Linguistic structures contain constructs, such as phonemes, 
signs, syntagms, etc. $ and linguistic relationsq 
such as 
relations of opposition, substitutability 
in a given 
context, syntactic relations, dependency relations, 
etc.., which organise the constructs. 
Every construct 
and relation (in extension) is related 
to specific sets 
of observables (and relations between observables) 
ultimately by specifying the phonetic 
forms of constructs. 
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Each construct and relation possesses the characteristic, 
communicational function of the whole. Often, in lin- 
guistics, we find constructs, such as phonemes or 
syntagms which are themselves analysable as structures. 
Thus, the phoneme /p/ in English is analysable as 
a structure consisting of the set of distinctive 
features, j /labial/, /voiceless/, /stop/j , and the 
unordered, constructional relation described in this 
3u 
set, R i. e. /p/ is equivalent to the structure, or 
model, /labial/, /voiceless/, /stop/ ;Ruý, where 
Ru is an unordered, binary relation true for all pairs 
in the set. As a construct, however, /p/ contracts 
relations of opposition, mutual substitutability and 
constructional relations with other phonemes in other 
structures. To take another example, a syntagm construct 
such as "in the garden" is a prepositional phrase 
entering such relations as NP, Prep. Phr ., and copulative, 
Prep. phr. and contracts relations of opposition with 
other prepositional phrases ("on the table". "in 
Gibraltar", 
etc. ) and it is itself analysable as a structure of 
the 
components "in" and "the garden" and the ordered, con- 
structional relation, preposition, NP, where 
"the garden" 
is again a construct analysable as a structure 
(although 
"in" is not further analysable in grammar). 
Linguistic structures are often hierarchies 
of 
connected structures. Structures of 
distinctive 
features are not hierarchical but 
they enter a (phono- 
logical) hierarchy. (Had Hjelmslev accepted 
distinctive 
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features as linguistic units, he would have regarded 
them as the ultimate resultants of an analysis. ) The 
limits of a structure are reached when we arrive at 
the minimum units with communicational function. Dis- 
tinctive feature systems form such limits. 
Complex constructs, such as /p/ in English or 
"in the garden" can be considered analytically (as 
above) or synthetically as a function of their parts. 
So, the complex "in the garden" can also be viewed as 
a function of the grammatically simple item "in" and 
the complex "the garden" and the relation preposition, 
noun phrase (NP). In complex structures such as these, 
different constructs may contract the same constructional 
relations and, hence, be mutually substitutable in the 
same context(s). On this basis we group such constructs 
into Paradigms. Paradigms are, in fact2 just a different 
type of structure. The items in the set defined by 
the property of "standing in the counter-domain of 
the relation copulative; complement in English" ( the 
items commuting in that position) , e. g. "the man", 
"in 
the garden" , "good" , 
"broken" , etc , in 
the context 
flit is 11, contract the binary relation of 
mutual substitutability in this context. 
That is, for 
any pair in that set, the relation fix 
is mutually sub- 
stitutable with y" holds in the stated context, where 
x and y represent constructs. Thusq representing 
the 
relation as Mut , we obtain 
the model 9<x( predicative 
complement x); 
Mut. ), where items such as"a man119 




extension of the set. So, we see that the paradigm 
is a sort of structure or model.. The elements of this 
set are also further analysable into subsets or sub- 
paradigms on the basis of their different external 
relations (distribution). For instance, the class of 
predicative complements is analysable into such subsets 
as noun phrase, prepositional phrase, adjective (A), 
past participle (P. Pt. ), etc.. This gives us a 
cross-classification of the paradigm using unary 
(classificatory) relations described in the set of 
predicative complements. Since all pairs in that set 
continue to contract the relation of mutual substitut- 
ability, we can simply extend the above model, as 
follows ; 
<x (predicative complement x); 
Mut., NP, Prep. Phr., 
A2 P. Pt. => (The identity relation appears in 
all models. ) 
Of course, some of these sub-paradigms are themselves 
structures or models. We can see from this the hierarchi- 
cal nature of linguistic structures. 
It is on the basis of characteristic relations 
that any linguistic structure can be analysed 
into 
substructures. The set of all linguistic objects 
in a 
system is organised into phonological and grammatical 
Substructures by the unary relations, 
is a phonological 
form and is a sign. These substructures 
are further 
organised by other relationsq such as 
is a complex object 
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and the n-ary constructional relations found in the 
lahguage in question. 
A structuralist approach to science is one in 
which observable regularities and irregularities 
are accounted for by an organised system of constructs. 
Each such system will be finite and will assist the 
comprehension of real objects and their behaviour by 
forming a rational and controllable model of observables 
and the forces which fashion their behaviour. A system 
of this sort is accepted only insofar as it is capable 
of explaining observable phenomena. Clearly, every 
component and relation established must be necessary 
for an adequate account of the phenomena and have its 
own empirical justification. 
It is important that each structure or substructure 
is postulated as an autonomous entity. In its strongest 
form, e. g. in chemistryq psychology and in certain 
approaches to linguistics, structures are deemed to 
mirror exactly,, or to attempt to mirror exactly, un- 
observable, postulated entities (e. g. of the mind or 
of the sub-atomic world). According to a weaker claim 
(in other versions of linguistics such as glossematics 
or axiomatic functionalism) structures are not 
models 
of unobservable realities but the scientific 
conceptions 
by means of which we may understand phenomena 
and explain 
and predict their properties. 
The common, philosophical 
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claim of structuralism can be summed up as the view 
that observable phenomena are to be accounted for 
4/5 by the establishment of structurest where structures 
are objects endowed with at least the above mentioned 
characteristics. 
The conception of structure which we have outlined 
is widely held by linguists and others. In the physical 
sciences, there is a similar, though more literal, 
notion of structure, i. e. identifiable objects with 
a specific mechanical purpose. Bridges, for example, 
in the theory of structures are structures. They are 
composed of parts organised into a functional whole 
by specifiable mechanical and geometrical relations 
in order to meet this purpose. Bridges bear a family 
resemblance to linguistic structures. Bridges, however, 
exist in space and time ; they consist of real parts 
and relations. Linguistic structuresý by contrast, 
consist of postulated constructs and relations' Lin- 
guistic structures, at least as established by the 
linguist, have no physical existence ; they belong 
to the conceptual world (whether taken to mirror 
unobservable reality or not). They have a closer 
resemblance to the mathematical specification or 
"blueprints" of bridges. Howeverg there 
is a one- 
many relation between linguistic constructs 
and obser- 
vables which does not normally hold 
between a blueprint 
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and a bridge (although it might hold between a 
blueprint and a pump or a boiler). Again, by contrast, 
the constructs and relations of a linguistic structure 
are not determinable by direct inspection of the object 
under consideration. The constructs and relations of 
a linguistic structure are conjectural. They are for 
the linguist to establish through analysis. The "un- 
knowns" of physical science are different. They are 
mensurable properties of a given object with given 
parts under given quantifiable circumstances (e. g. 
loading conditions or behaviour in wind). The linguist 
deals with qualities rather than quantities. His 
description, as Mulder has called it, establishes the 
constructs and relations of the structure as conjectural 
entities. These conjectural entities meet the conditions 
of some principled theory of communication systems. 
Qualities, such as "is a phoneme", "is a syntactic 
: 3elation", etc. are examples (names) of such conditions 
6 
and are defined in a mulderian theory. The linguist's 
conjectural entities are not rendered haphazard or in- 
exact by dint of being qualities any more than a logical 
theory is haphazard or inexact. Linguistic conjectural 
entities are controlled by the theory which provides 
the methods of testing of each proposed construct or 
relation and the observable phenomena of speech. 
Again, by contrast with the bridge-specification 
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analogy, the linguistic structure established by the 
linguist has no "strategic" relation with the production 
of linguistic phenomenaý whereas a bridge blueprint 
specifies and directs the production and properties 
of an actual or potential physical object. Linguistic 
structures are established as conjectural, abstract 
and autonomous, explanatory entities which are tested 
by reference to observables (although they may have 
some application in a pedagogic grammar). 
In order for testing to take place, two conditions 
must be met. First, on the theoretical level, we must 
know the theoretical conditions involved (e. g. what 
it is to "be a phoneme"). Secondly, we must determine 
the empirical claim of a structure and subject it to 
empirical testing. This means that we must move away 
from structures and their parts and set up empirical 
statements, e. g. 11/p/ is a phoneme of English". 
Struc- 
tures are conjectural entities but they are not con- 
jectures. Conjectures are statements. Statements, 
but not abstract objects such as structuresq can 
be 
said to be empirically true or false. 
Structures are 
not statements, although they may 
be used to interpret 
the names of objects and relations which 
appear in 
statements. It would, for example, 
be absurd to say 
that a hypothetical structure 
"in at" was empirically 
false in English, just as a bridge or a 
blueprint could 
not be empirically false. 
It would be correct to say, 
however, that the statementq "there 
is a sign construc- 
tion "in At" in English'19 is empirically 
false. Equally, 
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it would be nonsense to say that /p/ is empirically 
true in English, whereas it would be reasonable to 
say that the statement, '"there is a phoneme /p/ in 
English" is true (or, at least, not falsified) . 
Similarly, a bridge or a blueprint cannot be empiri- 
cally true or false, although a claim such as "this 
bridge (actual or as specified in a blueprint) can 
carry four thousand vehicles per hour" can be empiri- 
cally tested and shown to be empirically true or false. 
Philosophers of science have not generally dis- 
tinguished clearly between the role of a non-empirical 
theory (such as Mulder or Hjelmslev 
7 
describe and have 
set up) and conjectural objects such as structures 
existing in what Mulder calls descriptions. The dis- 
tinction involves the difference between, for instance, 
the purely factual matter that the phonemes /b/, /i/ 
and /n/ form the ordered group /bin/ in English and 
the purely non-empirical matter that, by definition, 
8 
phonemes are the minimum analytical units in phonotactics. 
We must be careful to note that the term "theory" in 
the philosophy of science has, until recently, been 
applied to a variety of objects, most of them being a 
coalescence of empirical and non-empirical factors. 
It will be remembered from what we 
have said above 
that we should distinguish between a non-empirical 
level 
Of theory in linguistics and an empirical 
level of 
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description. "Structures" clearly belong to the level 
of description. Accordingly, we have defined a des- 
cription as a pair, < CY S> , where C is a calculus 
and S is a structure. Description, in this usage, is 
broadly comparable to the term theory as normally used 
in the philosophy of science. (A description might be 
thought of as an empirical theory of a particular 
language or part-language. ) It is most unfortunate 
that there is a confusing proliferation of terminology 
in model theory and that much of the terminology 
coincides with terminology in linguistics and the 
philosophy of science. In model theory the terms 
"theory" and llcalcýilusll are usually synonymous as are 
the terms "modelt' and "structureft, In what follows, 
we look at the notion description in terms of model 
theory and relate the notion "theory" or, rather, 
"calculus" in model theory to the notion "calculus" 
(above) and "nodel", ort ratherg" structure" in model 
theory to the notion "structure" (above). 
It should be clear that linguistic science is not 
exhausted by the investigation of structures. Firstly, 
there is a need for some general theory of communication, 
systems and, secondlyp there is the need to relate 
structures to empirical statements. In other words, 
a purely structuralist account of 
(linguistic or other) 
science would fail to explain either the meaning of 
theoretical terms or how empirical testing can take 
place. Empirical testing implies the establishment of 
statements with a claim about reality. 
Neverthelessq 
-257- 
one should not underestimate the importance of the 
philosophical claim of structuralism. It remains 
important that scientists account for the behaviour 
of real objects and processes by setting up structures, 
systems of abstract objects and relations. What is 
not clear in structuralist or philosophical accounts 
of science is the way in which theory, structures and 
empirical statements are related. Most scientists have 
(naturally) neglected the philosophical import of 
structuralism. This neglect of the philosophical claim 
of structuralism has led to the neglect of structuralism 
by philosophers. This absence of dialogue has given 
rise to an apparent disparity between the scientist's 
view of -sci-en-cje- and that of the philosopher of science. 
The dominant view of the philosophy of science has, 
in the last fifty years, generally characterised science 
in terms or systems of statements? Secondly, the philo- 
sophy of science has been principally concerned with 
10 
the logic of such systems of statements. Scientific 
theories are usually described as organised bodies of 
statements. The statements contained in scientific 
theories are restricted to those which make a claim 
about some sphere of reality, the truth of which 
depends 
on the nature of observable phenomena. Scientific 
statements must be capable of empirical testing ; 
they 
may be upheld or refuted by reference 
to experience. 
Such statements are usually called empirical statements 
or hypotheses. Hypotheses are normally 
deemed to form 
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part of a theory and have meaning only in the context 
of that theory. The scientific theory stands or falls 
with the hypotheses it contains. The organisation of 
the theory is a matter of the logical relations holding 
between the statements of the theory. Scientific theories 
are usually considered to take the form of axiomatic- 
deductive calculi (explicitly or implicitly) in the 
most rigorous ideal of science (which has sometimes 
been instantiated). Such calculi are normally mathe- 
matical/quantitative in character, although the possibility 
is not excluded that theories of a qualitative or classi- 
ficatory nature dealing with non-mathematical objects 
may exist (various linguistic approaches are, in fact, 
concrete examples - notably, glossematics, axiomatic 
functionalism and tagmemics, although numerous approaches 
have the same tendency). Qualitative theories naturally 
remind one of the formalisations of set-theory or the 
propositional calculus and concepts from these areas 
are often applied in linguistics. According to the 
usual version of the philosophy of science, scientific 
theories make use of deductive logic and are conjectural 
in character : they are, thus, hypothetico-deductive 
systems. 
The hypotheses in this familiar version of hypothetico- 
deductivism are of two main sorts : those which are 
introduced as premises of the theory and those which 
are the consequences , theorems or 
"derived hypotheses" 
Of the theory. Theorems are logically or mathematically 
necessary within the theory, but their ultimate 
jus I- 
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fication (and that of the theory as a whole) is a 
12 
matter o empirical testing. As Bochenskilhs pointed 
out, theorems may be deduced progre_ssively as "predictions" 
of the theory with the aid of the deductive inference 
pattern called modus ponens (schematically, (A & 
-5 B) or regressively, using the same inference pattern, 
where we wish to prove that some statement, B, based 
on observables or experimental evidence is a member 
of the consequence class of a general theory. Regressive 
13 
proof is usually known as "explanation". 
The testing of a scientific theory, according to 
Popper, involves the deductive inference pattern known 
as modus tollens. His opinion is based on the view 
that no degree of inductive support for a hypothesis 
would be logically sufficient to verify that hypothesis 
(although a scientific hypothesis could be (indefinitely) 
upheld or corroborated by surviving appropriate tests), 
whereas a single, genuine demonstration that a hypothesis 
of a theory was false would be sufficient to refute 
the theory which contains that hypothesis 
ý4 This does not, 
Of course, mean that the theory could not be revised 
so as to exclude the embarrassing hypothesis. Scientific 
advancement is thus held to involve the formulation of 
hypotheses (within specific theories) and the attempt 
to refute those hypotheses. Refuted hypotheses lead 
to 
the revision of theories and the formulation of new 
theories not containing erroneous hypotheses and so on. 
-260- 
Schematically, if the premises P1P29.. 
O.. Yp 
n imply 
the theorem, T, so, PI&P2&---- .&PnT, and T 
is false, i. e. -T is true, then the conjunction P1& 
p2&.... &Pn is false. The theory containing these 
statements is thus refuted, since it contains false 
consequences. This is simply the inference pattern, 
modus tollens, referr(O to above 
]5 
Important as the concerns of the philosophy of 
science undoubtedly are, the reader may well feel that,, 
in comparing the positions and interests of the struc- 
turalist and the philosopher of science, there is an 
enormous difference in their respective views of science. 
Is a science to be described in terms of theories or 
structures, or both, and, if of both, then how are the 
two related 
We should remind ourselves of two points. Firstly, 
it is necessary to distinguish the deductive or "calculus" 
element of a scientific theory from its empirical element. 
This is often stated as -a distinction between a 
"theory" 
or "calculus" and the "structure" or "model" which 
16 
interprets that "theory" or "calculus"* Secondly, there 
is a clear disparity between the structuralist, who sees 
scientific activity in terms of the establishment of 
structures, i. e. systems of abstract objects and relationsq 
and the philosopher of scienceý who typically views 
science in terms of theories, i. e. bodies of statements 
and their (logical) relations. 
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Now, this disparitY is considerable. Scientific 
constructs are not statements. Statements have a 
truth-value ; constructs do not. The scientist's 
overriding interest is in empirical objects and relations 
and not in logical objects and relations. If we say, 
for example, that "in English, /labial/ contracts the 
unordered constructional relation, Ru, with /nasal/", 
we do not present the distinctive features, /labial/ 
u and /nasal/, along with the relation, R We present 
the names of these constructs. The model, < /labial/, 
/nas6l/ ;RU>I with its known properties and its 
relation to observables interprets this statement. 
What we are saying is that one obvious way of 
relating theories and structures is to incorporate 
structures into the truth conditions of empirical state- 
ments. This would have the advantage that statements 
would be interpreted in terms of structures and that 
the empirical element of scientific theories would be 
introduced by a structural conception of reality. The 
"theory - model" or (terminologically 
better) the 
"calculus - model" distinction is one which 
is intended 
to overcome the problem of distinguishing the deductive 
and the empirical elements of scientific theories 
and which does so by relating calculi and structures 
(where structures are understood as models) 
in the 




When dealing with a deductive calculus, we can 
determine the logical truth of theorems by purely formal 
means. If we take as a simple example the argument, 
"all metals expand when heated ; iron is a metal : 30, 
iron expands when heated", we can see that the conclusion, 
"iron expands when heated" , is a logical consequence of 
the premises : it is analytic. As such, the argument 
contains no more information than that contained in 
the argument schema, x (Px)----) (Qx) & (Ex i) (Px i) 
(Qxl). The only difference is that the above argument 
is expressed in ordinary English and the names of real 
objects and processes have been inserted, viz. "iron", 
"metals" and "expand when heated". Of course, we accept 
the argument schema as a means for the logical deduction 
of consequences but the specific inference, "if x is 
a metal, x expands when heated", is clearly not a law 
of logic. What lends importance to the argument is 
its place in our understanding of the universe (in 
physical theory) and, therefore, the interpretation of 
the names in the argument become important. In a 
scientific theory, the interpretation of statements is 
of at least as much importance as the logical form of 
the theory, the "naming" or "nomological" function is 
of vital importance for empirical interpretation. 
The 
conclusion, "iron expands when heated", becomes a claim 
about reality (an empirical statement) only when we 
know 
the interpretation of the names involved. We reach 
the 
same conclusion, if we look at a linguistic argument. 
For example, "In English, all verbs select 
the -ing form 
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in the construction, preposition) verb, "run" is a verb 
so, "run" takes the -ing form in the construction, 
preposition, verb". To become a claim about reality, 
this argument must be interpreted and that means knowing 
the interpretation of the names in it, i. e. "run", -ing 
form, preposition, and verb. The problem in the hypo- 
thetico-deductive version of scientific theories is 
that, as Winniel7has said, 
"To hold that a statement of the theory is analytic 
is surely to consider that statement as devoid of factual 
content but then we must deny that statement any 
1117 nomological function in the theory.. 0 
This clearly conflicts with the above recognition that 
in a scientific theory the nomological function is of 
vital importance. We are thus led to distinguish the 
purely formal calculus of a theory from the empirical 
interpretation of that theory. It virtue of this 
empirical interpretation that we can formulate claims 
about reality and which, we maintain, should be a 
structure in linguistics. 
We are now in a position to see how the two points 
about the philosophy of science are related. To intro- 
duce a distinction between a calculus and the 
inter- 




disparity between a view of science dominated by systems 
of statements and one dominated by structures. We can 
assign the logical element of scientific theories 
(descriptions in axiomatic functionalist terminology or 
in glossematics) to calculi and the empirical element 
can be introduced through a structural interpretation 
of the statements of a calculus. We arrive at empirical 
statements, or hypotheses, by determining a fixed 
18 interpretation for each statement of the calculus. 
Model theory gives us a precise way of relating 
calculi to structures. In model theory, a calculus 
(or "theory", as it is often called) is related to 
the world of observables through the intermediary of 
a "model", "relational system" or "structure". A 
calculs, C, as understood in model theoryt 
".. is a series of names of relations, RR 
the names of variables, x, y, z,.... t and the formulae, 
F12F22.... 2F 
n, expressed with these names'. 119 
To give an exact definition of "calculus"q we would 
need to specify also axioms, logical constantsq 
rules 
of formation, rules of inference, etc., although, 
in 
practice, most of this information is 
drawn from branches 
of logic, e. g. the propositional calculus. 
A "model", 
"relational system" or "structure" , as 
it is variously 
called, M, can then be defined asq 
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"a certain set, M, with a set of relations, 
2n 19 R j* ... *qR described in it". 
M is a model of calculus, C, if each relation of M 
is compared with every name of that relation in the 
calculus in such a way that, if the variables of the 
calculus are explained as elements of the set, M, 
all formulae of the calculus are true. The calculus 
is said to be true for the interpretation in question. 
Naturally, the question remains open, whether the theory 
or "description" validly corresponds to the phenomena 
in question. Empirical testing would then be a matter 
of comparing the fixed interpretation of statements 
with observables and tests on observables. 
Model theory was originally devised for the inter- 
pretation of mathematical theories, although its 
applicability in other areas seems clear. In particular, 
the notion, "model", corresponds to the notion, 11self- 
20 
contained set", used by Mulder. 
Let us illustrate these ideas with a restricted 
example. If we take the set of substantives 
(including 
Possessive pronouns) in Russian as the set, 
M; so, 
(S(ubstantive) x)t 
we can classify the members of this set 
by two unary 
relations, D(eterminer) and N(oun)ý and we can establish 
two binary relations in the setq the constructional 
relation, Rc and the dependency relationg 
R-ý. Ignoring 
allomorphy, we would obtain a model as 
follows ; 
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II/etAT/11 ( "this/that" )ý "/vIeSI /11 ("all"), 11/moj/,, 
"my" ), II/xAro6I/11 ("good") 
I "/z'Il IonI/11 ( 11greentlY, 
II/Stol/11 ("table") 'I/p 'Iro/11 ("pen") D, N 
c4 RIR> 
We can now set up a calculus for this model. For 
instance, we will require the following premises. 
a. All substantives are either determiners or nouns. 
b. A pair of substantives are in direct, constructional 
relation, only if one of the substantives is a 
noun. 
In any construction, the determiner is grammatically 
dependent on the noun (i . e. determiner --4 noun) . 
Using variables and underlin--Lng letters for the names 
of relations, we can express these premises more 
formally ; 
a. x- (Nx & Dx) 
b. x, y (x Rc y) )(Nx V Ny) 
C. xRcy&- (Nx) ----> x 
J> Y. 
A simple and rapid inspection of this subset of signs 
in 
Russian will show that this account is broadly correct. 
By establishing subsets of determiners and nouns 
and 
substituting for variables7 we will obtain a 
large 
class of well-formed constructions 
(after allowing 
for allomorphic variance). Also, 
by immediate inference, 
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we can see that no determiner7 according to this theory, 
can be the head of a noun phrase and no noun can be 
subordinate in a noun phraseand there is no direct 
constructional relation between substantives, unless 
a noun is in the construction 
ý1 
We could also establish 
that the above calculus leaves open the possibility 
that two nouns might be in direct construction, which 
is a case actually found in Russian (although fairly 
infrequently). To allow for that possibility, one 
would have to add a premise and one would also have 
to introduce a further binary relation of interordination, 
, as there is no unilateral subordination between 
nouns in construction in Russian, such as 11/aFtAr 
sAt I ir I IK/11 ( "author-satirist" etc., viz., 
d. xRCy& (Nx & Ny) --ý xy- 
As it stands, the description we have established 
describes a small section of the Russian syntactic 
system and illustrates the role )of the model , the role 
of the calculus and how we can form and test hypotheses. 
We have also seen how the calculus and model can 
be 
revised . 
In an exact description of Russian, one would 
wish to distinguish between "articles" and 
lladjectives, ý 
that is, one would introduce two new unary 
relations 
into the model, Art. and Adj., and remove 
the unary 
relation, D, and make the corresponding 
changes in 
the calculus (i. e. one would make 
an exact subdivision 
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of the rather coarse class of determiners) . One would 
also want to take care of the rare Possibility that 
a pair of interordinated articles may form a noun phrase, 
e. g. II/FsIo etA/" ("all that"). We also note that 
a pair of adjectives may not be interordinated to 
form a well-formed noun phrase or substantival phrase. 
We note also that some substantives belong both to the 
class of nouns and to the class of adjectives (and 
this is the only possibility of overlap between classes). 
Any description which did not allow these possibilities 
would be easily empirically refuted. One would need 
a considerable revision not only of the above model 
but also of the calculus to accommodate these possi- 
bilities. The model would be as'. follows ; 
"? etAT/ It, 'I /v I eS 1 /11 , 11/mo I/", 'I/ xAros' 
1/ 11 1 Ilz Il Ion 1/ 11 , 
"/Stol/11 11/p I Iro/11 11/aFtAr/11 sAt I ir I IK/11 
c 4/94 Art. I Adj .INR9RR> 
Our calculus must allow for the following constructions 
and dependencies : article (-4article2 article --ý noun, 
adjective --ý noun, noun f-4noung article -+ (noun k--ý noun) , 
adjective---). (noun " noun). We must exclude, however, 
* adjective k-4 adjective ,* adjective --j 
( article ý-ý article ), 
and * article -4 (article ý--+ article) . 





a. x- (Art. x & (Adj. x V Nx) 
x, y (xRc y)---> - (Adj. x & Adj y) 
C. (x Rc y) & Nx & Ny ---> x FC: y 
d- (x Rc y) &xRy) -ý xey 
x, y, 7- (x R (Y 9z)) ----i ( -Nx & Ny & Nz) & (y 
ez) 
c 
xR (y xCy, z 
These formulae state : (a) that nothing is both an 
article and either an adjective or a noun (although it 
may be both a noun and an adjective, e. g. 11/bIloI/11, 
"past" or "the past") ; (b) that, if two items are in 
construction, then it is not the case that they are 
both adjectives (although they may be both adjectives or 
both nouns) ; (c) if two items are in construction and 
only one of them is a noun, then the noun is superordinate 
to the other item ; (d) if two items are in construction 
and (c) is not satisfied, then the items are inter- 
ordinated (i. e. either a pair of artic les or a pair 
of nouns) ; (e) in a triple, a pair of interordinated 
nouns may be in construction only with a non-noun (ad- 
jective or article) and (f) if (e) is satisfiedý then 
the adjective or article is subordinate to the inter- 
ordinated pair of nouns. The application of these 
rules will give us a more exact picture of the system 
of Russian substantives than either of those previously 
given and the description applies to a very large class 
of Russian constructions. Neverthelessq it is quite 
clear that any full-scale description of Russian would 
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have to take into consideration many other factors; 
for exampleý numerals and the many types of relative 
clause. The attempt to model such phenomena would 
lead to the refutation of the present description 
and a new calculus and model would replace those 
given here (although this is beyond our present 
illustrative purposes). However, we can see how the 
kind of description which we envisage can be refuted 
and changed, while remaining within the same overall 
framework of description. The present description 
contains no ill-formed constructions but allows such 
well-formed constructions as ; II/FsIo eTA/11 ("all 
that", article P-4 article), f/moj Stol/11 ( "my table", 
article ---ý noun), 11/z I Il IonI StolP ( "the green table", 
ad jective---ý noun), 11/aFtAr sAt I ir I IK/11 ("author -satirist", 
noun ý-4 noun), II/etAT aFtAr sAt I ir I IK/11 ("that auther- 
satirist", article---ý (noun <-ý noun)), II/xAro9I aFtAr 
sAt I ir I IK/11 ("the good author-satirist" t adjective --ý 
(noun ý--) noun) . Clearly, an article and an adjective 
may be subordinate to the same noun or pair of inter- 
Ordinated nouns. This possibility allows us such 
constructions as II/etAT ztjllonI Stol/" ("that green 
table") and II/et, AT xAros4I aFtAr sAtlir'IK/11 ("that 
good author-satirist") 
The acceptance of the distinction between calculus 
and model leads to adjustments in the hypothetico- 
deductive version of the nature of science. 
Notablyq 
model theory introduces a distinction between a deductive 
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calculus in which there are no empirical statements 
and systems of objects and their relations, which 
interpret calculi. We arrive at empirical statements 
via the fixed interpretation of a specific model. It 
is only by comparing our models with reality that 
empirical claims can be tested. Thus, using the 
above description of Russian, we could predict that 
for instance, II/xAro5I Stol/11 ( "a good table") or 
111Fs IopI Iro/11 ( "all the pen" ) are well-formed con- 
structions and that II/xAroS'I/11 and "Fslo/11 are gram- 
matically dependent and these claims can be tested. 
Equally, we could test a claim that II/zIIlIonI etAT/11 
("a green that") is not well-formed. This is quite 
a different conception from the usual version of 
hypothetico-deductivism, in which a theory is a system 
of hypotheses, and the usual version of structuralism, 
in which scientific description is the establishment 
of a structure. 
What we are proposing is that the notion I'linguis- 
tic description" be explained by reference to the notion 
"scientific theory" as developed here with the help 
of model theory. We have suggested that a linguistic 
description (an empirical "theory" of a language or 
part-language - hence a "3cienti 
f ic theory" ) is a pair 
< C7 S>. we can give more substance to this by relating 
C to the notion "calculus" in model theory and 
S to 
I linguis- the notion !,, model" in model theory. Scientific 
tic hypotheses would then be a function of C and 
S. 
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Since a general linguistic theory would play a considerable 
role in C (see above, for instance, in giving substance 
to the, -notions, constructional relation and dependency 
relation) , we can begin to see the sense in which a 
description is theoretically motivated and how a des- 
cription always involves considerable, theoretical 
(general) presuppositions. 
There are numerous advantages to this view. First, 
this conception of empirical, linguistic description 
makes clear the components of calculus and structure 
and their relations in a way which is compatible with 
modern views of the philosophy of science. Secondly, 
we can arrive at a precise characterisation of the 
notions, calculus and structure. By using the relation 
of "being a model of a calculus" we can, furthermore, 
give a precise understanding of the hitherto intuitive 
notion of establishing a linguistic structure in ac- 
cordance with a general theory, since the calculus 
draws upon and must satisfy the general theory. In 
fact, many premises of any description will come from 
the theory, e. g. that ordered grammatical relations are 
syntactic or that phonemes are the minimum units of 
phonotactics, and many classificatory predicates will 
be defined in the theory, e. g. "is a phoneme", "contract 
dependency relations", "is a moneme", etc.. Conversely7 
no theoretical predicates can come from outside 
the 
theory and no premises can be set up in a calculus which 
contradict the theory, although there may be description- 




tion-specific predicates or premises are restricted by 
the requirement that all calculus statements be inter- 
pretable through the model and that they be theoreti- 
cally justifiable . On the other hand, we can arrive 
at testable empirical statements by interpreting the 
variables and relations of the calculus using the 
structures established by our models. 
This outline of the structure of scientific 
linguistic descriptions preserves the deductive and 
empirical elements found in the hypothetico-deductive 
version of science, maintains the role of structures 
and allows us to remove the disparity between struc- 
turalist and philosophical versions of science, pro- 
vided that we accept the conclusion that an empirical 
theory or description must contain both a calculus and 
a model-interpretation (structure). In linguistics, 
this would mean that a linguistic description cannot 
be regarded solely as a calculus (or hypothetico- 
22 deductive theory). nor can it be regarded as solely 
23 
a structure. To regard linguistic description as solely 
a calculus sacrifices the conception of language as 
a "structure sui generis" and the view of linguistic 
description as concerned solely with structures fails 
to explain how we can arrive at empirical statements 
24 
(and, indeed, how we can form predictions about pheno- 




Summary_of the conditions of acceptability of linguistic 
descriptions 
It will be obvious from the above that linguistic 
descriptions must be characterised, from the present 
point of view, as possessing a logical structure and 
meeting meta-theoretical conditions different in at 
least one important respect from those of linguistic 
theories. Linguistic descriptions must be characterised 
as being "empirical" in nature, i. e. they must be 
"directly scientific systems". 
The principal Points to bear in mind with respect 
to linguistic descriptions are that any description 
must be both theoretically justified (be constructed 
in accordance with some theory) and an empirical system. 
We sum up these requirements by saying that a linguistic 
description is an application of the theory to the 
phenomena. The first of these requirements will be 
met, if all the theoretical expressions in a description 
("is a phoneme", "is subordinate to", etc. ) are 
found in 
or are deducible from the theory and no theoretical 
expression applied in the description is not drawn 
from 
the theory. (We shall mean by "theoretical expression" 
a defined theoretical predicate or relation finding 
its 
place within the ontology and related in 
the appropriate 
ways to the methodology. ) The description 
is then not 
ad hoc. We will require, in addition, that 
the descrip- 
I 
tion be consistent with res_ 
heory, i. e. any 
w 
-275- 
descriptive model must satisfy the conditions of the 
theoretical expression of which it is an application. 
We will say that a description is consistent with the 
theory, if, for all descriptive models in the descrip- 
tion, there is no descriptive model which does not 
satisfy all the conditions (stated by definition) of 
the theoretical expression applied in constructing that 
model and if all necessary models appear in the descrip- 
tion. If we say, for instance, that /p/ is a phoneme 
of English in an axiomatic functionalist description, 
then it must be the case that the descriptive model, 
is a phonological form, a minimum syntagmatic unit 
and a bundle of distinctive features. To say that /p/ 
is a bundle of (non-syntagmatic) distinctive features 
implies, among other things, that the description of 
English contain (somewhere) the distinctive features 
contained by /p/. (This is what is meant by saying that 
all necessary models must appear in-, the description. ) 
25 
On the other hand, we require any description to 
be an empirical system. A system will be "empirical", 
if the judgement of its validity depends ultimately on 
the experience of externally existir-99 observable pheno- 
mena, i. e. if its class of potential falsifiers 
is non- 
zero. In particular, we require, along with 
Popper, 
that the descriptive system and the descriptive models 
in it be capable of refutation with respect 
to the 
phenomena. Thusq any description must be consistent 
with the phenomena it purports to 
describe and it must 
ARM 




this requirement the condition of "empirical adequacy" . 
The capacity to satisfy the condition of empiri- 
cal adequacy is what principally distinguishes linguis- 
tic descriptions from linguistic theoriese As far as 
the "internal structure" of descriptions is concerned, 
the conditions to be met by descriptions are similar 
to those to be met by theories, i. e. descriptions must 
also be consistent,,, sufficient (for describing the 
range of phenomena in question) and relatively simple. 
As we have seen, the logical structure of descriptions 
is not the same as that of theories. The description 
will not contain a semantics, an ontology or a methodo- 
logy, but it will be a pair, consisting of a calculus 
and a structure via which empirical interpretation 
may take place. We require, finally, of course that 
descriptive calculi meet the conditions of axiomatic- 
deductive systems (mentioned in connection with theories 
- above ). 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 
This formulation is quite close to Hjelmslev's 
(e. g. in Prolegomenes) but differs in imcluding 
the notion of empirical validation. 
2. Translated "ensemble autonomell in Mulder's "Postu- 
see defs. lb and lb 
I) 
pp. 23 - 4. 
3. J. Mulder, Sets and Relations, pp. 9- 12. 
For a fuller discussion of structuralist views of 
science, see R. Harre, The Philosophies of Science. 
The most notable linguist who has defended this 
view is, of course, Hjelmslev (see Prolegomenes or 
Resume). 
See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,.... " and L. 
Hjelmslev, Prolegomenes. 
See Mulder, ibid. and Hjelmslev, ibid,. 
See J. Mulder, Sets and Relations, or J. Mulder and 
H. Hurren, "The English Vowel Phonemes". 
Harre says, in the Philosophies of Science, that 
"science is a collection of well-attested theories 
which explain the patterns and regularities and 
irregularities among carefully studied phenomena", p. 
62. 
10. See P. Nidditch in his "Introduction" to The 
Philosophy of Science, who says, "broadly speaking, 
philosophers of science haveg since the end of 
World Wat II, been chiefly occupied with the logic 
of science. They interpret science as a body of 
deductive or quasi-deductive systems of assertions.. ", 
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ii. See K. R. Popper, The Logic Of Scientific Discovery 
and many other places. 
12. K. R. Popper, Logic Of Scientific Discovery, pp. 
40 - 42. 
11 
13.1. M. Bochenski, Europaische Philosophie der 
Gegenwart, p. 101. 
14. K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 41. 
15. K. R. Popper, ibid., pp. 89 - 114. 
16. The distinction is now accepted by Popper ; see 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 6 
th (Revised) 
Edition, 1972, P. 74, fn. *2. 
17. J. Winnie, "Theoretical Analyticity", p. 145. 
18. It is important to see that the interpretation of 
a calculus is normally indirect, i. e. we reach 
observables via an abstract structure. This is 
obvious in physics, where sub-atomic objects are 
set up as constructs to account for observables 
(e. g. in cloud chambers). Similarly, abstract 
objects in linguistics, such as phonemes and syntagms, 
are set up to account for communicational observables. 
19. See Ju. A. Shrejder, "Mathematical Models.... ", Pp. 
242 - 5, and J. Bridge, Beginning Model Theory. 
20. See fn. 2 above. 
21 It is quite clear that thousands of constructions 
meet the same conditions apart from the examples 
ited. 
22. That is, as one conform with the usual version of 
hypothetico-deductivism as suggested bY7 e. g. 7 





23. As seems to be suggested by, for exampleg Hielmslev, 
opera citanda, and Shaumjan, Principles. 
24. The importance of empirical statements in linguistic 
description can not be underestimated ; see J. 
Mulder, "Linguistic Theory,.... ", p-92. 
25. For the conditions on phonemes, see J. Mulder, 




AND DISTINCTIVE FEATURE COMBINATIONS 
-281- 
In previous chapters, we have considered the 
meta-theoretical conditions of acceptability applying 
to both linguistic theories and descriptions . In the 
last chapter we looked at examples of linguistic des- 
cription in the light of these ideas. We have also 
specified the forms of linguistic theories and descrip- 
tions. In this chapter, we turn to a concrete example 
of theory building which is intended to illustrate how 
new theoretical apparatus can be set up in accordance 
with the principles previo, Lf3ly established. To be 
precise, we develop some supplementary theoretical 
apparatus which allows us to model well-formed complexes 
of distinctive features on the basis of the mutual 
compatibility or exclusiveness of distinctive features. 
The apparatus helps us to see distinctive feature struc- 
ture in a new light. In concentrating on the possible 
combinations and mutual exclusiveness of distinctive 
features in determining the well-formed complexes of 
distinctive features, the new apparatus is intended to 
supplement existing phonological theory which is con- 
cerned with the identity of phonological elements and 
their complexity. In particularý we are not concerned 
with the analysis of complex objects into their com- 
ponents ; we are concerned with the reverse of that 
analysis ; viz. the establishment of complex objects 
as a function of simple components. For the purposes 
Of illustrating theory construction, we will be especially 
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concerned with showing how descriptions can be set up 
using the new apparatus, how the apparatus satisfies 
the, demands placed upon it by the meta-theory and how 
it fits in with existing phonological theory. 
a. PhonfBme tables 
Linguists are accustomed to the idea of analysing 
phonemes into their component distinctive features. 
Phoneme tables, or distinctive feature matrices, 
present information about the identity of distinctive 
features and about the structure of phonemes in terms of 
distinctive features. If we think of the table as 
presenting information about the structure of phonemes, 
it is clear that we presuppose the establishment of 
the identity of the proposed component distinctive 
features. We can think of the structure of the phoneme 
in two ways (when we consider a phoneme table). Broadly, 
we can think of the phoneme as analysed into component 
distinctive features or we can think of the phoneme 
as the product of (or function of) distinctive features. 
These two ways are merely different aspects of the same 
thing but the theoretical apparatus we require for the 
analysis of the complexity of phonemes is quite different 
from the apparatus we require in generating complexes 
Of distinctive features . 
Let us look at the types of table available. 
It 
was Jakobson 1 who first presented a type of matrix 
in 
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which the features are placed in the leftmost Column 
and the phonemes are listed on the top row. The table 
is then plotted, as Jakobson explains, 
"Let us exemplify the results of dissolving 
phonemes into bundles of distinctive features. The 
inventory of Standard Serbocroatian totals 29 quali- 
tatively distinct phonemes and, if we add the phonemes 
distinguished by prosodic features, the amount of pho- 
nemes swells to 47. The whole pattern is based on 
eight dichotomous properties ; among them six inherent 
(or qualitative) features concerning the axis of 
simultaneity only (vocality, nasality, saturation, 
gravity, continuoU3ness and voicing) and two prosodic 
features involving also the axis of successiveness 
(length and high tone). We mark by a plus sign only 
the presence of the feature in question ; the absence 
(as its opposite) is indicated by a minus sign only 
there, where no plus sign occurs at all .A complex 
combining both opposite terms is represented by the 
+ sign. To avoid longer comments, the current spelling 
form is used for denoting the Serbocroatian phonemes' 
1 
There have been various developments of the Jakob- 
sonian table but it remains clearly a two-dimensional 
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The type of table presented by, for example, 
Martinet 
2 
is also a two-dimensional table. In the 
Martinet-style of matrixg there is one set of distinc- 
tive features in the column on the left and another 
(different) set of features on the top row. Each 
phoneme is then plotted as a function of these two 
dimensions, i. e. each phoneme in the table is equiva- 
lent to a pair of distinctive features. A typical 
Martinet-style of matrix might be that given by Mulder 
for Pekingese (see Table 2). Another way of looking 
at this is to say that a phoneme, as a simultaneous 
bundle of distinctive features, is equivalent to a 
pair, < x, y> , of distinctive features and the set 
of pairs is the product of the cartesian multiplication 
of the two discrete and disjunct sets or dimensions of 

























Two-dimensional table of distinctive features for 
Pekingese following Mulderý (To complete the picture for 
"consonantal" phonemesý one would have to add the single 






Partial Cartesian multiplication of distinctive feature 
dimensions for Pekingese and mapping onto the set of 
phonemes. 







have Pointed outy however, 
there is no reason to think that linguistic systems 
are restricted to two-dimensional systems of distincti-., e 
features. There might be three sets of distinctive 
features involved, as in English (see Table 3 following 
Mulder 
4) 
or there might be four or more dimensions 
involved . 
Stop Fricative 
"T Voiced Unv oiced Voiced UnvQiced asal 
Labial b p vfm 
Apical d t n 
Dorsal 9 k 
TABLE 3A 
3-dimensional Cartesian table for part of the English 
consonantal system (following Mulder 
4 ). Of course, the 
nasal phonemes are 2-dimensional. The analysis is 
completed by setting up the following 2-dimensional 
table and by specifying the features /1-ness/ and 
/h-ness/ for the single feature phonemes /l/ and /h/. 
The case of the marginal phonemeq /x/7 in Scottish 







Russian is an example of a language with four 
sets or dimensions of distinctive features (see Table 
6 
4A) . Of course, the increase in the number of sets 
involved does not affect our view of phonemes as 
combinations of distinctive features. We should note 
merely that we must regard phonemes as n-tuples of 
distinctive features rather than as simply pairs. 
Similarly, we will think of cartesian multiplication 
as, an operation on more than two sets, if necessary. 
Also, as Mulder has pointed out, there may be occasions 
when n=1, i. e. where we have phonemes such as /l/ 
and /h/ in English which possess only one distinctive 
feature. In these casesp clearlyq no cartesian 
multiplication is involved. As we said, aboveý we 
can equally well look at phonemes analytically. That 
is, we can think of the distinctive features and their 
organisation as an analysis of the minimum entities 
contracting ordering relations (i. e. phonemes are the 
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4-dimensional cartesian table for part of the 
Russian consonantal system. The analysis is completed 














(These two subsystems connect with the main 
cartesian matrix through the dimensions, /voiced/ - 
/unvoiced/ and /palatalised/ - /unpalatalised/l 
respectively). 
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One disconcerting problem here is that it is 
not really very clear what the sets of distinctive 
features or dimensions of distinctive features are. 
For Martinet there are two dimensions for consonants, 
series and order, which correspond to the phonetic 
distinction between 'point of articulation' and 'manner 
of articulation'. Distinctive features are grouped 
into classes on the basis of their mutual exclusion 
with respect to these two criteria. Thus, we have 
a series of points of articulation from labial to 
pharyngal. Phonemes are then further analysable 
by manner of articulation, e. g. presence of voice, 
nasality, obstruction, etc.. Where we are dealing 
with a system in which there are three or more 
dimensions, we might have two or more dimensions 
corresponding to 'manner of articulation'. In Russian, 
furthermore, a dimension of Imanner of articulation', 
/palatalised/ - /unpalatalised/, is combined with the 
features in the series or 'points of articulation' 
(see Table 4A, above). In other wordsq a simple 
correspondence between series and point of articulation 
and between order and manner or articulation is no 
longer possible. In particularg we end up in the dark 
about the defini tion of dimension. Martinet's dimensions 
are, in any case, a preliminary form of analysis and 
look much more like the phonetic exponents of phono- 
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logical dimensions than they, perhaps, should. (It 
is this, no doubt, that led Hjelmslev to regard phonemes 
as the minimum units of phonology and distinctive 
feature analysis as part of phonetics. ) We require 
a phonological definition of dimension. 
In order to clarify the notion of dimension, 
we can use the ideas of mutual exclusion and mutual 
combinability. A dimension can then be understood 
as a set of mutually opposed distinctive features 
in which the identity of each feature is defined by 
reference to the oppositions it enters within the 
set. The identity of each feature is then defined 
negatively, relationally and oppositionally and is 
the negation of the sum of features which commute with 
it in an identical context. Distinctive features of 
different dimensions are cartesian multiplied to 
form complexes of distinctive features. In some 
cases two dimensions are involved and in other cases 
there are more than two dimensions. As Mulder has 
Pointed out, however, the definition of the identity 
of distinctive features is not as straightforward a 
business as it might appear at first sight. Since 
identity is defined by reference to mutual exclusiveness 
in a given context, we may find, as Mulder says, that 
a single item in the table refers to two or more 
distinct identities. In the case of the phoneme table 
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for Pekingese (above), for example, the identity of 
"labial" in the complexý /labialýaspirated/, is not 
the same as the identity of "labial" in /labial, nasal/, 
since, as inspection of the table will show, the set 
of oppositions entered by "labial', in the context of 
/aspirated/ is different from the set of oppositions 
"labial" enters in the context of /nasal/. In the 
article in question, Mulder overcomes this problem 
by introducing a modified Jakobsonian distinctive 
feature matrix which makes plain the differences in 
the functional identity of a feature in different 
contexts. As Mulder explains, 
"If we mark 11+11 for a feature and we note 1111 
for an opposition into which it enters and "Oll for 
a gap, we get the following scheme. The number and 
place of the items 1111 in any one dimension determine 
the value of the item 11+11 in that dimension. I 
use a thick line to separate the two dimensions. 
"This table speaks for itself. Though we may still 
say that, for instance, /b/ has the distinctive feature 
(labial, 
unaspiriated3, and, for instance, /m/ has the 
distinctive features, [labial, nasalj , it is clear 
from the scheme that the label "labial" refers to 
items of different identity andq hence, to not exactly 





table for Pekingese consonants 
7 following Mulder* 
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Quite clearly, when we interpret the notion 
"dimension" in this way and incorporate the Jakobsonian- 
type table into the description Of the identity of 
distinctive features, we are a long way from any pho- 
netic definition of the notion "dimension" and we 
avoid the difficulties referred to above. As Mulder 
goes on to show, however, there are still problems 
of the identity of distinctive features concerned with 
gaps in phoneme tables. Where gaps occur, due to the 
absence of a dimension, no serious problems arise, 
because we can simply describe which dimensions are 
involved in which cases. In other cases, however, 
such as that of the phoneme, /x/, in Russian (see 
Table 4A above), there is a phoneme which we would 
expect to be represented by the features, /dorsal, 
unpalatalised, fricativel unvoiced/. However, the 
feature, /unvoiced/, is not opposed to the feature, 
/voiced/ in the context of /dorsal, fricative/7 although 
there is opposition between /voiced/ and /unvoiced/ 
in the context of /dorsal, stop/ and /dorsalý fricative/. 
In terms of the system, we expect, as it were, an 
opposition, /voiced/ - /unvoiced/, in this case 
and it is this opposition which links the three- and 
four-dimensional systems to the two-dimensional system 
(see Table 4B). Following Mulder 
7 
we will say, the I 
phoneme /x/ represents both /dorsalg fricativeg unvoiced/ 
and /dorsal, fricative, voiced/. It is a hyperphoneme. 
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In this case, there is no further feature with which 
/voiced/ and /unvoiced/ are in OPPosition, so the 
distinctive feature specification for /x/ will be 
simply /dorsal, fricative/. The phoneme, /g/ in Russian, 
is also a hyperphoneme. Although there is a connection 
between the dorsals and the rest of the system, because 
displays the Opposition between /ýalatalised/ 
and . . /'-unpalatalised/, this opposition is not present 
for the voiced, dorsal stop. (Cg3 and U15 are in 
complementary distribution, as are Cx3 and [xj). 
If there had been a third feature involved, we 
might have set up a hyperfeature, /voiced / unvoiced/, 
8 
as Mulder does for Kamali Arabic in the article cited . 
In that case, the opposition between two features, 
/voiced/ and /pharyngal/ is suspended in the distinctive 
feature system in the case of the phoneme, /ý/j but 
a third feature, /unvoiced/ ý is opposed to the suspension 
of features in the same dimension. This factor makes 
the suspension of features , or hyperfeature, 
functional in that dimension - it has identity. 
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Occlusive Fricative Nasal 
UnvId Voiced Pharyngal UnvId Voiced PharIgal 
Labial b f m 
Apical t d t n 
Hushing z 
Dorsal k 9 q x y 
Glottal ? h 
TABLE 6 
Phoneme Table of Kamali Arabic consonants quoted by 
Mulderý 
As we have said, in looking at phonemes as com- 
plexes of distinctive features or in generating com- 
plexes of distinctive features to map onto phonemes, 
we presuppose the identity of distinctive features 
and we will clearly have to take into account the 
problems raised by hyperphonemes and hyperfeatures. 
If we turn now to the question of generating complexes 
of distinctive features, we will find that the Martinet- 
style table (whether two or more dimensional) has 
drawbacks in this respect also. 
It is not the case, for instancet that all the 
features in one dimension of a phoneme table combine 
with all the features in another dimension. That 
is, 
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there are restrictions on the cartesian multiplication 
of sets of distinctive features. Thus, in English, 
Is"I is a two-dimensional phoneme equivalent to /h,,, ishing, 
voiced/, whereas /p/ is three-dimensional and equivalent 
to /labial, unvoiced, stop/. Therefore, /labial/ but 
not /hushing/ combines with /stop/, even though /labial/ 
and /hushing/ appear in the same dimension. To take 
matters from another point of view, the features, /nasal/ 
and /dorsal/, belong to two different dimensions of 
distinctive features in Russian (see Table 4A above), 
where the sets of features in question can be car- 
tesian multiplied to produce well-formed pairs of 
distinctive features. However, there is no phoneme 
in Russian which contains or is equivalent to the pair 
/dorsal, nasal/. That is, cartesian multiplication 
of the series set with the order set would produce a 
non-pair. We have already seen some of the problems of 
identity concerning accidental gaps. Such gaps also 
cause problems in determining the set of well-formed 
complexes of distinctive features in the usual Martinet- 
style matrix. Cartesian multiplication of the dimensions 
of a phoneme table (such as in Table 4A) for Russian 
would generate as well-formed the complex, */dorsal, 
voiced, fricative/ to which no phoneme corresponds. 
Careful analysis of the complexity of the phoneme, 
/x/, 
and its categorisation as a hyperphoneme helps us 
to 
overcome the problem but, as a consequence, we see 
the 
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weakness of the phoneme table. It does not give a 
very accurate picture of the combinatory possibilities 
of distinctive features. In the case of the above 
table for Russian consonants at least two non-pairs 
of distinctive features are generated. The phoneme 
table also rather glosses over the fact that the feature, 
/dorsal/, can only be combined in, RUS3ian 
with either of the features, /palatalised/ or /unpala- 
talised/, in the case of an unvoiced stop. Also, in 
the table 4B (above), we have detached the two-dimensional 
phonemes, /ý/ and /9/, from the phoneme table. Clearly, 
they are connected to the major system through the 
opposition, /voiced/ - /unvoiced/, just as the phonemes, 
/l/I /11/, Irl and IrIl, are connected through the 
opposition, /palatalised/ - /unpalatalised/, to the 
main system (Table 4C). of course, it is natural to 
find that there is no pair, /hpshing, nasal/, and one 
would not expect to find an opposition between voiced 
and unvoiced 11111 phonemes and 'Ir" phonemes (although 
they might occur). The point isy howeverg that the 
phoneme tables present combinatorY restrictions as 
a fait accompli without explaining their nature. It 
is also the case that in many presentations we find 
the phonemes of tables, 4A, 4B and 4C, lumped together 
into one phoneme table with large numbers of gaps which 
could not, even in principle, be filled precisely 
because of the combinatory restrictions operative 
but 
unexplained in the language. That is, we have already 
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been rather more subtle than is normal with our 
phoneme tables. 
b. A new type of distinctive feature matrix 
In order to show the structure of distinctive 
feature systems from the point of view of the possi- 
bilities of combination and mutual exclusion of dis- 
tinctive features in forming well-formed complexes, 
we will present a new sort of distinctive feature 
matrix which overcomes the deficiencies of the older 
types of matrix. On the basis of this new type of 
matrix, we will set up classes of mutually exclusive 
distinctive features. Because these classes are not 
identical with dimensions of opposed distinctive 
features, we will call them categories of distinctive 
features in order to avoid any terminological confusion. 
Let us say that any pair of distinctive features 
which may be combined contract a simultaneous construc- 
tional relation and we will denote this relation by IS'. 
Thus, if x and y are distinctive features and x and y 
may be combined, then xSy. The features, x and y, 
may be combined, if and only if there is a phoneme, 
such that /at/ == x, y or /vt / (- --x, Y9... , 
i. e. 
if and only if there is a phoneme which is equ. Jvalent 
to that pair or which is equivalent to an n-tuple 
containing that pair. Thus, we have in English /labial/ 
/voiced/ and /unvoiced/ S /stop/ because of the phonemes, 
/b/ (equivalent to <voiced, labial, stop>) and /t/ 
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(equivalent to <unvoiced, apical, stopý). However, 
we do not find the construction /nasal/ S /hushing/, 
/nasal/ S /hushing/. 
We now proceed to set up a new type of two- 
dimensional matrix for Russian which will express the 
possibilities of combination of distinctive features. 
We can set up the matrix in the following way. 
Let the distinctive features be placed in any arbitrary 
order in the lefthand column, I .... n. The features 
are then placed in the top row in the same order, 1 ... n. 
The value, /I, for the i 
th feature in the column and 
the j 
th feature in the row will be /3 igj* 
The value, 
'd 171 will express 
the combinatory possibilities of 
the features i and j. If i and j may be combined, i. e. 
if iSj, then we will fill in 11111, if not, i. e. if 
-iSj, then we will fill in 1101). This is the normal 
sense of the word "matrix" as used in mathematics. 
We have simply applied the notion to linguistics. Thus, 
we will have, 
iff isj 
iff -is 




































































0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 
New-style cartesian matrix for the Russian con- 
sonantal system. 
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This table expresses quite clearly the combinatory 
possibilities and restrictions for all pairsl of con- 
sonantal features? The table tells us, for instance, 
whether /labial/ combines with IstopV. It does not 
tell us whether the combination, /labial, voiced, 
palatal, stop/, is a well-formed complex. Also, we 
have not yet arrived at categories of distinctive 
features; these will emerge from the matrix. 
First, however, if we look at table 7, we will 
observe a number of points. In the first place, since 
no feature ever combines with itself, we can see that 
the matrix forms a Kronecker Delta. That is, a matrix 
in which the diagonal values from top left to bottom 
right are all the same (in this case 11011) - Secondly, 
the table is, of course, symmetrical in that the triangle 
above the diagonal exactly matches the triangle below 
it. More importantly, we observe that some features 
are identical with respect to the relation "S". Other 
features are partially alike and others have little 
or nothing in common. For instance, /labial/ and 
/apical/I /voiced/ and /unvoiced/ and /palatalised/ 
and /unpalatalised/ are three pairs which are identical 
with respect to mutual exclusion and combinability 
with other, features. That is, these three pairs of 
features are mutually exclusive and combinable with 
exactly the same sets of features. If we compare 
/labial/ or /apical/ with /dorsal/, however, we will 
find that the values are only partly alike, since 
/dorsal/, but not /labial/ or /apical/I is mutually 
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exclusive with /nasal/. Similarly, /nasal/ is mutually 
exclusive with both /voiced/and /unvoiced/ and with 
/stop/ and /fricative/I whereas /stop/ and /fricative/ 
are combinable with /voiced/ and /unvoiced/. If we 
compare the values for /labial/ and /voiced/, fcr 
example, we will find still less in common. 
Now, let us propose the following definition ; 
a category of distinctive features is a set of 
distinctive features which are mutually exclusive with 
respect to the relation 'IS". That is, a set of dis- 
tinctive features such that no pair in the set contract 
the relation of simultaneity. If we let "C" denote 
category, we get the following formal definition ; 
C distinctive features, d1...... dn (E di dj 
(d' S dj)j. 
It is worth pointing out here that the relation of 
mutual opposition , which is used to 
define identity, 
does not wholly coincide with the definition of mutual 
exclusion. Mutual exclusion, as defined here, is the 
absence of combinability for a given pair of features. 
Mutual exclusion will often coincide with mutual 
commutability in a given context. It is commutability 
which is the test of opposition. However, mutual 
exclusion does not always involve commutability. The 
feature, /dorsal/, in Russian is, for example, mutually 
exclusive with the feature, /nasal/. There is ro 
complex, */dorsal, nasal/. However, there is also 
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no case where /nasal/ and /dorsal/ commute. This is 
not unusual. The features, /hushing/ and /palatalised/, 
neither combine nor commute, etc.. Very occasionally, 
we may find the reverse of this situation. That is, 
cases where distinctive features which enter the same 
dimension (i. e. the same set of mutually opposed dis- 
tinctive features) can nevertheless form combinations. 
The most obvious cases of this phenomenon are those 
of the "semi-cluster". A semi-cluster, such as /dý/, 
in English, is a pair of phonemes which, in certain 
contexts, contract an ordering relation but whicN in 
other contexts, function as a single phoneme. When 
functioning as a single choice in the chain a semi- 
cluster is described as possessing the totality of 
the distinctive features of the constituent phonemes. 
Thus, /dI/ has the features /apical, hushing, occlusive, 
voiced/, where /apical/ and /hushing/ enter the same 
dimension. The case of the semi-cluster is admittedly 
10 
6, rather marginal. However, the case of 
the phoneme, /pf/, 
in German, is, as Mulder points out, less so]' That 
phoneme is described as /labial, occlusive-fricative/, 
where /occlusive/ and /fricative/ enter the same 
dimension but are equally represented by the phoneme 
in question. 
If we now return to the above definition of 
I category 4nd apply it in the case of Russian, we 
find 
that some features fall into two or more categories. 
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Thus, for example, /nasal/ is mutually exclusive with 
/voiced/and /unvoiced/ and is also mutually exclusive 
with /stop/ and /fricative/. We can represent this 
diagrammatically as follows, 
DIAGRAM 2 
Venn diagram showing /nasal/ at the intersection 
of two categories (in Russian). 
Here the circles represent sets of mutually exclusive 
features, i. e. sets of features which cannot be 
combined. Whereas we can have the combinations, 
</voiced/, /fricative/>, </voiced/, /stop/ý </unvoiced/, 
/fricative/> 
, 
</unvoiced/, /stop/> , we can never have 
( /nasal/, /stop/> , 




(/nasal/, /unvoiced/> . Using the 
above table 7, we can read off these sets of mutually 
exclusive features and their intersections. They 
can be represented in the following Venn diagram. 
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DIAGRAM 
Venn diagram for Russian distinctive feature 
categories (consonantal). 
This definition has some unusual consequences. The 
most unusual is that not only is a feature like /nasal/ 
found at the intersection of categories but we also 
find a feature such as /dorsal/ in the same category 
as/hasal/ . Similarly, /hushing/ is mutually exclusive 
with the series /labial/, /apical/ and /dorsal/, as we 
might expect, but it is also mutually exclusive with 
the order--/palatalised/9 /unpalatalised/ and with 
the order feature /nasal/. We find that the features, 
/1-ness/ and /r-ness/9 are mutually exclusive with all 
other features except /palatalised/ and /unpalatalised/. 
We can list the categories of Russian2 as follows ; 
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Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
labial palatalised voiced stop 
apical un- unvoiced fricative 
palatalised 
dorsal 1-ness nasal 
hushing hushing r-ness hushing 
1-ness nasal 1-ness 
r-ness r-ness 
TABLE 8_ 
Categories of Russian distinctive features based 
on Table 
If we set up this kind of matrix for English, as below, 




















(13 -0 4.1 4.1 H U) (4-4 Q, > 
labial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
apical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
dorsal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
hissing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
hushing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
stop 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
fricative I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
nasal 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
voiced 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
unvoiced 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
TABLE 
New-style cartesian matrix for English consonants. 
Firstly, we find the following categories ; 
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DIAGRAM 4 
Distinctive feature categories of English 
Consonantal phonemes as a Venn diagram 
(see tables 3A and 3B). Note that /-'ness/ 
and '/. h-ness/ stand at the intersection of all- 
se 
Here we find not three categories, as we might expect 
from an inspection of the three dimensions of table 
3A, but we find that, on our present definitiong we 
must set up four categories - one of which cuts across 
two others. If we look at Mulder's analysis of 




















































labial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
apical 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
hissing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
hushing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
dorsal 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
unaspirated 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
aspirated 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
fricative 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
nasal 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-ness 0 0 0 0111-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
r-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TABLE 10 
New-style matrix for Pekingese consonants 
following Mulder (see Table 2 above). 
Converting this to a Venn diagram, we again obtain 
more categories than dimensions - in this case 
four categories as opposed to two dimensions (see 
Table 2 above). 
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_DIAGRAM 
We can see that an interesting feature of Pekingese 
is that the distinctive features, /1-ness/, /r-ness/ 
f, and /r-ness/, are mutually exclusive with all other 
features and so they stand at the intersection of all 
categories. The same is true of the features, /1-ness/ 
and /h-ness/, in English. 
So far, we have been concerned only with pairs 
of features, i. e. those pairs which contract the relation, 
and those which do not contract this relation. In 
many languages, including English and Russian, there 
are, of course, n-tuples of features, where n is greater 
than two. In such cases, we must find a way of speci- 
fying the well-formed n-tuples. We can do this in two 
stages. Firstly, we construct a lattice representing 
the combinatory possibilities of all distinctive 
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features. That is, we will set up a graph in which 
a distinctive feature, x, is connected by a line to 
a distinctive feature, y, if and only if xSy. if 
xSy is the case, we can set up a representation as 
follows, 
x- y 
But if it is not the case that xSy, i. e. if -xS yj 
then there will be no line., Thus, for instance, in 
Russian we find /hushing/ S /voiced/ and /hushing/ S 





In a more complicated caseý where we find four 












Here are some other lattices for Russian ; 








Combined 2,3 and 4 category lattice for Russian. 
Our function will specify all the maximum well-formed 
n-tuples of distinctive features. It also systematically 
excludes impossible combinations. The combination, 
/nasal, dorsal/, is excluded because the features, 
/nasal/ and /dorsal/, are never connected by -. 
Similarly, we never find n-tuples containing both 
/hushing/ and /palatalised/ or /unpalatalised/ and we 
never find /1-ness/ or /r-ness/ in combination with 
either /voiced/ or /unvoiced/, since all of these features 
are in the same category. A systematically excluded 
Phoneme is one for which, in principle, there could 
/nasai/ /stop/ /fricative/ 
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never be a corresponding, maximumq well-formed n-tuple 
of distinctive features. 
On the other hand, we can see from the above lat- 
tices that the combinations, /voiced, dorsal, palatalised, 
stop/ and /voiced, dorsal, unpalatalised, stop/, are 
defined as well-formed. This is because all of those 
features are connected by a line; viz. /dorsal/ and 
/voiced/, /dorsal/ and /palatalised/, /dorsal/ and 
/unpalatalised/, /dorsal/ and /stop/, /voiced/ and 
/palatalised/, /voiced/ and /unpalatalised/, /voiced/ 
and /stop/, /palatalised/ and /stop/ and /unpalatalised/ 
and /stop/. All these pairs separately contract the 
relation 'IS", 
We have already seen, however, that there is no 
correlation, */g/ - /gl/, in Russian. Although palatalised 
and unpalatalised, voiced2 dorsal stops occur, they 
are in complementary distribution. The phoneme, /g/, 
is then a hyperphoneme with the features, /voiced, 
dorsal, stop/, which also represents 
12 the features, 
/palatalised/ and /unpalatalised/. In a case of this 
sort, we require an additional convention, viz. that 
mutually exclusive features (features in the same cate- 
gory) may be connected by a line, if they are repre- 
sented by the same hyperphoneme. The line would 
be 
in force only in a fixed context. For instance, 
/palatalised/ and /unpalatalised/ would be 
joined only 
in the case where both of these features are connected 
/dorsal/ and /voiced/. This is not 
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a case where we find the relation, /palatalised/ S 
/unpalatalised/, and consequently we join the features 
in question by a broken line - ------- We will have 
to amend the conditions for a well-formed lattice 
to include the broken line. We will say simply that 
a broken line completes the lattice in the case of 
a hyperphoneme and thus all features joined in the 
graph are represented by the hyperphoneme inýquestion. 





The phoneme /x/ in Russian represents a slightly 
more complicated case, since /x/ has the featuresq 
/dorsal, fricative/, but represents the features, 
/dorsal, fricative, voiced, unvoiced, palatalised, 
unpalatalised/-. --The reason for this is, as we can 
see from the lattice, both /dorsal/ and /fricative/ 
contract the relation 'IS" with /voiced/, /unvoiced/, 
/palatalised/ and /unpalatalised/. With broken lines, 





The "broken line convention" helps us to overcome one 
of the problems of the phoneme table, viz. the treat- 
ment of distinctive feature combinations in the case 
of hyperphonemes. It also helps us to see that the 
idea of a phoneme representing more features than 
it is functionally equivalent to arises because of 
a disparity between the identification of distinctive 
features on the basis of their oppositions and the 
combinatory possibilities of distinctive features. 
Another case where the broken line may be useful 
is the case of the archiphoneme. An archiphoneme such 
as, in Russian possesses all the features of the 
phonemes involved in the suspension of opposition. ISI 
in Russian possesses the features, /hushing/9 /voiced/ 
and /unvoiced/. It is formed by the suspension of 
Opposition, mainly in post-nuclear contexts, of /g/ 
and /I/. Of course, the features, /voiced/ and /unvoiced/, 
/palatalised/ ----- /unpalatalised/ 
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are not communicationally relevant and, in any case, 
"cancel each other Out". However, we can represent 
the archiphoneme as a lattice in which the contextual 
suspension of opposition intrmduces a broken line, 
as follPWP7 
/voiced/ ----------- /unvoiced/ 
/hushing/ 
DIAGRAM 11 
In a language, such as Russian, which possesses a huge 
number of archiphonemes, we will find the broken line 
extremely useful. (In Russian, the oppositions, /pala- 
talised/ - /unpalatalised/ and /voiced/ - /unvoiced/, 
are regularly suspended in pre-consonantal position 
and, as consonantal groups can be quite complex, this 
involves a large number of suspensions of opposition. 
In /FStol/ ("into the table") IFI and ISI both involve 
the suspension of both the above-mentioned oppositions. ) 
It may be that this convention can also be invoked in 
the case of n-tuples of hyperfeatures. 
In setting up categories we are interested in those 
distinctive features which do not contract the relation 
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IISII, i. e. those pairs of features for which -iSj 
is true. In setting up lattices we are, in effect, 
establishing the pairs of features which do contract 
the relation 'IS", i. e. the pairs for which iSj is 
true. We have seen that a number of contextual con- 
siderations may override the cases where we find 
-iSj; they can be described as, perhaps, --iS 
The well-formedness condition(s) determine the well- 
formed combinations of distinctive features in a 
given system. 
In both cases (i. e. setting up categories and 
lattices), we are working principally from the function 
which establishes our new type of distinctive feature 
matrix. A Venn diagram representation of the distinc- 
tive features which contract 'IS", i. e. their organisation 
into sets, is possible but very clumsy, as the reader 
can quickly demonstrate for himself simply by drawing 
the sets of distinctive features for which the relation, 
S, holds. 
So far, we have been concerned solely with con- 
sonantal features. However, it is quite clear that 
there is no reason why we should not specify a new 
style distinctive feature matrix for vocalic features 
as well. The following table gives a conventional 
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(Martinet-style) distinctive feature analysis for the 






Martinet-style distinctive feature 
matrix for Russian vowels. 
The following table, 12, uses our function to specify 
a new style matrix on the basis of this information. 
bo 10 1 0 
. r-l H cd ý-4 (13 
high 0 0 0 1 1 
mid 0 0 0 1 1 
1 a-ness 0 0 0 0 0 




New style matrix for Russian vowels. 
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Lattice for Russian vocalic distinctive features. 
(Only the features, /high/, /mid/, /front/ and 
/back/, are considered since /a-ness/ has no 
combinatory possibilities. ) 
The matrices for RussiAn consonants and vowels can 
be combined to give the following overall matrix 
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labial 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
apical 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
hushing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
dorsal 
.0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
pal I sed 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
unpallsed 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
stop 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
fric I ve 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
nasA1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
voiced 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
unvoiced 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
front 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
back 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
high 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
mid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1a-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TABLE 13 
Combined matrix for Russian consonants and vowels. 
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If we look at the lattice in diagram 12, then 
we see that there are no common terms with the previous 
consonantal lattices. Similarly, if we look at table 13, 
we see that the vowel features never combine with con- 
sonantal distinctive features. This is obvious on 
the matrix as two symmetrical blocks of 101s. If we 
look at the vowel features (with the exception of /a- 
ness/, which is the sole feature of the phoneme /a/), 
then we find they are intercombinable. The same is 
true of the consonantal distinctive features. Now, this 
lack of combinability between the two sets of features 
is clearly one of the reasons for speaking of two sub- 
systems of distinctive features, "vocalic" and 11con- 
3onantal", in a language. Of course, it is not neces- 
sarily the case that there is no combinability between 
the features of "vocalic" or "nuclear" phonemes and 
"consonantal" or "peripheral" phonemes. The possibili- 
ties of independent and connected subsystems of dis- 
tinctive features present an interesting typological 
classification. In fact, we will normally find two 
major subsystems, where the features of each subsystem 
are not combinable and not interconnected in any way. 
That is, we expect to find a "vocalic" and a 11consonan- 
tall' subsystem. It is interesting to note that in 
English and in Russian, however, there are minor classes 
of those features that do not combine with any other 
feature. In Russianv there is the feature, /a-ness/9 
and in English the features, /1-ness/ and /h-ness/, which 
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behave in this manner. In Russian, we should naturally 
associate /a-ness/ with the vocalic subsystem and 
/1-ness/ and /h-ness/ in English with the consonantal 
subsystem. /a-ness/ is phonetically Clow3 and is 
obviously part of a series with Chigh3 and [mid-3 
and is the sole feature of the nuclear phoneme /a/. 
In Englisý, /1-ness/ and /h-ness/ are the sole features 
of the phonemes, /l/ and /h/, respectively, where, of 
course, /l/ and /h/ are consonantal or peripheral in 
their distribution. From the present point of view, 
however, this sort of classification is misleading, 
We should be quite clear that, from the point 
of view of the new type of matrix, /1-ness/ and /h-ness/ 
form a special subsystem of distinctive features of 
their own in English. That is, they are the set of 
features which are never joined by to any other 
feature. This set is clearly different from the 
English consonantal subsystem containing /labial/, 
/apical/, /dorsal/9 /hissing/, /hushing/, /occlusive/7 
/fricative/i /nasal/, /voiced/ and /unvoiced/. It is 
also different from the nuclear subsystem containing 
/neutral/, /spread/, /rounded/, /vocalic/ and /semi- 
vocalic/ (as in the matrix set up for English by Mulder 
and Hurren 
13_ 
see the following table). We will call 
such a sub-system a "zero-combination" sub-system. 
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Martinet-style matrix for English vowels 
following Mulder and Hurren 
13 
In a similar way, the feature, /a-ness/, in Russian 
can be considered "vocalic" only if we look at it from 
the point of view of the Martinet style of matrix and 
distinctive feature analysis. From the present point 
of view, /a-ness/ forms a subsystem of its own. What 
we are saying is that the terms "vocalic, " and "consonantal" 
may be misleading, as may the terms "nuclear" and 
"peripheral", in distinctive feature analysis (although 
not in phonotactics)ý since apparently consonantal 
features may not belong to the "consonantal" subsystem 
and apparently vocalic features may not belong to the 
"vocalic" subsystem2 as in the cases of English /1-ness/ 
and /h-ness/ and Russian /a-ness/ respectively. In 
fact, we may have three or more distinctive feature 
subsystems. These subsystems emerge naturally from 
the new type of matrix. 
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There are some other points which are important 
in this respect. It is significant, for instance, 
that there exists the possibility that no absolute 
division between the "consonantal" and the "vocalic" 
subsystems appears in a given language, i. e. it is 
possible to have a single lattice and not two lattices 
- one overall system not two subsystems. Such a case 
arises when one or more features combine with both 
"consonantal" and "vocalic" features. Such a feature 
might be, for example, /nasal/ in Old Church Slavonic 
or French. If we take the phoneme tables for Old 
Church Slavonic to be as follows, 
stop fricative , voiced unvoiced voiced unvoiced nasal 
labial b p vfm 
apical d t zsn 
hushing 
dorsal 9 k x 
TABLE 15 
Martinet style distinctive feature matrix for 
Old Church Slavonic consonants. (Assuming that 
/ts/, /t6/9 /dz/, /dý/q /ri/9 /ii/ and /ni/ are 




high i u 
reduced i u 




Martinet style matrix for Old Curch Slavonic vowels. 
We are now in a position to set up the following new 
style matrix for Old Church Slavonic consonants and 
vowels combined. 
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r--I r--I S--_ r-A 4--ý 10 


















bo ý: S v :r a) z a) z 
C13 
-C 
10 U) r- > 
labial 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
apical 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hush Ig 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
dorsal 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
stop I 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
fricIe 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
nasal 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
voiced 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
unvId 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
front 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
back 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
high 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
red I ed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
r-ness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TABLE 17 
New style matrix for all Old Church Slavonic 
distinctive features (including the features 
/1-ness/ and /r-ness/ of the single feature 
phonemes /l/ and Irl respectively). 
-329- 
We can now set up the following lattice for Old 
Church Slavonic in which the "consonantal" and "vocalic" 
features are connected. (We leave aside the minor 

















In Russian, but not in Old Church Slavonic, we 
can set up a clear distinction between two major sub- 
systems of distinctive features on the phonological 
grounds of mutual exclusion and combinability. As we 
have said, the "consonantal - vocalic" distinction is 
not present in Old Church Slavonic. 
In English, we find two major subsystemsq con- 
sonantal and vocalic, and a minor "zero-combination" 
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subsystem. The vocalic features are not connected 
to the consonantal features or to /1-ness/ and /h-ness/ 
(of course). However, the vocalic phonemes, /i/, Irl 
and /u/, are distributed in both nuclear and peripheral 
positions. The same is true of the phonemes, /i/ and 
in Russian and the phoneme /i/ in Old Church 
Slavonic. That is, there may be a disparity between 
the behaviour of the distinctive features and the 
behaviour of the phonemes containing those distinctive 
features. 
To round off this discussion let us say that, 
although we have chosen to set up the new style of 
matrix via the familiar Martinet style of matrix, 
this is by no means necessary. We can go direct to 
the new style of matrix from an analysis of phonemes 
into their distinctive features. However, the new 
type of matrix is intended to supplement existing 
styles of matrix (which have other virtues) and not 
to replace them. The new type of matrix allows us 
to look at the structure of distinctive feature systems 
in a new and interesting way. The possibility of 
setting up Venn diagrams of mutually exclusive features 
and lattice diagrams of mutually combinable features 
provides a useful and novel view of distinctive fettures 
and helps us to overcome problems of multidimensional 
representation. The function specifying well-formedq 
maximum n-tuples of distinctive features, which grows 
directly out of the new matrix, allows us to 
distinguish 
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impossible feature combinations as well as possible, 
but unrealisedg combinations quite clearly and to define 
them in phonological terms. The establishment of 
phonologically determined subsystems of distinctive 
features also follows from this function. and allows 
a new view of the behaviour of distinctive features. 
By applying the convention on broken lines, we can 
overcome any disparity between the economy of the dis- 
tinctive feature system and the actual stock of phonemes 
(as with the hyperphoneme problem) or concerning con- 
textual considerations in distinctive feature combina- 
tions (as in the case of archiphonemes)- 
Let us now try to look at these ideas in a more 
formal manner. We have used a number of ideas from 
the existing theory of distinctive features. Notably, 
we have used the notions, phoneme and distinctive feature, 
and the relation, unordered constructional relation in 
phonology. We have attempted to analyse the premises 
that, all phonemes are maximum n-tuples of distinctive 
features and that all pairs of distinctive features in 
a ph_oneme contract the unordered constructional relation. 
We have added the notions, category, C, and subsystem 
of distinctive featuresS - 
The unordered constructional relation in phonology, 
Sq has been interpreted and definedg as follows, 
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def. 1. S i<X7y> : < xqy> = /4(/ or9. .. x, y, 0, *> 
= /o( / 3 
where /0(/ is a phoneme and x and y are distinctive 
features. That is, the relation, S, is extensionally 
the set of all pairs of distinctive features which 
combine either in such a way as to be equivalent to 
a phoneme are members of a larger n-tuple of distinctive 
features which is equivalent to a phoneme. For example, 
the features, /hushing/ and /voiced/, combine in English 
to form the pair /hushing, voiced/ which is equivalent to 
the phoneme, /z/, whereas /labial/ and /voiced/ combine 
only in larger constructions, such as /labial, voiced, 
occlusive/, equivalent to /b/. 
A (distribution) category, C, can now be defined 
for distinctive features, as follows, 
def. 2. CiX, y, z... :- (E<x, y> ) (x S y) 
3 
That is, a category is a set of distinctive featuresq 
such that no pair of features in the set contract 
the 
relation, S. In English2 there are four consonantal 
categories, as follows ; 
C1= labial, apicalq dorsalq hissingg hushingr 
1-ness, 
h-ness 
c2 occlusive, fricativeg nasal, 
hissing, hushing, 
1-ness, h-ness 
C3= nasal, voiced, unvoiced, 
1-nessq h-ness 
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c4 hissingý hushing, 1-ne3S9 h-ness, fricative, 
dorsal 
and two nuclear categories 
C5= spread, neutral2 rounded 
C6= vocalic2 semi-vocalic. 
A subsystem of distinctive features, j; , is defined as 
follows p 
def. 3a. Z=1X: (Ey) (x S y) 
That is,,.: a subsystem of distinctive features is a set 
of features, each of which contracts the relation, S, 
with at least one other feature in the set. A zero- 
combination subsystem will be almost the opposite of 
this, i. e. a set of features, none of which contracts 
the relation, S, with any other feature in the language. 
That is, a zero-combination subsystem, 
0 is defined ; 
def. 3b. s0=fx: - (Ey) ýx S y)3 
In English there are three subsystems, 
I= labial, apical, hushing, hissing, dorsal, voiced, YJ 
unvoiced, nasal, occlusive, fricative 
S2 
spread, rounded, neutral, vocalic, semi-vocalic 
z3= 1-ness, h-ness 
Z is the zero-combination subsystem. 
Finally, we can analyse the two premises stated 
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above. An n-tuple of distinctive features is well- 
formed, W, if it is maximum and all pairs in it 
contract 'IS" and there is no phoneme which is not 
equivalent to such a well-formed n-tuple (where n> 1). 
def.. 4. i<Xgyý 




This definition determines which n-tuples of 
distinctive features are maximum and well-formed when 
n>2. Clearly, if a feature belongs to the set of 
zero-combination features, then it is a well-formed 
n-tuple, where n=1. Now, we require a further 
definition which states that there is no phoneme which 
is not equivalent to a well-formed n-tuple of distinctive 
features, where n 
def . 5. - (E o( ). 6( 1W 
(where, as before 
'(X Iyp-- ZY 
o( is a phoneme). 
Given the specification of all the pairs that con- 
tract S and the information that, for example, 
I /labial/ 
S /occlusive/ & /labial/ S /voiced/ & /occlusive/ S 
/voiced/j is well-formed, then the n-tUple can be 
mapped into the set of phonemes. Since the triple, 
< labial, occlusive, voiced) , satisfies 
def. 4., we 
can write W labial, occlusive, voicedy 
That is, all 
the features in the triple contract the relation, S, 
and there is no quadruple or greater combination 
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including these features and satisfying def. 4.. 
Finally, def. 5. is also satisfied because there 
is a corresponding phoneme, /b/, in English for this 
triple (equivalent to the triple). Given the above 
conventions on lattices (and broken lines, where neces- 
sary), one can say simply that a complete lattice of 
distinctive features is a well-formed maximum n-tuple 
of distinctive features. 
What we have described for English using the above 
definitions is a model of the distinctive featpýre struc- 
ture of English. The model contains the distinctive 
14 features of English, nine unary relations, which 
classify the distinctive features (viz. the six cate- 
gories, C1 14-9c 
6, 




and Y. 3 ), the binary relation, S, the n-ary well-formed- 
ness relation, W, and the equivalence relation, =, 
which is found in all models. That is, we have a model 
or structure for English distinctive features in the 
sense of "structure" defined in previous chapters; i. e. 
ilabial, 
apical, hissing, hushingg dorsal, voiced, 
unvoiced, nasal, fricative2 occlusive, 1-ness, h-ness, 
vocalic, semi-vocalicý spread2 neutralq rounded3 ;C 
C2yC39C4yC51C6yS19 yj 29 Yj 39Sýw9=> 
In accordance with our view of linguistic descrip- 
tion stated above, we can now give the following cal- 
culus for the model. The calculus has the following 
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premises ; 
If a distinctive feature belongs to any of the 
categories, CIq.. G*jC 
4 
then it is a member of 
13 
subsystem, or S. 
If a feature belongs to either C5 or C6, then it 
2 is a member of S. 
If a pair of features belonging to 1; 
2 
also belongs 
to different categories, then that pair is a well- 
formed maximum combination (they contract S) and 
there is a corresponding phoneme to that pair. 
If a feature belongs to the zero-combination sub- 
system, ý; 
3, then it is a well-formed n-tuple, where 
n=1, and a phoneme corresponds to it. 
An n-tuple of features from S1 is well-formed and 
maximum, if and only if none of the features 
are members of the same category and the combination 
corresponds to a maximum lattice (all pairs contract 
S and the n-tuple is maximum). There is then a 
corresponding phoneme. 
These rules apply only to English, of course, and 
specify the interpretation of the relations in the above 
model and ultimately the well-formed n-tuples of dis- 
tinctive features in English. Clearlyý the terms, cate- 
gory, distinctive feature, subsystem, the relation 'IS", 
and the notion "well-formedness" must be interpreted 
in the light of the existing theory and of the new 
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theoretical apparatus given above. Trivially, Of course, 
a more formalised, or ratherý more formularised account 
of these rules could be given. 
In earlier chapters, we defined a linguistic 
theory as a triple, 
T=K&v9 MI 0 
and linguistic description as a pair, 
< 
We can see that the new apparatus given here is a 
calculus, K, in which a number of new theoretical, 
propositional functions are introduced and inter- 
related. They are also related in obvious ways to 
existing phonological theory (distinctive feature 
theory), since they operate on notions from that theory, 
subject them to analysis and are consistent with existing 
theory. The new apparatus supplements and, to some 
extent, develops distinctive feature theory.. In par- 
'I e the unordered ticular, the apparatus helps us to r6Lat 
constructional relation to the notion of maximum, well- 
for_med n-tuple in phonematics. Furthermore, each of 
the new terms is defined verbally and formally. That 
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is, we have a system of definitions, V. The defini- 
tions lead on to clear methodological tests, M, notably 
consistency with lattices and the analysis of phonemes 
into their distinctive features. The ontology, 0, of 
the apparatus is quite clearý since it sets up operations 
over, and sets of2 distinctive features, which are 
objects of known ontological status. The main require- 
ment of the ontology, that all statements in a descrip- 
tion be capable of empirical test through an observable 
connection with first-order objects, is thus satisfied. 
Any proposed linguistic theory, or part theory, 
must, as we have said, be applicable in the description 
of speech phenomena. Descriptions based on the proposed 
theory, or part theory, must be subject to empirical 
test and, so, to empirical refutation. A linguistic 
theory or addition to a linguistic theory (part theory) 
which is applicable in this way is deemed to be indirect- 
ly scientific in the sense given above. We have inter- 
preted the notion I'de3cription" to mean the combination 
of a calculus and a structure (or model). A descrip- 
tion, considered as a system of empirical hypotheses, 
is a function of the calculus and the structure. It 
follows that, in order to be indirectly scientific7 a 
new theory or part theory must be applicable in the con- 
struction of descriptions of the required sort. One 
can see that our new apparatus me'ets this condition 
and that it is thus indirectly scientific. 
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Since our new apparatus meets both the formal 
requirements imposed on linguistic theories and part 
theories and it is also indirectly scientific, we can 
conclude that the new theoretical apparatus appears 
to be acceptable. We do not claim, of course, that 
it is correct. It may, for instance, be shown, at 
some point in the future, that our new apparatus 
is untenable. What is important is that the formula- 
tion of new theoretical apparatus be sufficiently 
rigorous and transparent for it to be inspected for 
acceptability and that the considerations involved 
in inspecting a theory, or part theory, for its 
acceptability be themselves clear and defensible. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE NEED FOR METHODOLOGY 
-342- 
We have argued that it is necessary to incorporate 
a methodology into linguistic theory and that the metho- 
dology should be logically related to the theoretical 
models, relations and statements of the calculus and 
semantic components in such a way that proposed des- 
criptive models, relations and statements relying on 
these theoretical "genotypes" may be definitively tested. 
We have interpreted this to mean that the methodology 
should supply appropriate tests giving clear results, 
which lead us either to uphold the descriptive model 
tested or the relation or statement tested or to reject 
it. Thus, if we choose to incorporate the notion, 
"phoneme", into the theory, we must be able to define 
the term, e. g. as a simultaneous bundle of distinctive 
features in phonology and a minimum unit in phonotactics 
and maximum unit in phonematics. Clearly, there must 
be tests of maximum size in phonematics (e. g. the well- 
formedness condition - above) and of simultaneity 
(e. g. 
the permutation test). These tests in combination may 
be applied whenever a phoneme-model is proposed for a 
given language. By applying the tests to the appro- 
priate range of data, we can judge the validity of the 
model. We have argued that this is possible and give 
an example in Chapter 11. 
From a meta-theoretical point of view, we regard 
a methodology of this sort as necessary 
for all theore- 
tical models, relations and statements. 
Not all linguists 
6- 
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have been in agreement. 
a. The feasibility and necessi dology in 
linguistics 
The main argument against the feasibility and 
necessity of a methodolgy in linguistics has been ad- 
vanced by Chomsky in Syntactic Structures. Chomsky 
argues that it is, 
flunreasonable to demand of linguistic theory 
that it provide anything more than a practical evalu- 
ation procedure for grammars. " 
I 
In doing so, he suggests that it is neither feasible 
nor necessary for linguistic theory to develop a 
rigorous methodology. As will emerge (below), this 
position is both self-contradictory and confused. 
In this connection, Chomsky begins by considering 
the question, "what is the relation between the general 
theory and the particular grammars that follow from 
2 it ?". He finds three answers to this question distin- 
guishing between "discovery", "decision" and "evaluation" 
procedures. He says ; 
"The strongest requirement that could be placed 
on the relation between a theory of linguistic structure 
and particular grammars is that the theory must provide 
a practical and mechanical method for actually construc- 
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ting the grammar, given a corpus Of utterances. Let 
us say that such a theory provides us with a discovery 
procedure for grammars. 
"A weaker requirement would be that the theory must 
provide a practical and mechanical method for deter- 
mining whether or not a grammar proposed for a given 
corpus is, in fact, the best grammar of the language 
from which the corpus is drawn, Such a theory, which 
is not concerned with the question of how this grammar 
was constructed, might be said to provide a decision 
procedure for grammars. 
"An even weaker requirement would be that, given 
a corpus and given two proposed grammars, Gl and G2, 
the theory must tell us which is the better grammar 
of the language from which the corpus is drawn. In 
this case, we might say that the theory provides an 
evaluation procedure for grammars. 
"These theories can be represented graphically 
in the following manner. 
36 (i) CORPUS 










G. hDmsky comments ; 
G2 
1,2 
"36 (i) represents a theory conceived as a machine 
with a corpus as its input and a grammar as its output ; 
hence, a theory that provides a discovery procedure. 
36 (ii) is a device with a grammar and a corpus as its 
inputs and the answers "yes" or "no" as its outputs, 
as the grammar is, or is not, the correct one ; hence, 
it represents a theory that provides a decision pro- 
cedure for grammars. 36 (iii) represents a theory 
with grammars Gl and G2 and a corpus as its inputs and 
the more preferable (sic !) of G1 and G2 as its output ; 
hence, a theory that provides an evaluation procedure 
for grammar sl., 
3 
From these remarks it will be self-evident that, 
when Chomsky rejects both discovery and decision pro- 
cedures as unnecessary and not feasible, he rules out 
of linguistics the kind of methodology that would be 
capable of either corroborating or refuting the adequacy 
Of linguistic descriptions. The "methodology" for 
which he opts merely determines the better, or 
best, 
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of proposed grammars. At no point in such an evaluation 
procedure could there be any question of determining 
the validity or non-validity of a given grammar with 
respect to the behaviour of empirical phenomena. Chomsky's 
suggestion is, therefore, simply inadequate, since it 
fails the meta-theoretical condition that a methodology 
be capable of testing the empirical adequacy of des- 
criptions with respect to the phenomena which those 
descriptions purport to describe. That is, according 
to Chomsky, there can be no methodology which can determine 
the empirical truth or falsehood of any descriptive 
statement. This would be a strange type of science. 
Chomsky is no doubt correct, however, when he 
rejects "discovery procedures", although it is not 
certain that he rejects them for the right reason. If 
Chomsky means by "a practical and mechanical method 
for actually constructing a grammar" the kind of in- 
ductive cycle adopted by Zellig Harris and others, then 
it is unnecessary to bring the charge that such a metho- 
dology is unfeasible. Equally, the feasibility of any 
approach which demands that a descriptive hypothesis 
be 
justified by some mechanical discovery procedure 
is 
beside the point. Whether it is actually possible 
to 
devise such procedures or not2 the reason 
for their 
rejection is simply that "discovery procedures" 
are 
neither necessary nor sufficient 
for either the launching 
or the testing of a descriptive 
hypothesis and they 
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bear no relation to the question of the validity or 
otherwise of a given hypothesis. At best such discovery 
procedures may give a certain "motivation" (rather than 
"justification") for the launching of a4 hypothesis. 
We may say, then, that discovery procedures are 
irrelevant to, and evaluation procedures inadequate for, 
the testing of the empirical claim of linguistic des- 
criptions (grammars). The remaining "decision procedures", 
as adumbrated by Chomsky, are similar to the kind of 
methodology which would satisfy the meta-theoretical 
conditions of empiricism which we have set up in that 
the ultimate test of the validity or otherwise of a 
given empirical statement (or set of statements) in a 
given description lies in the confrontation of that 
statement (or those statements) with empirical phenomena 
(the "corpus"). The descriptive statement(s) will be 
either refuted or, if not refuted , upheld 
(a- simple "yes/ 
no" answer given). Two curious points emerge in this 
connection. The first is that at no point in his dis- 
cussion does Chomsky demonstrate, or attempt to demon- 
strate, the "unfeasibility" of decision procedurest 
although he criticises discovery procedures at length 
in this connection. Decision procedures are simply 
asserted to be not feasible and an unreasonable require- 
ment. Perhaps, Chomsky feels that they are tarred 
with the same brush as discovery procedures. 
Again, 
however, an attack on decision procedures concerning 
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their feasibilitY9 were it forthcoming, would not affect 
their necessity. 
The second curious point here is that Chomsky 
asserts the following in the course of the same argu- 
ment, 
"Clearly, every grammar will have to meet certain 
external conditions of adequacy ; e. g. the sentence 
generated will have to be acceptable to the native 
speaker. .. In addition, we pose a condition of generality 
on grammars ; we require that the grammar of a given 
language be constructed in accordance with a specific 
theory of linguistic structure in which such terms as 
"phoneme" and "phrase" are defined independently of any 
particular language. 115 
It will be fairly obvious that "external conditions 
of adequacy" of the sort Chomsky has in mind involve 
testing the validity or non-validity of descriptive 
statements with respect to certain empirical judgements. 
In the case cited by Chomsky one test of the empirical 
validity of a grammar is whether or not the set of sen- 
tences generated by that grammar are acceptable to the 
6 
native speaker. Such a test will involve answers of 
a "yes/no" sort (leaving uncertainty aside ; the problem 
of uncertainty merely shows the inapplicability of 
the 
test). External conditions of adequacy require, then, 
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some sort of decision procedure. It is therefore self- 
contradictory for Chomsky to assert either that decision 
procedures are unreasonable demands(since he himself 
requires them) or that they are unnecessary (since he 
himself argues de facto for them) or that they are not 
feasible (since he himself gives an example of one). 
we take Chomsky's Itondition of generality" also into 
account, then one can envisage that the actual metho- 
dology (as part of theory as opposed to meta-theory) 
will be incorporated, or can be incorporated, into 
If 
the general theory (as we have argued). Thus, it would 
be necessary to replace evaluation procedures with 
decision procedures in transformational theory or to 
drop the pretence that evaluation procedures are anything 
other than disguised decision procedures. 
From another point of view, we may say that it is 
simply absurd to attempt to evaluate grammars that do 
not meet the conditions, suggested by Chomsky himself, 
of external adequacy and generality (which are not dis- 
similar to the kind of conditions laid down by Hjelmslev 
and many others). It would seem reasonable to maintain 
that the evaluation of two grammars presupposes, at least, 
that both the grammars in question are both formally and 
empirically adequate. (Other conditions would be that 
they cover the same "range" of describienda and that they 
have the same scope (are constructed under the same 
theory and utilise the same parts of that theory - 
otherwise they are not in competition (if made using 
different theoriesq they are not theoretically comparable) 
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or there must be a relation of total inclusion between 
the descriptions - in which case the description with 
wider scope is preferable). Evaluation loses its point, 
unless one is evaluating equally (empirically) adequate 
descriptions ; it would remain possible that one was 
evaluating two equally false grammars without decision 
procedures. If evaluation is to have any point, then, 
it must presuppose decision procedures, just as con- 
siderations of simplicity presuppose conditions of 
empiricism (of the decision procedure type), as was 
noted by Hjelmslev long ago. A method which ignores 
decision procedures contains no methodology for the 
testing of empirical hypotheses ; it follows, therefore, 
that no empirical hypothesis associated with any des- 
cription made under that theory refers directly or in- 
directly to any refutatior-4 or verification, class and 
this renders such descriptions a-scientific from the 
point of view of any attitude in the philosophy of science. 
We may add that the view of a linguistic theory 
as an evaluation procedure is presented in a 
deliberately 
naive way. As we have indicated elsewhereq 
there are 
many connections between a theory and 
the grammar of 
a given language (constructed in accordance with 
that 
theory). This is the implication, incidentallyý of 
Chomsky's "condition of generality". As we 
have also 
pointed out earlier, a theory as an evaluation 
procedure 
can not be impartial. It will select 
grammars which 
are constructed in accordance with 
the theory or are 
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in close harmony with the theory. The theory as an 
evaluation procedure merely turns out to be a way of 
preferring one sort of grammar over others. 
The attitude that linguistics must do without 
decision procedures (hence, without a sufficient metho- 
dology) implies that linguistics must be a-scientific 
in the sense given to this word by Popper or in the 
modified sense we have given to it. Having disposed 
of the the arguments against the feasibility and necessity 
of decision procedures, we can now turn to an independent 
proof of their necessity. 
Popper has pointed out the question of the need 
for a methodology is closely connected with the criterion 
of demarcation. As Popper says, 
"The theory of method, insofar as it goes beyond 
the purely logical analysis of the relations between 
scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of 
methods - with the way in which scientific statements 
are to be dealt with. 
7 
In general, Popper argues, the methods chosen should 
be such as to allow empirical statements 
to be revised, 
i. e. it should be possible to reject given statements 
in favour of new ones in the light of new observations 
which refute the old statements. 
In this way one relates 
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methodology to the criterion of demarcation between 
science and non-science, since any methodology which 
allowed the revision of descriptive statements in the 
light of further empirical information would include 
the notion of unilateral testability, i. e. falsifiability. 
That is to say that descriptions subject to such a metho- 
dology would be capable of rejection on the grounds of 
the empirical refutation of the hypotheses they contain. 
Since empirical testability can only be unilateral 
(according to Popper), it follows that such a metho- 
dology must include the notion of "falsifiability". A 
scientific theory in Popper's sense or in our sense 
is distinguished not so much by its formal properties 
as by its methods, since, as Popper says, 
"If we characterize empirical science merely by 
the formal or logical structure of its statements, we 
shall not be able to exclude from it that prevalent 
form of meta-physics which results from elevating an 
obsolete scientific theory into an incontrovertible 
truth. " 
8 
Thus, from our point of view, a linguistic description 
is distinguished as scientific by its subjection to 
the condition of empirical adequacy and a 
linguistic 
theory is (indirectly) scientific in virtue of containing 
a methodology capable of testing 
the empirical validity 
of proposed descriptions constructed using 
that theory. 
It is for this reason that an empirical methodology 
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(decision procedure) is indispensable to linguistics, 
as to any discipline which claims empirical content for 
any of its statements, i. e. without some form of metho- 
dology it is impossible to relate the supposed empirical 
statements of a science to the phenomena which those 
statements seek to describe and, hence, any body of 
statements lacking this requirement can be put forward 
(vacuously) as scientifically true in virtue of their 
factual incontrovertibility (impossibility of confron- 
tation with potential falsifiers). One may conclude 
that there can be no scientific linguistics without 
some form of empirical methodology involving a decision 
procedure. 
It might be felt by some that this conclusion 
has been reached rather "from above" by an appeal to 
the philosophy of science. This would be so, were it 
not for the fact that the same conclusion can be reached 
from a purely linguistic point of view (working from 
first principles). The arguments reinforce one another. 
The linguistic argument is as follows. 
Let us assume (as above) that the "theoretical 
problem" of linguistics is to set up the both necessary 
and sufficient conditions for communication ( I'semiotic 
theory" ) and the "descriptive problem" is to set up 
descriptions of selected fields of communicational 
phenomena through the application of the theory to the 
phenomena, then we may say that the "meta-theoretical 
problem" is to set up the conditions for 
the acceptability 
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of both particular theories and particular descriptions. 
Now, it is required (among other things) that a theory 
be adequate or sufficient and this may be interpreted 
to mean that a theory must meet the condition that 
it lead-to descriptions which are empirically adequate. 
It is the aim of the theory to lead to empirical know- 
ledge of given fields of phenomena (descriptions), 
and no description is acceptable, unless it is descrip- 
tively adequate. Thus, 
"A necessary condition of the acceptability of 
of theories is that the descriptions which they lead 
to, through the application of the theory to the pheno- 
mena, be empirically adequate. " 
In order that a description may be considered empiri- 
cally adequate, it must meet conditions of a formal, 
a theoretical and an empirical nature. As we have seen 
above, when we require that a description be formally 
justified, we state that any description should be 
logically consistent and sufficient for the derivation 
of all necessary descriptive statements. This require- 
ment excludes vacuity through self-contradiction or 
eclecticism or ad-hocness. Thusq 
"A necessary condition of the adequacy of a given 
description is that it be formally justified". 
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The theoretical condition may be expressed, as follows, 
"A necessary condition of the adequacy of descrip- 
tions is that they be theoretically justified. " 
That is, each statement must be consistent with some 
part of the general theory. We can refine the require- 
ment, as follows, 
"A necessary condition of the adequacy of a given 
description, as an application of a given theory to a 
select field of phenomena, is that the description in 
question be justified by that theory. " 
This refinement restricts a description to the application 
of one theory to the phenomena and thus helps to avoid 
eclecticism. Finally, we require that any description 
be emPirically adequate ; that is, following Poppert 
any description, which, after appropriate tests, is 
not demonstrated to be empirically false, will be 
provisionally upheld. Thus, 
"A necessary condition of the adequacy of a 
description is that it is not empirically false. " 
All of these conditions do not add up to a sufficient 
condition of adequacy. The adequacy of a description 
is always open to doubt. Clearlyq a methodology will 
be necessary for all these conditions. Except 
for 
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logical tests, which have their own methodology, such 
a linguistic methodology must come from the theory. 
This methodology must decide the consistency of a des- 
cription with respect to the theory and the sufficiency 
of the description as an application of the theory 
to a given set of phenomena. It must decide the empiri- 
cal validity of descriptions as applications of the 
theory. The methodology must be applicable to the 
description as a whole and to each point of the des- 
cription. We conclude, then, 
"An appropriate methodology is a necessary 
condition of a linguistic theory"? 
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REDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 
IN EMPIRICAL LINGUISTICS 
-359- 
It will be obvious from the comments in the previous 
chapter that the objects and relations that are set up 
in a linguistic description are to be the product of the 
application of the methodology of the theory to indepen- 
4 dent phenonmena and that this product is to be arrived at 
by way of a deductive argument. The satisfaction of the 
methodology by a given set of phenomena should imply or 
be equivalent to the satisfaction of the theoretical 
predicate or relation associated by equivalence or im- 
plication with that methodology. It should also be 
clear that any description will contain a consequence 
class or set of predictions about the data. Where ob- 
jects or relations are predicted by the description, it 
is important that the objects and relations can be in- 
dependently established by the application of the raetho- 
dology to the relevant data. We will give an example 
of this form of testing in the following chapter. 
Although we advocate a deductive approach to lin- 
guistics, it does not at all follow that all deductive 
approaches are equally acceptable. In this chapter we 
will look at some of the unacceptable aspects of empirical 
testing in deductive approaches to linguistics. We 
must distinguish first of all between "reductive 
testing" 
and "deductive testing". In the case of linguistic 
des- 
criptions which can be tested only through 
the applica ion 
of empirical tests to their consequence classesq 
we will 
speak of "reductive testing". Where 
the objects and 





consequences of applying the methodology to the pheno- 
mena, we speak of "deductive testing". In this latter 
case, objects and relations may or may not have been 
previously hypothesised. It does not really matter, 
since, if they have been hypothesised and the product 
of applying the methodology is equivalent to the hypo- 
thesised objects and relations, then the hypothesis 
stands and, if there is no prior hypothesis, the ap- 
plication of the methodology provides one. Clearly, 
if a previously hypothesised object or relation is not 
equivalent to the product of applying the methodology, 
the hypothesis falls in any case. In the case of re- 
ductive testing, however, typically the objects and 
relations of the description are not open to direct 
empirical testing. They are confirmed, or corroborated, 
if the consequence class withstands empirical testing 
and at least one part of the description is deemed to 
be false, if the consequence class does not survive 
empirical testing. 
Both of these methods have been employed in de- 
ductive approaches to linguistics and reductive testing 
is very widespread. While deductive testing, in 
its 
naive form, has a number of practical difficulties 
(discussed below), reductive testing has a number of 
principle (and has been misunderstood). The practical 
problems of deductive testing can be overcome 
by a more 
carefully integrated approach but we 
take the position 
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here that reductuctive testing can be no more than a part 
of empirical testing in linguistic s and that it must 
always be subordinate to deductive testing. 
a. Reductive and deductive methodalogy 
In the simplest outline, the "reductive" and 
"deductive" modes of inference have been described by 
Bochenski in the following manner ; 
"In deduction, we infer the consequent from a 
conditional statement and its antecedent : 
if A, then B, 
A, 
therefore, B. 
In reduction,, -on the other hand, we infer the antecedent 
from a conditional statement and its consequent : 
if A, then B, 
B, 
therefore, 
Although reduction is the dominant form of empirical 
testing in contemporary linguistics (being advocated 
more or less clearly by, among others, Shaumjanj Katz, 
Lockwood and Sampson - see below)ý it is nevertheless 
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probable that reduction is the less familiar of the 
two modes of argument. Deductive testing may be re- 
garded as the utilisation of the "classical" (standard) 
logical mode of inference (modus ponens) in methodology 
and, as such, it is very familiar. 
Clearly, if in a linguistic description there 
is an implication that, if the methodological conditions 
(A) are satisfied by such and such phenomena, then (B) 
those phenomena satisfy a certain theoretical predicate 
(or A and B are equivalent) and we find that A is the 
case, then we can deduce B and we will have an instance of 
deductive testing. For example, the "functional principle" 
tells us that all linguistic objects must have separate 
identity and the commutation, test is part of the metho- 
dology which tells us that, if two items commute, then 
they have separate identity. The objects Ep 
h3 
and Lb3 
commute in English, so they must have separate identity. 
however, there is an implication that, if the 
structural analyses and distributional statements of 
a description (A) are such as to imPlY (B) that an item7 
x, belongs to the consequence class of the grammar (is 
generated by it) and x genuinely corresponds to observed 
objects in specified way(s) (so B is asserted to 
be true), 
then A is taken to be true (A is confirmed), then we 
have 
a fairly familiar reductive argument. Bochenski 
demon- 
strates two types of reduction, the one "progrersive" 
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and the other "regressive". He explains, 
"In both cases the consequent is known to be true, 
but not the antecedent ; if the reduction is to be done 
progressively, however, the antecedent - whose truth- 
value is still unknown - is taken as the starting point, 
from which the argument proceeds to the known or ascer- 
tainable consequent. This progessive reduction is 
called "verification" . Regressive reduction, on the 
other hand, begins with the known consequent and pro- 
ceeds to the unknown antecedent. Regressive reduction 
2 is called "explanation". " . 
It is clear that all forms of reduction contain 
some initial regressive reduction in order to establish 
an antecedent which may be tested progressively or re- 
gressively. 
When the progressive type of reduction is called 
"verification", this is rather misleading. The point 
is that no absolute confirmation of the validity of the 
antecedent can be obtained through the testing of its 
consequents. The reason for this is that a reductive 
inference is one which is not logically valid. That 
is to say that the validity of the consequent 
is a neces- 
sary but not sufficient condition of the validity of 
the 
antecedent. Consequently, those linguistic theories 
which involve the requirement that descriptions construc- 
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ted in accordance with them be tested only reductively 
can never in principle lead to ultimately verifiable 
descriptions. On the other hand, if we set up the 
testing of descriptions in such a way that the satis- 
faction of the methodological conditions by the pre- 
dictions of the description (its consequents) is a 
necessary condition of the validity of the descriptiony 
it is obvious that, in the absence of any direct testing 
of the antecedent description, it is impossible (logi- 
cally speaking) to draw any conclusion about the vali- 
dity or non-validity of the antecedent. We cannot even 
say (strictly speaking) that the description is not 
invalid, since the satisfaction of methodological con- 
ditions by the predictions ("derived hypotheses") of 
a system is insufficient for this purpose. Such con- 
firmation as can be given through the reductive method 
is of a purely "operational" character. The method can 
be useful if the system devised to describe a given set 
of, say, speech phenomena is operationally adequate in 
in every case. Reductive testing may lead to the con- 
clusion that a system (e. g. a transformational-generative 
grammar) is operationally adequate. 
On the other hand, however, as Bochenski points out ; 
"Falsification is logically valid, but confirmation 
..... is never conclusive 
in the reductive method . In 
this case ..... the 
inference from consequent to antecedent 
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does not hold logically ; whereas the inference from 
the negation of the consequent to the negation of the 
antecedent is based on a law of logic and is universally 
valid . 11 
That is, to use the formula given by Popper, 
(C t- p). )- t. 
(Read "if p is derivable from t and if p is false, 
114 then t is also false As Sochenski points out, the 
reductive method is usually not set up in such a way 
that a consequent is derived from a single antecedent 
statement, "but from a conjunction of this statement 
with others (perhaps some theory or the like) , say 'IT" I' 
The schema is then, 
if (A and T), then B, 
not B, 
therefore, not (A & T) - 
6 
That is to say, going along with Popper, the whole system 
required for the deduction of B is falsified, if B is 
false. Bochenski argues that the falsehood of B in 
such a case leaves "a choice between the rejection of 
,, 7 A and the rejection of TI This may be true 
but surely 
involves a misunderstanding on Bochenski's part. 
The 
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reason for this is that B is derived from the conjunction 
of A and T and not either A or T separately. Consequent- 
ly, it is the conjunction, (A & T) , which is the ante- 
cedent of B. When B is false, (A & T) is false. The 
import of this point is that a single false prediction 
of a system is sufficient to show that the system is 
fa1se. As far as linguistics is concerned, a single 
validly generated non-entity of L would be sufficient 
to falsify that description. (Of course, a very similar 
theory of L might be set up which avoided the false pre- 
dictions, but it would be a different theory nonetheless. ) 
The trouble with adopting Bochenski's point of 
view and allowing that the falsification of some pre- 
diction of a scientific system implies the falsification 
of either of the conjoined antecedent statements but not 
both is that the scientific system can, in this manner, 
always be preserved by laying the fault at the door not 
of the theory, T, but of the other, obviously less im- 
portant, antecedent statement, A. This means that the 
scientific system in question could never in fact be 
falsified. It would be irrefutable because the falsi- 
fication can always be explained away as due to some 
minor fault. In linguistiCs, rules of interpretation 
are useful as a form of immunisation of the theory for 
some linguists - where the rules of interpretation 
are 
minor antecedent statements. Where this is the case, 
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no amount of empirical evidence could ever in principle 
be used to reject an "immunised" theory or to choose 
between competing theoriesq such as generative semanticsy 
case grammar and the extended standard theory. This is 
for two reasons. On the one hand, as we have said, i t 
is always possible to spirit away some falsification 
by putting it down to some minor false assumption in 
the correspondence rules, which can always be corrected 
by another ad hoc assumption - hence the theory of 
exceptions in some versions of transformational grammar. 
On the other hand, since the only constraint imposed by 
the reductive method is that of operational success, 
one can imagine the proliferation of any number of des- 
criptions incorporating all sorts of deep structures, 
8 
each one equally irrefutable. 
b. I. Reduction in linguistics 
As we have already noted, the reductive method of 
testing is associated in linguistics with the transforma- 
tional generative approach. In fact, it is the only 
method of testing available to those linguists who 
treat transformational generative grammars as the only 
form of linguistic description. Other forms of 
"hypo- 
thetico-deductive" testing are available only to those 
linguists concerned with structural grammars or with 
the structural and generative aspects of 
linguistic des- 
cription as heads and tails of the same coin. 
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The general strategy of those who adopt the re- 
ductive method of testing or, what amounts to the same 
thing, those who adopt a transformational-generative 
framework is as follows. Some form of deep structure 
is set up. This contains a set of structures defining 
the notion (initial symbol)t S. The deep structure also 
contains a set of items, each of which is accompanied 
by a distributional statement defining the categories 
which may be entered by that item. By further defining 
the set of structures in terms of categories, it is 
possible to generate strings of items filling the defined 
set of structural categories. This is done by means 
of a set of permissible operations or rules. By means 
of a further set of transformational rules it is possible 
to determine a set of terminal strings which stand in 
a hypothetical relation of "correspondence" to the set 
of observables to be described. 
What we have just described takes the form of a 
sort of deductive argument. Clearly, if we make our 
definitions proPerly, then the set of generated entities 
will be the set of necessary consequences of the cate- 
gories, distributional statements and permissible opera- 
tions of the grammar. For instance, to take a simplified 
example, if S is defined as the structure AB and x is 
an item which may appear in position A and y is an 
item 
which may appear in position B, ther-4 in the absence of 
any other restrictive rule, the grammar will necessarily 
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generate the complex ((x, A), (yB)). Various transforma- 
tional rules might be devised to operate necessarily 
or optionally on any part of the complex, but, given 
that a certain transformational rule is to apply, then 
the form of the resultant is a necessary consequence 
of the operation of that rule in a given context. Again, 
to take a simplified example, the phonetic form of x, 
above, might be defined in L as [fis] and y as Ldop] 
Now, given a rule that final unvoiced consonants are 
voiced in the context of an ensuing voiced consonant 
and no restrictive rule to the contrary, the final phonetic 
form of our complex will obviously be necessarily [fiz 
dop] . Now, if some semantic representation is also pro- 
vided, we can say that a semantic-phonetic complex is 
generated as a necessary consequence of the adoption of 
a particular grammar. 
It is clearly the case that no such grammar, how- 
ever it may actually be formulated (i. e. begging no 
questions about the arrangement or form of particular 
deep structure proposals), will be acceptable, unless 
the generated strings are empirically adequate for the 
description of observed phenomena. This is, then, a 
necessary condition of the acceptability of the grammar. 
The usual method of testing is to set up a hypothetical 
relation of correspondence between the terminal strings 
and the set of observablesý such that each 
terminal 
string corresponds to a non-null sub-class 
of the set 
of observables. 
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Regarded in terms of its logical relation to the 
class of terminal strings, the grammar can be considered 
as the antecedent in a logical (deductive) argument, 
whereas the terminal strings can be regarded as the 
consequents in such an argument. These consequents are 
usually known as the predictions or derived hypotheses 
of the system. From this it is obvious that the vali- 
dity of the derived hypotheses is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of the validity of the grammar, 
i. e. a transformational-generative grammar makes use 
of a reductive method of testing, insofar as its vali- 
dity depends on the extensional correspondence of ter- 
minal strings and (idealised) data. The methodology 
involved is that of testing the hypothetical relation 
of correspondence between the derived hypotheses and 
the class of observables. 
The reductive framework for the testing of genera- 
tive descriptions has been described most often and 
9 
most clearly by Shaurnjan, ttough the method has been 
described and used by many others also (as we shall see). 
For our present purposes, the exposition of 
the 
hypothetico-deductive approach combined with a reductive 
method of testing given by Shaumjan will suffice 
to 
show how these techniques have been set up 
by linguists. 
Shaumjan begins with a comparison of "the genetic 
(or 
constructive)" and the "axiomatic" 
10 
methods of constructing 
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scientific systems. He tells us, "a generative device 
is a mathematical system based 11 on the genetic method". 
"Axiomatic methods" are said to be typically concerned 
with "classification" or "taxonomy". Shaumjan goes on 
12 to explain this distinction further by quoting Kleene, 
as follows ; 
11 'With the axiomatic method the set of objects in 
relation to which the theory is constructed is not taken 
as given. What is taken as given is a certain system of 
statements describing a certain set of objects and a 
system of logical operations on the statements of the 
theory. 
"'The genetic approach takes as its starting point 
certain given objects and a certain system of permissible 
operations on the objects. In the genetic theory the 
process of reasoning is represented as mental experi- 
mentation with objects which are taken as actually 
given. 11,13 
What Shaumjan presumably has in mind is the dis- 
tinction between so-called "taxonomic" linguistic des- 
criptions , which typically 
determine the set of des- 
criptive entities, roughly speakingg by the application 
of a descriptive theory and transformational-generative 
descriptions which do not, in principleg presuppose 
any 
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prior establishment of the descriptive entities. 
Shaumian tells us ; 
"In each generative device the following three 
components must be distinguished : 
(1) A set of elementary grammatical objects from which 
complex objects are generated. 
(2) A set of operations which apply to the elementary 
grammatical objects and serve to generate the complex 
grammatical objects. 
A set of structural specifications which are given 
to each complex grammatical object generated (in this 
way a hierarchy of generated, complex, grammatical 
objects is set up) . it 
14 
One can see that this outline of the "genetic" or 
"generative" approach accords with the general strategy 
of reductivists given above. It is obvious that, if the 
initial objects of the descriptive system are given , týe 
only mears of testing the adequacy of the description 
available is to examine the empirical adequacy of the 
generated complex entities. As we have said above, 
this 
is because no direct method of testing the initial 
in- 
ductive class of entities or the set of structural -, --, 
tate- 
ments is available to us. If this approach 
is adopted, 
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then the generated complex entities may be regarded as 
the necessary consequents of the operation of the system. 
As we have said, this allows us to look upon the genera- 
tion of the prediction-, or derived hypotheses of the 
system as a kind of deductive argument in which the 
components (1) - (3) given by Shaumjan are the antecedents 
and the generated complex entities are the consequent,,. 
It fo3 lows that the adequacy of the generated entities 
is a necessary but not sufficient conditicn of the vali- 
dity of the system. That is to say that the genetic 
method of Shaumjan and many others is fundamentally 
reductivist in nature. From a strictly logical point 
of view, the fact that reductive testing is insufficient 
to test the validity of descriptive systems is in itself 
sufficient reason to regard this approach, however wide- 
spread it may be, as only a useful way of helping to 
determine the "projectivityll of the grammar. It does 
not help us to test the validity of any particular rule 
or object in the grammar (unless the grammar leads to 
false predictions and the cause of the falsehood can 
be traced). Positive tests merely corroborate the grammar. 
There are also other difficulties with this method 
which are concerned more with the way the reductive 
method has been construed anl used (or mis-used) 
in 
linguistics. 
The first point to be made is that 
there is often 
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a confusion of two different points of view when the 
predictions of the system are considered. One point is 
that the "predictions" of the grammar, that is simply 
grammatical objects (n-tuple3 of linguistic objects), 
cannot be empirically true or empirically falsey since 
objects do not have a truth-value. It is only by courtesy 
or as a short-hand that we can consider the predictions 
of a grammar as empirically true or false. To be precise, 
we would always have to say that for each member of 
the set of generated objects there is an empirical claim 
that the object in question corresponds to, or correctly 
models, some set of data. This point may be of a rather 
nit-picking nature but the fact that it is ignored is 
itself indicative of confused or inaccurate thinking 
and hides another confusion over the nature of the 
predictions of the grammar. The predictions are supposed 
to be the necessary consequences of a deductive argument 
and at the same time they are supposed to have empirical 
content. The point is that, as deductions within the 
descriptive system, the predictions, if validly deduced, 
are necessarily true. That is to say that the truth of 
the predictions depends, within the description, on the 
entities, definitions and operations of that system and 
on nothing else. However, if we claim that these self- 
same predictions are, at one and the same time, "empirical 
hypotheses" and thereby that the truth of the predictions 
depends on judgments of experience2 then we fall into 
self-contradiction. The reason for this is that this 
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state of affairs is tantamount to the claim that the 
predictions and the antecedent statements of the grammar 
are both a priori true and that they are synthetic,, i. e. 
their truth depends on experience of reality outside 
the description. Since a priori statements and synthetic 
statements are held to be mutually exclusive (see above), 
this position is self-contradictory. As we have argued, 
moreover, there can be no empirical evidence which is 
logically sufficient to justify the view that the ante- 
cedent statements of the grammar are synthetically true, 
although, as a system, they may be held a priori. To 
accept that a grammar is a system of statements which 
are both a priori and synthetically true would be tanta- 
mount to accepting, for instance, that the rules of Chomskyls 
phrase-structure component (and much else besides) are 
empirical truths a priori. This is precisely the position 
adopted by Shaumjan who fails to distinguish the "hYPO- 
thetical" from the "deductive" in his explanation of the 
method of testing. He tells us, 
"Logical conditions of adequacy for an explanation 
can be reduced to the following three points. 
(1) The explanandum must be a logical consequence 
of 
the explanans. 
(2) The explanans must contain general 
laws required for 
the description of the explanandum. 
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The explanans must have empirical content, so that 
it is capable, at least in principle, of verification by 
experiment or observation. it 15 
Let us observe that exactly the same position is adopted 
by Sampson who tells us, 
"A paradigm type of scientific explanation .... is 
deductive explanation., according to which the data 
are to be explained as logical consequences of premisses 
which are counted as explaining them. It is standard 
practice in science to adopt a hypothesis on the grounds 
that, perhaps in conjunction with "auxiliary hypotheses" 
which are accepted independently, it entails further 
propositions which are observed to be true. " 
16 
This type of scientific explanation is none other 
than Bochenskils reduction'' and is described in the 
following schematic form by Hempel ; he tells us that 
we can construe 
"explanation as a deductive argument of this 
form ; 
Cly c 2'********'Ck 
LI, L 2'0***-'" 
Lr 
E 
"Here C19C21.0. ICk are statements 
describing the par- 
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ticular facts invoked ; L11 L 2'...., Lr are general 
laws ; jointly these statements will be said to form the 
explanans. The conclusion E is a statement describing 
17 the explanandum-event". 
Clearly, it is a necessary condition of the adequacy 
of the explanans that E be empirically adequate to 
describe the explanandum-event. 
Now, whether this form of explanation is "standard 
practice" in science, as Sampson suggests, or not, it 
is evident that the conclusion of the deductive argument 
is required by all these three writers to be both necessar- 
ily true, from the point of view of the descriptive sys- 
tem,, and to depend for its truth on the experience of 
observable phenomena. This is precisely the inconsistency 
which arises from confusing the two different points of 
view involved in the deduction of predictions within the 
system and the testing of the claimed empirical edequacy 
of the deduced descriptive statements. It is for this 
reason that we have distinguished between calculus 
statements and the hypotheses which are formed through 
the Etnpirical interpretation of them. 
A second point, which has not been sufficiently 
stressed in liguisticsq is thatp as is obvious 
from 
Hempel's remarks, there is a distinction 
between the 
explanandum-event a6 an observable event, 
and the con- 
clusion of a deductive argument, which purports 
to des- 
cribe that explanandum-event (and others 
like it). 
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It is vital to preserve this rather obvious distinction, 
since, otherwiseq we are led into the self-evidently 
non-sensical claim that a deductive argument entails 
an observation or set of observations. A deductive 
argument entails its conclusion, which may or may not 
stand in a relation of correspondence with and model 
some observable or set of observablesq depending on 
whether or not the conclusion is empirically adequate 
for the description of those observables. This may 
seem very obvious, yet Sampson, for one, clearly fails 
to appreciate the distinction, when he says in conjunc- 
tion with the above ; 
"An important characteristic of deductive explana- 
tion is that any datum needs only one explanation. Thus, 
let E be an observation or set of observations to be 
explained and suppose H1 and H2 are two hypotheses, such 
that H1 entails E and H2 entails E, but H1 and H2 are 
logically independent of one another : then E provides 
evidential support for the disjunction H1VH 2' 
but, if 
we have independent grounds for holding H2 to be true, 
18 
then E provides no support for H1 (and vice versa)". 
Ignoring the import of this particular argument, it is 
clear that Sampson is either using the term E inconsistent- 
ly to mean both the set of observations and the 
deduction 
from H1 or H 2' or 
he believes that data can be explained 
as logical consequences of premises. 
In either case the 
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argument is to be rejected. It is obvious that data, 
as purely contingent explicanda, are not the logical 
consequences of anythitig. Conversely, one simply fails 
to understand in what sense a hypothesis, as a scientific 
statement, could be said to entail an observation or 
set of observations. It is a further danger that it 
will also be forgotten that HI and H2 are statements 
in a system, as is the deduction E, and not states of 
affairs. 
A third confusion which has arisen over the use of 
the reductive method of testing is exemplified in the 
work of Katz, who does confuse statements of the theory 
with real states of affairs. The confusion concerns the 
ontological implications claimed for an explanans whose 
consequences are unrefuted. Katz makes out his argument 
in the course of a defence of an ideational theory of 
semantics. Such a theory, according to Katz, can be 
empirically testable, but yet have no recourse to intro- 
spection. His argument is as follows, 
"When we say that thoughts and ideas need not be 
present in conscious experience and so need not be 
available to introspective observationg and furtherg 
as we would have to, that they are not publicly ob- 
servable either, we are simply saying that they are 
unobservable in much the same sense in- which physical 
scientists say that certain micro-entities and 
micro- 
processes are unobservable. We are being no more, 
or 
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less, meta-physical than they. What gives their theories 
about such entities and processes empirical content is 
that their theories connect the Postulated existence of 
such things with certain observable phenomena through 
a complex chain of deductive relations. " 
19 
Such a method of justifying the claim of unobservable 
ideational entities is open to linguistics, Katz claims. 
The method he adopts is the familiar reductive one. 
"The method is that of hypothetically postulating 
a theory within which some unobservable entity or process 
is described and related to the observable behaviour 
of public' qbjects and of empirically verifying the theory 
by checking to determine whether what it predicts on the 
basis of this relation between the observable and the 
unobservable accords with the data about the behaviour 
of the relevant public objects. " 
20 
Katz goes on to conclude that, 
"The option of treating a theory of language and 
linguistic descriptions as hypothetically postulated 
theories... permits us to formulate the connection 
between 
a linguistic construction and an idea in terms of rules 
that relate the phonetic representation of the 
linguistic 




In this way it would, presumably, be claimed 
that, if 
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the theory makes adequate predictions, then one would 
be justified in hypothesising the existence of the 
unobservables in question. 
be made in this connection. 
There are two comments to 
In the first place, it 
is not at all clear that such a complex rigmarole is 
needed to justify the notion that we must hypothesise 
certain mental "micro-entiti-es" and "micro-processes" 
relating to semantic knowledge in the brains of speakers. 
It would be quite sufficient to observe that without 
the assumption of semantic knowledge on the part of 
speakers it becomes impossible to explain interpersonal 
communication. What is at stake is not whether an 
ideational theory is possible, but whether a given 
ideational theory is empirically adequate, i. e. whether 
the claim that a given theory is ýustified as an empiri- 
cally correct account of semantic knowledge. Now, as 
we have said, reductive testing (and Katz is obviously 
advocating reductive testing) allows only for the satis- 
faction of the necessary condition of empirical adequacy 
by the predictions of the system. Since this form of 
testing is insufficient to verify the validity of the 
hypothesised micro-entities and micro-processesq 
it is 
also insufficient to justify the further ontological 
claim that these underlying objects and processes cor- 
respond to the unobservable mental objects and processes 
which are assumed to exist in the brains of speakers. 
Katz' form of testing is simply insufficient 
for the 
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claim that the explanans (representation of semantic 
knowledge) represents or corresponds to the explanandum 
(assumed mental processes and objects). The most one 
could claim would be that the consequences of the de- 
ductive system observably correspond to the effects of 
some unobservable causal system. However many times 
the deductive system proved empirically adequate, the 
system in question could never be selected as the "cor- 
rect" representation of the underlying unobservable 
process. In fact, there might be any number of such 
empirically adequate systems. One certainly could never 
claim to reveal the nature of unobservable processes 
through the inspection of the deductive system, which 
is what Katz seems to be claiming. 
c. Deductive testing 
As we have seen, deductive testing, as it has been 
described above, involves a valid logical inference 
(modus ponens). it follows that any method employing 
such a testing procedure could not be attacked on 
logical grounds. This does not rule out the possibility 
that such a mode of testing might be inappropriate 
from 
a practical point of view or that the form of 
linguistic 
analysis employing this form of testing was 
badly for- 
mulated. In this latter case it might be, 
for instance, 
that either the various conditions of 
the methodology 
lead to contradictory solutions or that 
the proposed 
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conditions were not sufficient after all (although 
they may perhaps be necessary). 
As far as I am aware, no-one has, explicitly 
defended this mode of testing in linguistics. It would 
seem, however, that various linguists have nevertheless 
made implicit use of it. It may be remarked that, after 
all, there is no need of an explicit defence of such a 
well known and familiar form of inference. If there 
are linguists who use this method of testing, then they 
are to be found among the ranks of the "Praguians" and 
"Neo-Praguians" and I. C. Analysts. Most notably, Tru- 
betskoy and Martinet implicitly rely on deductive testing. 
As we have said, if there are criticisms to be made of 
the use of this method of testing by linguists such 
as these, then these criticiSM3 are of a practical 
and not a logical nature. This is the exact reverse of 
the situation which we encountered above in connection 
with reductive testing. In reductive testing the ob- 
jections raised were mainly of a theoretical and logical 
nature. One cannot doubt the feasibility of the reductive 
method of testing. 
To explain some of the practical difficUlties with 
deductive testing, let us try to follow TrubetskoY's 
chain of reasoning concerning phonemic analysis. 
The 
22 
exposition of phonemic analysis in Principles of 
Phonology 
shows most clearly the implicit reliance on 
deductive 
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testing. and demonstrate also how this method may lead to 
23 
contradictory solutions. 
Trubetskoy begins by remarking that the phonologist, 
as opposed to the phonetician, 
"needs to consider only that aspect of sound which 
fulfills a specific function in the system of language. " 
24 
It is in this way that the phonologist, by adopting a 
particular function as his dimension of relevance, can 
arrive at a phonological constancy despite the infinite 
differences in sound substance which can be observed by 
the phonetician. As is well known, Trubetskoy adopts 
as his dimensions of relevance the three functions of 
language enunciated by Buhler, the most fundamental of 
which for linguistic analysis is the "representation" 
or "communicative" function of linguistic entities 
(linguistic signs). Linguistic signs, for Trubetskoy, 
have both an expression and a content. The expression 
side of the sign is made up, for Trubetskoyj of phono- 
logical entities. Phonological entitiesq per se, clearly 
have no meaning but they serve to distinguish those 
entities (signs) which do have meaning. Thus, phono- 
logical entities have a differenciative function, 
i. e. 
"a meaning-differentiating function or distinctive 
25 the notion of distinc- function". Trubetskoy explains 
tiveness as follows, 
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"The concept of distinctiveness presupposes the 
concept of opposition. One thing can be distinguished 
only from another thing ; it can be distinguished only 
insofar as it is contrasted or opposed to something else, 
that is, insofar as a relationship of contrast or oppo- 
sition exists between the two. " 26 
Armed with this notion of distinctiveness, Trubetskoy 
can distinguish phonological units of various types, in 
particular those which are either simultaneous or suc- 
cessive in the chain. The division between simultaneous 
and successive entities allows the following definition ; 
"Phonological units that, from the standpoint of 
a given language, cannot be analyzed into smaller suc- 
cessive distinctive units are phonemes-" 
27 
Since it is possible to establish distinctive entities 
which are non-successive but which are always found in 
conjunction with other such distinctive units ( I'distinc- 
tive features" ), the above definition is equivalent to 
that which states, "the phoneme is the sum of the phono- 
28 
logically relevant properties of sound, ". 
Having stated his theoretical apparatus, Trubetskoy 
tj 29 gives "rules for the determination of phonemes . By 
this he means that ; 
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"After ascertaining the definition of the phoneme 9 
we must now give the practical rules by which a phoneme 
can be distinguished from phonetic variants on the one 
jt30 hand and from combinations of phonemes on the other . 
It is clear from this and from the actual formulation of 
the rules that Trubetskoy intends to determine the set 
of phonemes for a given language through the application 
of his rules to the "sounds" of a language. Strictly 
speaking, perhaps, one should begin with a hypothesis 
and then test that hypothesis by examining whether or 
not it is equivalent to a valid deduction from the 
application of the methodological rules. For all prac- 
tical purposes this will make no difference, however, 
and, in any case, in Trubetskoy's day only Hjelmslev 
could be said to have been concerned with such metho- 
dological niceties. The deductive mode of testing is 
particularly evident in Trubetskoy's first two "para- 
digmatic" rules for the determination of phonemes. 
They are ; 
"Rule I Two sounds of a given language are 
merely optional variants of a given phoneme if 
they 
occur in exactly the same environment and are 
inter- 
changeable without a change in the lexical meaning 
of 
the word. 
"Rule II :! If two sounds occur 
in exactly the same 
position and cannot be interchanged without 
a change 
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in the meaning of the words or without rendering the 
word unrecognisable, the two sounds are phonetic realisa- 
tions of two different phonemes. " 
31 
It is fairly clear that these two rules are each 
other's converse and that they both take the form of 
a classical deduction ; i. e. using the above argument 
schema, in the case of, say, rule II the satisfaction 
of certain methodological conditions (A) implies a 
certain phonemic solution (B) and so, if the methodological 
condition is in fact satisfied in a given language ( I- A) 9 
then one may conclude that there are two phonemes 
involved (B). In the case of rule I the argument schema 
is exactly the same except that the satisfaction of the 
conditions (A) implies (B) that a single phoneme is 
involved . 
Now, although a commonsense usage of these rules 
would not allow it, if we stick to the letter of the 
condition, then it is quite possible to conclude that 
/gr/, /bl/, /poteit/ and /hir/ are Phonemes of English 
on this basis, since these four commute in the context 




For this reason it is necessary to set up 
some I'syntagmatic criterion" in order to establish 
the minimum successive units. It follows also, 
however, 
that the rules given by Trubetskoy are not really 
suffi- 
cient for the determination of phonemes 
but are sufficient 
only for the determination of phonologically 
distinctive 
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units . Unfortunately, the method of setting up a de- 
ductive testing procedure is inappropriate for estab- 
lishing syntagmatic criteria for the determination of 
minimum successive units. The reason for this is that 
what is required by Trubetskoy is a necessary and not 
a sufficient condition. It is necessary for the com- 
mutation test that it take place in the same minimum 
relative position in the chain 
ý3 
It follows that none 
of Trubetskoy's syntagmatic conditions could be appro- 
priate to establishing minimum succesive entities. If 
we leave aside those rules given by Trubetskoy which 
are of a more or less phonetic nature, this is parti- 
cularly evident. Rule I (of the syntagmatic criteria) 
states, for instance, that ; 
"Only those combinations of sound whose consti- 
tuent parts in a given language are not distributed 
over two syllables are to be regarded as the realisation 
of single phonemes. " 
34 
Although this rule may well prove efficacious in 
many cases, it is nonetheless the case that combinations 
of sound which are not distributed over more than one 
syllable are still not necessarily to be considered 
single phonemes. Obviouslyq it is a sufficient condition 
of establishing that a sound represents a combination 
Of two phonemes that a syllabic juncture divides 
those 
two sounds. However, one cannot say that the absence 
of such a juncture implies that we are dealing with 
a 
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single phoneme. In this case the supposed implication 
is false (it "goes the wrong way"). The situation is 
particularly difficult with affricates which are the 
usual source of the "un ou deux phon'e"mes" problem 
35 
We find that the application of Trubetskoy's rules 
leads to contradictory results. Consider Trubetskoy's 
treatment of Russian ftsj . He says, 
"In Russian, Polish, Czech, etc. , where both con- 
stituents of the sound combination ts always belong to 
the same syllable, this combination of sounds is inter- 
preted as a single phoneme (c) . 11 
36 
The determination of /c/ as a single phoneme of 
Russian depends, for Trubetskoy, on the application of 
the above syntagmatic rule I. In fact, the above para- 
digmatic rule II is also satisfied in a number of cases, 
e. g. Ctsok(AtI)j ("to click") - Ctok) ("current") - 
Csok3 ("juice"). On these grounds we would be tempted 
to adopt three phonemes in Russian, /t/, Isl and /c/. 
However, if we apply the commutation test of rule II 
in other contexts, we find that the result of the previous 
tests is contradicted ; we findq for example, 
rtsarl] 
("czar") - 
Cp sarj ("huntsman") and 
Ctrokj (11surcingle") 
- 
[tsok( At')l p1to click"). These commutations show 
C t) and Cs: j to be successively commutable entities 
in 
the chain. The fact that we do not find 
*rPts] or 
* [tsrl groups shows that Cpj commutes in 
the same position 
as Lt3 and Lrj in the same position as 
Cs-3 (i. e. the 
--- A- 
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then Cts3 can be analysed into smaller successive 
distinctive units and, therefore, cannot be the realisa- 
tion of a single phoneme, /c/. Now, if this is so, 
we can conclude that not only does the criterion of 
syllabic juncture lead to contradictory results but 
that it is insufficient to determine sounds as belonging 
to a single phoneme in the chain : i. e. here is at 
least one example where the absence of a syllabic 
juncture does not imply that we are dealing with a 
single phoneme. Moreoverý the valid deductions from 
the application of the paradigmatic rule II are in 
conflict with each other and with the application of 
syntagmatic, rule I. By applying the paradigmatic rule 
II we arrive at different phonemic solutions by equally 
valid inferences because the rule is applied to different 
sets of data in each case. It is importantg thent in 
any deductive methodology to employ a condition of "no 
contradiction" which would choose one solution over 
the other. Such a condition might choose the solution 
with the lower number of phonemes in the inventory or 
it might require the selection of the solution which 
involves the most refined analysis. However this may 
be, deductive methodologies must avoid contradictions 
in descriptions which arise from the apýlication of 
them 
to different data within the same field. 
Trubetskoy's 
methodology fails in this respect (and so 
does immediate 
Constituent analysis - as we saw above). 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
DESCRIPTIVE MODELLING AND EMPIRICAL TESTING 
IN PHONOLOGY 
-394- 
In previous chapters we have seen examples of 
theory-building and description-building. We now 
turn to the empirical testing of linguistic descrip- 
tions. The processes of modelling and testing are 
considered in great detail in order to bring out the 
interplay of the calculus and methodology of the theory, 
descriptive models and statements, data and the appli- 
cation of the methodology. 
Linguistics aims at the construction of linguis- 
tic descriptions. Linguistic descriptions are the means 
to an ulterior goal. This goal is the understanding of 
the phenomena under description. As Hjelmslev pointed 
out ; 
Nb 
"Nous arrivons a llintelligence ou a la connaissance 
d'une langue par le meme chemin qui mene a llintelli- 
gence des autres objets, a savoir par une description. " 
Functionalist linguists take it to be axiomatic 
that the description of a language depends not upon an 
observed stucture in the phenomena but on the viewpoint 
2 
from which one chooses to consider the phenomena. 
in- 
guists influenced by Saussure would be agreed 
that 'Ila 
3 
langue, est une forme et non une substance". 
These two 
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attitudes imply that a linguistic description should 
provide us with a comprehension of the Phenomena by 
stating the linguistic form which accounts for the 
communicational aspect of the phenomena under considera- 
tion. We can account for the phenomena of speech as 
communicational phenomena by a process of linguistic 
descriptive modellingý Since functionalist linguistics 
does not adopt the naive realist view that the substance 
is itself structured in such a way that this inherent 
structure can be directly gleaned from the phenomena 
by inductive discovery procedures, one must conclude 
that a linguistic description must select a set of 
appropriate functions as its analytical basis. Such 
an analytical basis will necessarily adopt a particular 
point of view through a "rigid selection of functions 
as necessary and sufficient for unambiguous description", 
as Uldall 
5 
puts it. Any such set of functions 
6 
will 
constitute a potential theory. 
A theory of the sort in question is required 
to 
meet certain conditions. In the first place, 
the set 
of analytical functions must be defined 
by sufficient 
and necessary conditions 
7 in such a way that each ana- 
lytical function is related to a methodology. 
The 
satisfaction of the conditions of 
the methodology must 
be equivalent tot or imply, the satisfaction 
of the 
conditions of the definition. 
In this way we can en- 





conditions of a given theoretical model (i. e. which 
is theoretically justifiedt not ad hoc) is directly 
comparable with the application of the methodology of 
the theory to the phenomena which the description 
purports to describe. This gives us a means of empiri- 
cally testing descriptive models, since any genuine 
inconsistency between the results of applying the 
methodology and the descriptive model will be suffi- 
cient to show the unacceptability of the model. The 
theory, on the other hand, will be considered vacuous 
(inapplicable), if it does not contain any methodology, 
since without the methodology no application of the 
theory could be made; no descriptive model could be 
theoretically justified using the analytical functions 
of the theory. 
Associated with the condition of "containing a 
methodology" is the requirement that each theoretical 
function ("meta-modelllg e. g. "is a phoneme", "is a 
phonotagm", etc. ) be operationally relatable to 
functions 
whose conditions may be observably satisfied 
by empiri- 
cal phenomena. Furthermore, it is required 
that any 
proposed descriptive model satisfying the conditions 
of a given theoretical function (e. g. 
/p/ in English 
under an Axiomatic Functionalist approach) 
be empiri- 
cally interpreted using the operations 
defined in the 
theory. These two conditions will mean 
that ; (a) on 
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the theoretical plane, there must be an ontological 
framework such that all theoretical functions are 
inter-related and that at least one function is a 
"first-order" function (e. g. "is a phonetic form"), 
i. e. at least one function introduces the descriptive 
functions of phonetics which may be observably satisfied 
by empirical individuals observed in the communication 
substance and, (b) that, on the descriptive level, all 
functions must be satisfied in such a way that the 
first-order descriptive function (corresponding to 
the first-order theoretical function) is observably 
satisfied by empirical individuals in the phenomena 
under description. 
Condition (a) ensures that linguistic theory is 
translatable 
9 into the terms of another science (pho- 
netics) such that the categories of phonetics are 
phonetic forms, the conditions of which may be ob- 
servably satisfied by empirical individuals 
(e. g. C bj 
[bilabial] 
, etc. 
). This seems to have been the kind 
of relation between linguistics and phonetics envisaged 
by Saussure, when he says, 
IlLes rapports de la linguistique avec 
la physiologie 
% "brouiller ; la relation 
ne sont pas .... difficiles 
a de 
I que 11 est unilaterale, en ce sens etude 
des langues 
Is 
demande des e*'claircissements a la physiologie 
des sons, 
10 
mais ne lui en fournit aucun. 
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The fact that phonetics now includes acoustic and 
auditory phonetics does not affect the unilaterality of 
this relation. It is the job of the notion phonetic 
form in Mulder's sign theory 
11 
to perform this connection 
between the world of speech phenomena as classified by 
phonetics and linguistic theory. A "phonetic form" is 
a class ,[ij, of '0images" such that each image is the 
phonetic model of a single speech realisation. Each 
class of images is defined by a particular phonetic 
function, or form, f. Linguistic theory now provides 
the criterion of linguistic relevance , "distinctive 
function in phonology", so that any phonetic form con- 
tracting a given distinctive function (allophone, (f 
iR dj) 
is on a different, though operationally relatedq onto- 
logical level. A "phonological form", as a class of 
phonetic forms each contracting the same distinctive 
function in phonology, tfý' R dý, is again a more abstract 
conception. Thus, in axiomatic functionalist linguistics, 
we find just such an ontological hierarchy related to 
at least one first-order function as is required. Con- 
dition b, above, ensures on the other hand that any 
phonological descriptive model is related to a set of 
observables satisfying the conditions of phonetic 
forms. 
For instance, the phonological modelq /p/, 
in English 
is related to the set of phonetic f orms 
Cpj pI 
each of which is observably satisfiable. 
It is further required that the th6oretical 
functions, 
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their definitions and the methodology be consistent, 
12 
sufficient and relatively simple. (free from redundancy). 
The requirement of consistency will be met, if the law of 
excluded middle is satisfied and if the theory is homo- 
geneous (not eclectic). The theory will be sufficient, 
if it provides all necessary functions for the adequate 
description of fields of phenomena. If the theory is 
an axiomatic theory, then the axioms must be non-inter- 
derivable and non-redundant (necessary for their purpose). 
Any phonological description which satisfies the con- 
ditions of a theory of this kind will itself be required 
to meet formal conditions of the sort outlined above. 
Most important of all, however, the phonological 
description must be directly empirical, i. e. it must 
be capable of empirical refutation with respect to the 
phenomena, when the said phenomena are considered with 
respect to the methodology of the theory. That is to 
say that there may be no inconsistency between the set 
of phenomena which satisfy the conditions of the 
des- 
cription ( the "scope" of that description) and the results 
of subjecting the describienda ( the total 
"range" of 
phenomena under description) to analysis using 
the con- 
ditions of the methodology. This relation 
between the 
descriptive model and the phenomena analysed 
by the 
methodology gives us a means for the empirical 
testing 
of the model in question with respect 
to the phenomena. 
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In this form of testing the satisfaction of the functions 
of the theory will be equivalent to, or implied by, the 
satisfaction of the methodology. Consequently, the 
results of applying the mý(§thodology may not be at 
variance with any proposed descriptive model (for the 
same phenomena), since such an inconsistency would 
demonstrate the descriptive model to be inconsistent 
with the application of the theory to the phenomena. 
The way the testing is carried out is as follows. 
A descriptive model is launched such that the model in 
question meets the above epistemological conditions, i. e. 
the model is (a) theoretically justified. (b) formally 
acceptable and (c) empirically interpreted. It is a 
necessary condition of the acceptability of the des- 
criptive model that the hypothesis be established that 
the model is empirically adequate with respect to the 
13 
phenomena and that this hypothesis be not refuted. The 
latter condition may be interpreted as follows. The 
hypothesis of empirical adequacy is maintained as long 
as the application of the methodology to the phenomena 
does not yield results which are inconsistent with the 
validity of the model. If there is a genuine inconsis- 
tency 14 between "phenomena R methodology" and 11descrip- 
tive model R phenomena'12 then the hypothesis of empirical 
adequacy is refuted. If so, then it follOW3 
that the 
description is rendered unacceptable by modus 
tollens, 
i. e. it fails the necessary condition of empirical 
adequacy. 
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This analytical procedure may be followed for all 
descriptive models provided that all meta-theoretical 
and epistemological conditions are met. We thus set up 
a notion of descriptive modelling and empirical testing 
which relates descriptive models to observable phenomena 
in such a way that valid models account for the pheno- 
mena through a relation of modelling isomorphi3M. 
EXAMPLE 
We start with the meta-theoretically acceptable 
statement, 11/ts/ is a phoneme of Russian" . We test the 
empirical validity of this statement through the empiri- 
cal testing of the model, /ts/, in Russian. 
From the theory we know that a phoneme is a phono- 
logical form. From the above calculus we know that a 
phonological form is a self-contained class of allophones 
and that an allophone is a particular phonetic form in 
its capacity of contracting a particular distinctive 
function in phonologY. It follows that for each phoneme 
there is at least one phonetic form contracting the 
dis- 
tinctive function of that phoneme. There must be at 
least one allophone of /ts/ in Russian. 
This condition 
is met; rtsj IR d /ts/* 
The model is empirically inter- 
preted. 
We now determine the complexity of 
the [tsj pheno- 
thodologY. A phone-, e 
mena by applying the appropriate me 
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is a self-contained simultaneous 
- 
bundle of distinctive 
features in phonology org equivalently, a minimum syn- 
tagmatic element in phonology. Simultaneous relations 
and syntagmatic relations 
15 
are mutually exclusive, since 
simultaneous relations are symmetrical relations between 
entities in combinations and syntagmatic relations 
are asymmetrical relations between entities in combinations. 
A phoneme is a simultaneous bundle and a minimum syn- 
tagmatic element. It follows that a phoneme may contract 
but not contain asymmetrical relations. Therefore, if 
/ts/ is a phoneme of Russian, then it cannot be shown 
that rtsi satisfies the conditions of asymmetrical 
complexes. If it can be demonstrated that [ts] contains 
asymmetrical relations, then it will be inconsistent 
to maintain that 11/ts/ is a phoneme of RussiarYl is 
empirically valid, since /ts/ is a model of the phonetic 
events we call [ts] . 
Methodology. 
To demonstrate the phonemic complexity of an entity 
it is necessary but not sufficient to show 
that it is 
a combination of separately commuting entities. 
/ts/ 
meets this condition. /toK/ ("current") - 
/soK/ ("juice") 
/tsoK(ATI)/ (11to click, clatter"). This condition 
is 
insufficient, however, because /ts/i Isl and 
/t/ may 
commute at the same position in 
the chain, i. e. they may 
be the voiceless correlates in a+ 
voice correlation. 
In Russian, this could, in fact be 




/dzoS/ ("bunker") - /doK/ ( "dock" )- /zoF/ ("call"). 
In order to resolve this problem one must introduce a 
criterion of syntagmatic relations. A sufficient metho- 
dological condition of syntagmatic relations in phono- 
logy is the reversibility of separately commuting ele- 
ments in the same Positionsq contexts and distributional 
units such that a change in the cummunicational purport 
is achieved through the reversing of the elements. 
Clearly, any hierarchical relation is asymmetrical and, 
since the relation of greater or lesser degree of peri- 
pherality with respect to the phonological nucleus is a 
hierarchical relation, the condition of reversibility, 
which shows the separate relevance of degrees of peri- 
pherality, will be sufficient to demonstrate the presence 
of asymmetrical relations. In any simultaneous bundle 
degrees of peripherality will be irrelevant. Any proposed 
complex containing asymmetrical relations will be demon- 
strated to be not a simultaneous bundle. If /ts/ 
is 
a single phoneme in Russian, /ts/ occupies a single 
syntagmatic position in the phonotagm. For 
the purposes 
of the example, we establish the distributional-: 
unit in 
Russian as containing, provisionally, 
three pre-nuclear 
positions (E(xplosive) E2 and E3) and 
two post-nuclear 
positions (I(mplosive) and 1 
2) 
such that the proposed 







("cycles per second") 
We now attempt to show that the relative peripherality 
of the components of /ts/ is separately relevant to 
communication. This is quite easily shown in the case 
of Russian, if we compare the following model with the 
one above. 
E1E2E3N1112 
Fstf010 ("into the trunk") 
00 VI er st (I'versts", gen. pl. ) 
One must conclude that /ts/ is a complex of two phonemes 
16 
and that at least two additional positions are required 
43 in Russian, E and I We thus show that /ts/ as a single 
phoneme is inconsistent with the application of the 
methodology to the phenomena. These conclusions are 







("into the drift") 
("into the member") 
(11glance") 
("wizard") 
( , wool" ) 
Furthermore, it is evident that the oppos 
ition, /t/ - /d/9 
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is suspended in the context of a following /s/ or 
/z/ and so the complex in question must be represented 
as /T + sl . The model of phenomena in which /ýs/ is 
a single phoneme is inadequate and so the statement 
that 11/ts/ is a phoneme of Russian" is empirically 
refuted. We set up a new model, /T + s/, which is 
subject to further testing. 
The actual results of our analysis are not the 
most important thing here. What is important is that 
the example shows the many complexities of linguistic 
modelling and empirical testing. In particular, we have 
seen that a descriptive statement is given meaning, in 
the first place, through the interpretation of the names 
of objects and relations it contains by descriptive 
models which are themselves empirically interpretable. 
In the second place , the descriptive statement 
is made 
meaningful through the interpretation of the theoretical 
terms it contains by a given linguistic theory. 
The 
theory also controls the structure of the 
descriptive 
models and, hence, the empirical interpretation of 
the 
descriptive statement. Furthermore, it 
is the theory 
that provides the relevant tests of 
descriptive state- 
ments through the methodology. 
In the above example, 
the first descriptive statement was shown 
to be definitely 
false on the application of the relevant 
tests. To 
-4o6- 
arrive at descriptive statements that have not been 
refuted we have to change not only the initial descrip- 
tive statement and the descriptive models which inter- 
pret it but also numerous other parts of the description. 
What we arrive at is, in fact, new descriptive models 
and new descriptive statements. Quite clearly, this 
is not the end of the process, since the entire cycle 
of testing and modelling may be started again in the 
light of any new evidence which contradicts the present 
description. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 
1. L. Hjelmslev, Le Langage, p. 29. 
2. "Bien loin que 11 objet pre**cede le_ point de vue , on 
dirait que clest le point de vue qui cre"e llobjet", 
F. d Saussure, Cours, p. 23. 
3. F. de Saussure, Cours, p. 169. 
4. See, for example, S. K. Shaumjan, Principles, 
pp. 52 - 68. 
5. H-J. Uldall, Outline of Glossematics, p. 11. 
6. The functions of linguistic theory are "propositional 
functions" in the sense of A. Whitehead and B. 
Russell, Principia Mathematica, pp. 14 - 15. 
According to Whitehead and Russell, a definition 
is an equivalence relation. A I'definiens" is a 
sufficient and necessary condition of its "definiendum". 
See Principia Mathematicaý p. 11. 
The distinction between linguistic theory and lin- 
guistic. descriPtion is as established above. 
This "translatability" is advantageous to linguistics 
in allowing an easy and obvious way of relating 
phonological models to uncontentious and 
inter- 
subjectively agreed phenomena. 
10. F. de Saussure, Cours, p. 21. 
See, for instanceg J. Mulder, "From 
Sound to 
Denotation" or "Postulats de la 
Linguistique 
Fonctionnelle Axiomatique". 
12. See J. Mulder, "Linguistic Theory, 
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13. K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 
pp. OtD - 'je. 
14. That is, one which is not attributable to any 
mistake in the application of the methodology or 
one which may be otherwise consistently accounted for 
in some other part of the description. 
15. For I'syntagmatic relations" , see further, J. Mulder, 
Sets and Relations, pp. 30 - 33. 
16. That is, we have adduced a genuine inconsistency 
between the application of the methodology and 
the descriptive model. 
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APPENDIX 
EMPIRICAL TESTING AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 
-41o- 
We have seen that the relation between linguistic 
theory and empirical testing is indirect but highly 
important. To put the matter in a deliberately para- 
doxical light, we could say that a linguistic theory 
is not subject to empirical testing but that empirical 
tests are the most important tests of linguistic theories. 
Following Hjelmslev and Mulder, we will say that a lin- 
guistic theory has no empirical content and, hence, 
the tests to which a linguistic theory is subject are 
non-empirical. That is, there are no observations of 
phenomena which could, even in principle, be relevant 
to testing the truth or falsehood of a linguistic theory. 
This is, however, not to say that the adequacy of a 
linguistic theory cannot be empirically tested indirectly 
via linguistic descriptions. We explain this as follows. 
Apart from logical considerations, we expect a 
linguistic theory to contain : a. a calculus giving 
possible linguistic types (the phoneme, the distinctive 
feature, etc. ), possible linguistic relations 
(dependency, 
constituency, etc. ) and the connections between 
the 
types and the relations (distributioný sign 
theory, etc. ) 
b. the definitions of these types, relations and con- 
nections ; C. the ontological 
levels of the theory 
and d. a methodology to test descriptive 
claims made 
in accordance with the application of 
the theory. 
By contrast we expec ta 
linguistic description '-o 
-41 1- 
be an empirical system. 
logical considerations, 
This means that, apart from 
the description must : a. 
satisfy the conditions of the theory and b. make 
claims about a specific set of data. These claims 
must be capable of empirical test. It is only by means 
of empirical testing that we can determine whether a 
given descriptive claim or set of claims is false. 
We can sum up by saying that a linguistic descrip- 
tion is a model of a theory in the model-theoretical 
sense. The description is a way of applying the theory 
to data. It relates a non-empirical theory to the empiri- 
cal world by making a model of the data which satisfies 
the theory. A linguistic model is, then, a conceptual 
intermediary between a linguistic theory and the world - 
an interpretation of the theory. 
following diagram ; 
THEORY 
Let us introduce the 













Following on from what we said above, the diagram 
adds the ideas that : a. the descriptive model satisfies 
the 'calculus' part of the theory ; b. the relation 
between the model and the theory is subject only to 
logical checking ; C. empirical tests follow from the 
methodology and the methodology is closely connected 
to the rest of the theory ; and d. an empirical test 
is aimed at the relation between the model and the data. 
Ideally, we could imagine different stages in 
theoretical and descriptive activity ; i. e., 
1. CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY 
2. APPLICATION OF THEORY 
3. TESTING OF THEORY 
CONSTRUCTION OF MODEL 
THEORETICAL TESTING OF 
MODEL 
EMPIRICAL TESTING OF 
MODEL 
The testing of theories and models involves definite 
meta-theoretical conditions (such as those discussed 
above). The requirement that a model be empirically 
testable (and that it withsatnd relevant empirical 
tests) is itself a me ta- theoretical condition. 
We 
might have a diagram as follows to show 
the relation 
between meta-theoretical conditions and 
other parts 










(The descriptive calculus is subject to meta-theoretical 
conditions but is only indirectly affected by empirical 
considerations). 
This idealisation presents, of course, only a 
simplified rationalisation of the factors involved 
-a framework of ideas which helps us to juggle the 
many variables involved in linguistic theorising. In 
fact, the construction, application and testing of 
theories proceed simultaneously with the construction 
and testing of models. Each application is a test of 
the theory. But to say this is to claim that a theory 
must be productive of empirically viable models. This 
means that we can assert the following maxim ; no theory 
is acceptable without empirically acceptable models. 
This is why a linguistic theory is not 
directly 
subject to empirical testing but empirical 
testing is 
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